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SURVEYS OF THE MEMBER STATES' POWERS TO INVESTIGATE 
AND SANCTION VIOLATIONS OF  NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 
Introduction 
This report summarizes the findings from two surveys of the national competition laws of the 
Member  States  and  several  third  countries  (Canada,  Mexico,  Switzerland  and  the  United 
States), which were prepared during the period from October 1994-March 1995.  One survey 
compares the  powers of the competition authorities of the  EU,  the  Member States, and the 
third  countries to  learn of and  investigate potential  violations of the  competition laws; the 
other compares the authorities' powers to  impose sanctions. 
The research was done by  a group of young lawyers and economists working as stagiaires at 
DG  IV, 
1 who  gathered responses to  questionnaires/ relying on national competition laws
3
, 
annual reports, secondary sources, and telephone interviews with national authorities.  Their 
findings were subsequently reviewed by  national experts or officials of DG IV. 
The Investigations Survey showed that enforcement officials may learn of violations through 
voluntary notifications of  the parties concerned, complaints from current or former employees, 
competitors, consumers or customers, information from other government authorities, press 
reports, or sectoral or other studies.  The survey results show that,  in general,  the  EU and 
many of its Member States substantially rely on notifications to learn of potentially violative 
restnctlve  agreements.  In  contrast,  none  of the  third  countries  requires  notification  of 
restrictive  agreements,  relying  instead  on  other  means  to  learn  of possible  violations. 
However, merger notification is required under the EU system as well as the systems of both 
Member States and third countries which have merger control legislation. 
Eleven of the  fifteen  Member States have  notification systems with respect to  restrictive 
agreements.  The  EU  system,  requiring  notification of restrictive  agreements  only  if a 
negative clearance or exemption is sought, has been substantially followed by seven of the 
Member States, six of  which adopted or amended their competition law since·1989.  One other 
Member State requires notification of only a few specific categories of  agreements which can 
be exempted.  Moreover, notification requirements are substantially determined by  whether 
the competition law is based on the abuse control principle or the prohibition principle.  Four 
Member  States  whose  laws  are  based  primarily  on  abuse  control  require  notification  of 
restrictive agreements without regard to whether an exemption or negative clearance is sought. 
Three Member States do not require notification of restrictive agreements. 
Similarly, like the EU, seven of  the twelve Member States with merger control statutes require 
premerger notification for  mergers ·above certain thresholds and  impose waiting  periods 
during which the  concentration cannot be consummated, or if it  is,  subsequently  may  be 
subject to  divestiture.  One  Member State requires premerger notification,  but imposes no 
2 
3 
Appendix 1 contains a list of  the names of  the stagial18s who did the 18search for each Member State. 
Appendix 2 contains the questionnal18s for both surwys. 
Appendix 3 contains a list of  citations for the national competition laws of  eacih of  the Member States and third countries. page 6  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
waiting period.  Three other Member States make premerger notification optional; one  may 
order it  under certain conditions. 
Like the EU,  which has a form for the notification of restrictive agreements and one for  the 
notification of mergers, eight Member States with notification obligations require that their 
own form be used.  Most of the other Member States' statutes specify the information which 
should be  provided in a notification. 
Other  than  notifications,  the  predominant source of information  about  potential  violations 
relied upon by the Member States is complaints from present or former employees, consumers, 
customers or others.  They also rely to  a limited extent on information supplied by  EU and 
local  government authorities.  Reliance on sectoral or market studies is  very  limited. 
None  of  the  third  countries  included  in  the  survey  require  notification  of  restrictive 
agreements,  but  all  require  notification of mergers meeting certain thresholds.  In  the  US, 
officials  rely  on  complaints,  studies,  and  press  reports  to  learn  of  violative  restrictive 
agreements. 
Competition  enforcement  officials  need  strong  powers  to  investigate  not  only  notified 
activities, but also potential violations which they learn of through other means.  The need for 
strong investigatory tools is especially acute with respect to cartels.  The investigations survey 
reveals  that  the  Member  States  have  stronger  investigatory  powers  than  the  EU  in  two 
important respects:  many  of them  have  powers  to  direct their  investigatory  efforts  against 
individuals and sanction them for  failure to  cooperate, including imprisonment for failure to 
obey  a  court  order;  and  to  use  police  powers,  including  the  possiblity  to  obtain  search 
warrants, to  support their efforts to  make on-site inspections. 
The European Commission has  two  main  tools for  obtaining evidence  in  an  investigation: 
information  requests  and  on-site  inspections.  Only  undertakings  or  associations  of 
undertakings can be  the  subject of the  Commission's investigations, since it has no  powers 
against the individual.  The Commission may fine a party which refuses to cooperate but has 
no power to use force.  However, it may turn to Member State authorities for their assistance 
in conducting on-site inspections, which they are obliged to give.  It has no power to compel 
oral testimony, demand information from individuals, or impose fines on them. 
Member State authorities generally have more extensive powers to conduct investigations than 
their EU counterparts, mainly due to their ability to compel cooperation from individuals and 
their access to  the  state's police powers. Enforcement authorities in all  Member States may 
obtain information from undertakings.  Twelve Member States allow investigation requests 
to be directed to individuals who are not undertakings,  and fourteen allow request to  third 
parties. 
National enforcement authorities in all  Member States can question individuals orally and 
request documents; in all but France, they can issue written questions; and in all but  the 
UK,  they  can conduct on-site inspections.  Nine Member States require that a warrant be 
obtained prior to  conducting an on-site inspection; three others do not require such order for 
inspection of business premises.  Three Member States allow the search of a dwelling, but 
only with a warrant.  Eight Member States provide for police assistance in  the execution of 
an on-site inspection. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 7 
The force of the Member State systems also is derived from their ability to  impose sanctions 
for failure to cooperate in an investigation.  Seven Member States provide for imprisonment 
of individuals who  have  obstructed an  investigation following  contempt proceedings,  with 
maximum terms ranging from six weeks to two years.  In addition, all Member States provide 
fines for giving false or misleading information in a notification, and/or failure to  cooperate 
in an investigation.  Such fines  may be  provided in the competition law or the penal law, or 
both, with a maximum as  high as  ECU  100.000. 
The  US  system for  information-gathering,  which  is  based on its  adversarial  regime,  is  far 
stronger than the systems in  both the EU and the Member States.  In the US,  more forceful 
discovery tools are available, and they  are backed by the full powers of the courts.  Prior to 
initiating  a  lawsuit,  government  enforcement  officials  may  employ  various  tools  of 
investigation, including civil  investigative demands,  administrative subpoenas,  and requests 
to file special reports in civil cases, and the grand jury system in criminal cases (which allows 
the  prosecutor  to  interrogate  witnesses under  oath  so  that  he/she  may  determine  whether 
probable cause exists that a criminal violation of the laws has been committed and a lawsuit 
should be  initiated).  After a lawsuit is  filed,  a full  arsenal of discovery tools. is  available, 
including  document requests,  written  interrogatories,  and depositions (oral  examination of 
witnesses).  All  responses are  under  oath.  A  party  may  be  held  subject  to  sanctions  for 
perjury.  If the  subject of such discovery requests (whether an undertaking,  association of 
undertakings, individual or third party) fails to  provide full  and complete answers, he might 
be compelled by the court to  do  so, and failure to comply would be punishable as  contempt 
of court.  In addition, prosecutors may offer immunity to witnesses to obtain testimony which 
is  useful for  gathering sufficient evidence to  prove criminal violations, such as  bid-rigging 
agreements made  by  cartels.  These differences between the US  system and  the  European 
systems reflect the differences in the strength of the antitrust tradition. 
The  Sanctions Survey demonstrates  that the  EU  and  most Member  States  are  similar in 
relying substantially on administrative sanctions to ensure compliance with competition laws. 
The EU and all Member States provide for prohibition orders against enterprises regarding 
restrictive practices and abuses of a dominant position.  The EU and all eleven Member States 
which have concentration laws provide for prohibition orders regarding concentrations.  The 
EU  and  seven  of  those  eleven  Member  States  provide  for  divestiture  of  violative 
concentrations already consummated. 
Administrative fines,  which are  provided  for  under  EU  law  for  substantive violations  of 
Articles 85 and 86, are less universally accepted by the Member States.  In particular, eleven 
of the fifteen Member States provide for  fines against substantive violations of laws against 
restrictive practices and abuses of a dominant position.  EU law does not provide for fines for 
substantive  violations  of the  Merger  Regulation,  but  5  of the  11  Member  States  with 
concentration laws do provide for such fines. 
The  EU  system  only  allows  for  the  imposition  of sanctions  against  undertakings  and 
associations of undertakings.  In contrast,  fines  may  be imposed on the  individual  in six 
Member States for substantive violations. 
Criminal sanctions do not exist in the EU competition law scheme, and only play a small role 
in that of the Member States.  Only Austria, France and the Netherlands provide criminal 
sanctions  for  restrictive  practices  and  abuses  of a  dominant  position;  no  Member  States 
provide criminal  sanctions for  substantive violations of the  law regarding  concentrations. page 8  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
Criminal sanctions are possible, mainly against individuals, for obstructions of investigations 
or failures to comply with orders in  four Member States. 
The profile of third countries is similar to that of the EU and the Member States with respect 
to administrative sanctions, except that Canadian and US law rely on the courts to issue orders 
imposing  sanctions.  All  third  countries  studied  provide  for  prohibition  orders  regarding 
restrictive business practices, abuses of a dominant position, and concentrations; three of the 
four provide for fines for restrictive business practices and abuses of a dominant position; and 
three of them provide for  fines  for  concentrations. 
However,  the  profile for  third  countries  differs  considerably  from  that of the  EU  and the 
Member  States  regarding  criminal  sanctions.  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  US  all  provide for 
criminal sanctions, mainly to combat hard-core, per se antitrust offenses, such as price fixing, 
market allocations and bid rigging. 
Statutory limits on sanctions are set in the competition laws of the EU and thirteen  Member 
States,  many  of which  are  tied  to  turnover.  The  limits  apply  to  substantive  violations, 
procedural violations, and contempt.  Limits of various types also exist in  third countries. 
Information about sanctions actually imposed is somewhat incomplete, as printed sources are 
out of date and only some national authorities provided more up to date information.  Witl 
these limitations, it  is  apparent that the highest fines have been imposed by  the Commissi01 
(ECU 248 million in Cement, 132.15 million in Cartonboard,  117 million in Poutrelles, and 
75  million  in  Tetrapak).  Of the  Member States,  the  highest fines  have  been  imposed ir 
Germany  (ECU  119.2  million),  followed  by  France  (ECU  22.8  million),  Italy  (ECU  l.t 
million), the Netherlands (ECU 1.0 million), Spain (ECU 900 thousand), Greece (ECU 38.9 
thousand), Belgium (ECU 2.5 thousand) and Denmark (ECU 1.3 thousand).  The highest fine 
imposed in the United States approach those imposed in Cement (ECU 221.4 million).  Thes'"' 
data give no  indication of the percentage of cases brought in which fines  are imposed.  N1 
fines have ever been imposed in Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
In the EU, sanctions are imposed by the Commission.  In contrast, sanctions are imposed b-
independent authorities in 5 of the Member States.  In the others, sanctions are imposed b 
the ministries or individuals appointed by them or the cartel court. 
The Court of First Instance,  and ultimately  the  Court of Justice,  have  broad discretion 1 
review the Commission's sanction decisions in the EU.  In thirteen Member States, decisions 
regarding sanctions are subject to judicial review; in Ireland and Luxembourg, such sanctioJ 
are  imposed by  the courts subject to  the normal appellate procedures.  Sanctions must 1 
court-ordered  in  Australia,  Canada,  and the  United  States  (except for  FTC  orders);  court 
review of sanctions, whether imposed judicially or administratively, is available in all thi  -
countries. 
The results of the study are presented in greater detail below, and in the attached Tables. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 9 
INVESTIGATIONS SURVEY 
I.  HOW AUTHORITIES LEARN OF POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS 
The notification requirements and other means for  learning of violations of the competition 
laws is presented in  Table lA, and actions taken by  notified authorities following receipt of 
a notification is presented in Table lB. 
Notification requirements 
Restrictive Agreements 
European Union  : In the European Union, a party seeking an exemption pursuant to Art. 85(3) 
of an  agreement,  decision  or  concerted  practice  prohibited  by  Art.  85( 1)  must  file  a 
notification,  except in  certain limited circumstances.  Similarly, a party  seeking a negative 
clearance must file an application.  If an exemption is subsequently denied, fines may not be 
imposed with respect to acts occurring after notification but before the Commission's decision 
on the notification. 
Member States : The notification requirements for restrictive agreements are similar to those 
of the EU  - that is, requiring notification only when an exemption and/or negative clearance 
is sought - in 7 of the Member States (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden), 6 of which adopted or amended their competition laws since 1989.  However, only 
Sweden and Belgium have the same rules regarding imposition of fines after notification.  No 
suspension of fines  is available in Finland, Greece, or Portugal.  Irish competition law does 
not  provide  for  any  fines;  however,  if a  private  action  is  brought,  damages  may  not  be 
awarded for the period covered by a "certificate", which is equivalent to a negative clearance 
under EU competition rules. 
In Germany, only those specified categories of agreements which can be exempted from the 
general prohibition must be notified.  -
Four of the Member States (Austria,,Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK),  all of whose 
systems are based primarily on abuse''control, require notification of restrictive agreements 
(which each defines somewhat differently as shown in the endnotes to Table I), without regard 
to whether an exemption or negative clearance is either available or sought.  Notifications are 
required in order to provide· authorities with the information needed to determine whether an 
abuse exists. 
Three of the Member States (France, Italy and Luxembourg) do not require notification of 
restrictive agreements.  In France and Luxembourg, no notification system exists for restrictive 
agreements;  enforcement authorities rely  on other means to  learn of violations.  In Italy, 
notification is entirely voluntary. 
Third Countries : None of the third countries included in the study requires notification of 
restrictive agreements. page 10  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
Concentrations 
European  Union  : In the  European Union,  mergers meeting specified thresholds (aggregate 
worldwide  turnover  of all  undertakings  greater  than  ECU  5 billion  and  Community-wide 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings greater than ECU 250 million, unless each 
undertaking  achieves  more than  2/3  of its  aggregate Community-wide turnover within one 
Member State) must be notified before the merger is consummated. 
Member States : Merger notification with a waiting period, during which an investigation is 
made  and  the  merger  should  not  be  consummated for  mergers  above  certain thresholds  is 
required in 7 of the  12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Sweden) with merger control statutes.  In Italy, premerger notification is  obligatory for 
mergers exceeding specified thresholds, but no waiting period applies; the authority may order 
suspension of the merger at any  point until the investigation is  completed. 
Notification of concentrations is  optional in France, Spain, and the UK,  and may be ordered 
in  Finland if a dominant firm  or a firm  in a regulated industry is  involved. 
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands do  not have merger control statutes and 
thus do  not require premerger notification. 
Third Countries : Three of the third countries included in the study (Canada, MexiCo and the 
US)  currently  have  premerger  notification  requirements  for  mergers  exceeding  certain 
thresholds.  Under the new Swiss draft competition code, merger notification will be required. 
Notification  Forms 
European Union  : Regarding restrictive agreements, applications for a negative clearance and 
notifications  for  exemption  must  be  filed  on  form  AlB.  Regarding  concentrations, 
notifications must be filed on form CO. 
Member States : Eight of the Member States with notification systems require the use of a 
form (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK); in two 
of these  (Sweden and  the UK),  a  form  must be used both for  restrictive agreements  and 
concentrations; in four (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the form is used only 
for restrictive agreements; and in one (Italy), the form is used only for concentrations.  Spain 
provides a notification form even though all notifications are optional.  In five of  the Member 
States which have no form, the information which should be provided is specified in the law; 
in Finland, a party can request that the authority provide it with the questions which it should 
answer. 
Third Countries : Only the US  supplies a form  for premerger notifications.  In Canada and 
Mexico, the information required is specified in the statute.  Currently, the new draft Swiss 
competition  code  does  not  contain  a  notification  form,  but this  might  be  included  in  an 
implementing regulation. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 11 
Other means used to discover violations 
European Union  : Other than notifications, the Commission relies on both formal and informal 
complaints  by  third  parties,  such  as  consumers  and  competitors,  information  from  other 
authorities,  questions  from  Members of Parliament,  press  reports,  and  sectoral  studies,  to 
discover violations. 
Member  States  : All  of the  Member  States  except  Ireland  use  employee  or ex-employee, 
consumer, competitor, or other complaints as an important source for discovery of potential 
violations, especially with regard to  cartels.  Danish authorities only rarely use means other 
than notifications to  discover violations.  The Irish Competition Authority has no  direct role 
in the enforcement of Irish competition rules.  Enforcement is  mainly through private court 
actions.  The responsible minister also may file an action in court, although not for damages. 
National authorities appear to  rely  to  a limited extent on the EU  as  a source of information 
about potential violations.  Only Austria, France and Ireland did not indicate that they relied 
on such information.  Most authorities also appear to rely on county or local sources to a more 
limited extent. 
Reliance on market or sectoral studies appears to be quite limited, as only four Member States 
mentioned this as  a source of information (Austria, France,  Italy and Portugal).  Similarly, 
only very few national authorities mentioned press reports as a source (Germany, Greece and 
the UK). 
Third  Countries : Authorities  in  all  four  third  countries  included  in  the  study  rely  on 
consumer, competitor or other complaints to learn about violations.  Canadian officials receive 
complaints almost daily.  Moreover, Canadian law provides that any six Canadian citizens may 
address  a  formal  request  for  an  inquiry  to  the  Director  of Investigation  and  Research. 
Mexican  law  and  the  new  draft  Swiss  code  explicitly  provide  that  complaints  may  be 
considered by the authority. 
In Canada, the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs may require an investigation to 
be done of a specific case by competition officials. 
In the US,  authorities also rely on reports in major trade journals and newspapers,  sectoral 
studies undertaken by  the  agencies' attorneys or economists, an inquiry  from  a  concerned 
senator or representative of the US Congress, and monitoring private antitrust litigation. .. 
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Authority 's responsibilities upon receipt of notification 
Restrictive Agreements 
European Union  : Article 89 of the EC Treaty requires the Commission to investigate cases 
of "suspected infringements" of the principles laid down in Articles 85  and 86.
4  Article 14 
of Regulation 17  provides that the Commission "may undertake all necessary investigations 
into  undertakings  and  associations of undertakings"  in  performing  its  duties  under Treaty 
Articles 87  and 89.  Following an investigation, and after consulting with the Member State 
Advisory Committee, Article 89 requires the Commission to decide whether an infringement 
exists  and,  if so,  the  Commission must  "record  such infringement of the  principles  in a 
reasoned decision," "propose appropriate measures to  bring it to  an end," and may authorize 
the Member States to take the necessary measures to remedy the situation.  However, neither 
the Treaty nor Regulation 1  7 requires the Commission to take a decision on a request for an 
exemption. 
Member  States : Investigations are  optional  in  all  7  of the  Member  States  which require 
notification in order to obtain an exemption or negative clearance (Belgium, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Sweden).  In  Belgium  and  Sweden,  each  notification  is 
investigated to  some extent.  In Ireland, the competent authority has no duty to  investigat( 
upon  receipt  of notification.  However,  a  bill  currently  being  considered  by  the  IrisL 
parliament would impose a duty on the Director of Competition Enforcement (a member of 
the  Competition Authority)  to  investigate any  restrictive practices or abuses of a dominan 
position that he suspects to  have occurred, and to  recommend to  the Competition Authoritj 
as  to  whether to  bring an enforcement action in the courts. 
In Germany, officials have discretion to investigate. 
Of the  four  Member  States  which require  notification of restrictive  agreements  (Austria 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK), the Director General of Fair Trading in the UK is 
required  to  bring  proceedings  before the  Restrictive  Practices  Court with respect to  eacl 
agreement registered, with certain exceptions.  To determine whether one of the exception 
applies,  the  DGFT may require  further  information.  In  Denmark and  the Netherlands,  a 
notification will not generally trigger an investigation. -However, in Denmark, if the notifie1· 
transaction facially constitutes an obvious infringement,  an investigation would be  initiate~ 
with the goal of reaching an agreement to modify the violative provisions and if  this does not 
lead to an acceptable result, an order may issue.  In the Netherlands, the party  may apply fo 
an exemption from a "generic prohibition," which would be investigated. 
Of the  three  Member  States  which  do  not  require  notification  of restrictive  agreement 
(France, Italy and Luxembourg), investigation of a notified restrictive agreement is require 
in  Italy  if an  infringement  is  suspected.  In  the  other  two,  officials  have  discretion  to 
investigate. 
Third Countries : Since these countries do not require notification of restrictive agreements, 
there are no inspecti9n requirements with respect to notifications. 
4 
In Automec v. Comm'n, Judgment of  the Court of  First Instance, Sep. 18,  1992, II ECR 2223 (•Automec II? the court  hE  ' 
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Concentrations 
European Union  : Regarding concentrations,  the Merger Regulation requires the Commission 
to  examine  notifications  as  soon as  they  are  received,  and  to  decide  whether  the  notified 
concentration  meets  the  minimum  thresholds  for  Community  competence,  and  whether  it 
"raises serious doubts" as to  its compatibility with the common market - that is, as to whether 
it  "create[  s]  or  strengthen[  s]  a dominant position as  a result of which effective competition 
would  be  significantly  impeded  in  the  common  market  or  in  a  substantial part of it."  If 
serious doubts are raised,  then the  Commission must initiate proceedings, involving a more 
in-depth investigation which must be  completed within strict time limits. 
Member  States : Of the  eight  Member  States  requiring  premerger  notification  (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden)  an investigation is required of 
all  notified  concentrations  in  four  of them  (Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  and  Sweden).  In 
Austria,  authorities  have  no  responsibilities  to  investigate  unless  requested  to  do  so  by 
government authorities, interested parties, or other parties specified in  the competition law. 
In  Ireland,  the  minister  who  receives  the  notification  must  decide  whether  to  request  an 
investigation or approve the  notified concentration within specified time limits.  In  Italy,  an 
investigation is  required only  if the authority suspects that a concentration violates the  law. 
In  Portugal,  the  Direcc;:iw-General  de  Concorrencia e  Precos is  responsible to  "instruct the 
case," which may  include investigation and hearing,  followed by making a recommendation 
to  the Ministry. 
Third Countries : In Canada, Mexico and the United States, an initial decision must be made, 
based  on  the  information  filed,  whether  to  request  further  information  during  a  specified 
waiting period.  If further information is  requested, the waiting period is  extended. 
In  Switzerland,  investigation  is  optional  unless  it  has  been  requested  by  the  civil  court, 
Competition Commission, or Federal Department of Economic Affairs.  Under the new draft 
code, it will  be required to  assess the effects on competition of all notified concentrations. 
II.  INVESTIGATIONS 
The powers of investigation are presented in Table IIA,  and the recipients of investigation 
requests and powers to compel or encourage their responses is presented in Table liB. 
Authority's investigation powers 
European Union  : Regulation 1  7 and the Merger Regulation set forth the Commission's tools 
for  investigation.  In  investigating  cases  under  Articles  85  and  86  and  under  the  Merger 
Regulation,  the  Commission  may  obtain  all  necessary  information  from  undertakings, 
associations of  undertakings, and the Member States. The Commission may obtain information 
either through a request for information, or through an on-site inspection.  In performing an 
on-site inspection, Commission officials may examine books and other business records, take 
copies,  and ask for oral explanations on the spot. 
Initially,  responses  to  information  requests  and  submission  to  on-site  investigations  is 
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decision, which is an order from the Commission to the undertaking requiring it to cooperate 
in the investigation.  Sanctions (described below) may  be imposed if it does not cooperate. 
Finally, the Commission may rely on the assistance of Member State authorities to complete 
the investigation. 
Member  States : The enforcement authorities of the  Member  States are  vested with  broad 
investigatory powers. 
Document Requests : In all Member States, enforcement authorities are empowered to reques1 
documents.  In the Netherlands, only the Minister has power to inspect documents, and only 
when demonstrable circumstances exist raising doubts about whether a restrictive agreemen~ 
or dominant position is in conflict with the general interest. 
Written  Interrogatories  : In all  Member States except France, authorities may  issue writter 
interrogatories. 
On-Site Inspections  : In all Member States except the UK, competition enforcement official 
are empowered to  conduct on-site inspections. 
In three Member States (Finland, France, and Greece), on-site inspection of business premise 
may  be  made  without a  warrant.  In  France,  however,  a warrant  is  required· to  conduct 
search for  items  not in  plain  view.  In Italy,  on-site inspections can be  arranged  for  the 
limited purpose of viewing and copying corporate documents. 
In  nine  Member  States  (Austria,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden), on-site inspection of  business premises may be made onl 
under the authority of a warrant or permission from a government minister.  In Austria, tr 
cartel court may order an on-site inspection.  In Germany, although a court order is generally 
required,  the  search may  be  done  without  a  warrant  when  there  is  danger  in  delay.  J 
Luxembourg, the writt_en order of the Minister is required (rather than a warrant).  Similarl~ 
in  the  Netherlands,  the  Minister  can  make  on-site  inspections  when  demonstrable 
circumstances exist raising doubts about whether a restrictive agreement or dominant positi( 
is in conflict with the general interest. 
In Belgium,  on-site inspection of business premises can be  made  following  issuance of 
mandate by  the President of the Conseil de la Concurrence. 
In Spain, on-site inspections can be made either with the consent of the party or pursuant 
judicial order.  In practice, these inspections have been made with the party's consent,  a._  ' 
never pursuant to judicial order. 
In three Member States (Belgium, Germany, and Greece),  the search of a dwelling is possil..: 
with a warrant and observing constitutional guarantees.  In Belgium, dwellings of  directo·~, 
administrators and financial officials of an undertaking under investigation may be search1 
Under the German criminal law, the search of dwellings is permissible. 
The police may be requested to assist in the execution of an on-site search in .eight Meml 
States  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  a  ...  '"· 
Portugal).  However, in Denmark, this has never been done.  In Germany and Portugal,  ... Lt 
police always accompany officials to make on-site inspections. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 15 
Oral Questioning of  Individuals  : In all Member States, competition law enforcement officials 
may question individuals. In France, questioning must be based on a request of the Ministre 
de l'economie or the Conseil de Ia Concurrence, then a judicial authorization.  In the UK, the 
Director General  of Fair Trading has  the  power to  require  individuals or firms  to  provide 
details of any unregistered agreements to which they are a party, but only if he has reasonable 
cause to  believe an agreement exists. 
Criminal Investigative Powers : Apart from the possibility for police assistance in conducting 
an on-site inspection, none of the Member States except Germany have criminal investigatory 
powers  for  conducting  investigations  of possible  violations  of the  competition  laws.  In 
Germany, criminal procedures are followed if the remedy sought is the imposition of fines. 
Third Countries : The investigatory powers under US law, which are based on an adversarial 
system, are far  more extensive than those of the EU  or the Member States.  In civil cases, 
government enforcement authorities may  conduct all four types of investigation, and private 
plaintiffs have access to  all such discovery tools except on-site inspections.  Prior to filing a 
complaint,  government enforcement agencies may  issue civil  investigative demands, which 
may  compel the  production or on-site inspection of documents,  require  answers to  written 
interrogatories,  and  compel  sworn  testimony.  Following  the  filing  of a  complaint,  both 
government enforcers and private plaintiffs have broad discovery powers as  provided in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Discovery tools include deposition upon oral examination 
or written questions, written interrogatories, production of documents or things or permission 
to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes, physical and mental 
examinations, and  requests for admission.  The procedures followed for  on-site inspections 
in the US  differ, in practice, from those in the EU.  Rather than conducting an unannounced 
search, investigators schedule an appointment to appear on-site, and responding parties arrange 
for the on-site inspection of original documents. 
A party who refuses to cooperate may be ordered to  do  so  by the court.  Failure to comply 
with a court order constitutes contempt, with sanctions as described below. 
In criminal cases, the Justice Department may initiate an investigation with the impanelling 
of a grand jury.  A subpoena may issue, requiring the production of documents and materials 
and commanding oral· testimony before the grand jury without the presence of  judge or legal 
counsel.  A search warrant also may be obtained.  Investigators from the FBI  may be used, 
who  may  utilize  such tools as  wiretaps and  "plants" (where a government official may be 
secretly  placed  to  work  within  an  organization  to  observe  whether  illegal  practices  are 
occurring). 
In Canada, as  in the US,  both civil and criminal investigations are possible.  Investigation 
powers are similar to those in the US, although in practice, these powers are rarely used since 
parties  generally  cooperate  in  providing  information.  In civil  cases,  a judge  may  order 
responses to written interrogatories or to a request to produce documents.  A judge also may 
authorize competition enforcement officials to  enter and search premises for  records when 
reasonable grounds exist to believe that this is necessary, or may order a person to appear and 
submit to  oral  examination.  A  court  order  is  not  necessary  if there  is  risk of loss  or 
destruction of evidence.  Failure to comply with court orders is punishable as contempt, as 
discussed below. 
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Recipients of requests 
European  Union  : In  the  European  Union,  the  Commission  may  obtain  all  necessm 
information  from  the  Member  States,  undertakings,  and  associations  of undertakings. 
However,  it  may  not  direct  its  investigation  requests  against  individuals.  Moreover,  no 
individual is  responsible to  provide the  answers on behalf of the undertaking or associatic 
of undertakings. 
Member States  : Enforcement authorities in all of the Member States may obtain informatic 
from  undertakings.  In  Germany,  the  law  indicates  which  individuals  are  responsible for 
providing information on behalf of undertakings, as follows: the owner of the undertaking, l 
such  representatives  as  provided  by  law.  In  Greece,  the  authorized  representative  is  tl 
individual  responsible.  In  Portugal,  the  legal  representatives  of  the  undertaking  are 
responsible.  In the UK,  individuals named in the investigation request or, if not named, ar 
director,  manager, secretary or other officer of a company, officer of a trade association, , 
individual  or  member  of a  partnership  who  carries  on  business  may  be  held  personally 
responsible. 
Authorities  in  all  Member  States  except  Belgium,  Finland  and  Germany  may  obtain 
information from individuals who are not undertakings. In Finland, authorities may direct th( · 
investigation requests only to  those individuals deemed to  be undertakings because they off 
for  sale, buy, sell, etc.  goods on a professional basis. 
Enforcement authorities  in  all  Member  States  except Austria may  direct their  requests f 
information to  third parties.  In Denmark, such requests would be made only in conjunction 
with market surveys.  In Germany, such requests can be made only to third parties which 1 
undertakings or associations of undertakings, unless criminal procedures are being followc 
in which case third party individuals also may be questioned. 
Third Countries : In the United States and Canada, an individual or corporation over whc  l 
the court has personal jurisdiction is subject to compulsory process and can be compelled to 
produce information and documents within their possession.  Non-party witnesses also can 
compelled to produce documents and to  submit to a deposition upon oral examination. 
In Mexico and Switzerland, undertakings, individuals and third parties may be the recipie 
of investigation requests. 
Tools available to encourage recipients to respond 
Favourable Treatment 
European Union  : If  an undertaking displays a genuinely cooperative attitude which faciliU  I: 
the Commission's fact finding by  providing unsolicited assistance to the Commission, it rna~ 
receive favorable treatment in the imposition of sanctions.  Such assistance may take the fc 
of drawing the Commission's attention to an infringement in which it is or was a particip< 
supplying information which supports evidence already  in the Commission's possession, o 
supplying  the  Commission with  information  without  which  the  Commission would  h 
difficulty establishing the existence of a cartel. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 17 
Member  States : Only  one  Member  State,  Germany,  indicated  that  it  may  give  favorable 
treatment to  individuals who  cooperate in  an investigation;  and  only  Finland and  Portugal 
indicated  that  they  offer  favorable  treatment  to  undertakings  which  cooperate.  Spain  may 
impose higher fines than average fines on individuals and undertakings who fail to cooperate 
in an investigation. 
I 
Third Countries : In  1991, the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy initiated a favourable 
treatment  program  which  provides  incentives  for  corporations  voluntarily  to  disclose their 
participation in  conspiracy and bid-rigging offenses prior to  the Bureau's knowledge of such 
matters.  The program thereafter was expanded to  include individuals and to  cover a·broader 
range of criminal offenses under the Competition Act.  The Attorney General has discretion 
to  decide what  favourable  treatment to  offer,  normally after consultation with the  Director. 
Moreover,  immunity  from  prosecution can  be  offered  under  Canadian criminal  law  under 
certain conditions.  The  Attorney  General  can  stay criminal  proceedings,  assure immunity 
against future prosecution, or provide "use" immunity (under which evidence provided by the 
witness cannot be  used as an  admission of guilt in a subsequent prosecution). 
In August 1993, the United States announced a corporate leniency policy, and in August 1994, 
a leniency policy  for  individuals who  report criminal antitrust activity of which the  Justice 
Department had not been aware.  Under the corporate leniency policy,  no  criminal charges 
will  be  lodged  against  officers,  directors  and  employees  who  come  forward  with  their 
corporation  with  information  about  criminal  antitrust  activity  and  confess.  Under  the 
individual leniency policy, individuals may confess on their own behalf to  seek leniency for 
reporting illegal antitrust activity. 
Sanctions 
European Union  : Regarding restrictive agreements, the Commission may impose fines of up 
to  ECU  5.000  for  supplying  incorrect  or  misleading  information  in  an  application  or 
notification,  in  response to  a  request for  information,  for  supplying  incomplete  books  or 
records or refuse to  submit to an investigation which has been ordered by decision. Periodic 
penalty  payments  of up  to  1.000  per  day  may  be  imposed  to  compel  undertakings  or 
associations of undertakings  to  supply  complete  and  correct  info~ation ·which  has  been 
requested by  decision or to  submit to  an  investigation which  it has  ordered  by  decision. 
However,  the  effectiveness of this penalty scheme to  assist in the  investigation process is 
questionable,  as  the  mechanism  for  imposing  such  penalties  is  cumbersome  and  time-
consuming,  and  the  penalty  amounts  are  not  considered  by  many  to  be  high  enough  to 
encourage cooperation. 
Regarding  mergers,  fines  of ECU  1.000-50.000  may  be  imposed  for  intentionally  or 
negligently failing to notify a concentration, or supplying incorrect or misleading information 
or incomplete documents, and periodic penalty payments of up  to ECU 25.000 per day of 
delay in supplying information requested or submitting to an ordered investigation. 
Member States : All of the  Member States impose fines  for  providing false or misleading 
information in a notification, and/or failure to cooperate in an investigation.  In Denmark, 
fines have been imposed on very few occasions, as the party in question normally will produce 
the requested information after negotiating with the Competition Council. page 18  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition lav 
The level of fines  for obstruction of an investigation is specified in some Member States, ,  / 
follows:  Belgium, BF20.000-lmillion (ECU 512-25.610);  France, FF 50.000 (ECU 7:595, 
Germany,  penalty  payments of up  to  OM  2.000  (ECU  1.055)  and  criminal  fines  of up to 
OM 50.000  (ECU  26.370);  Greece,  ORG  5-30  million  (ECU  16.890-101.300)  for  nor 
notification, ORG 1.000-1 million (ECU 3-3.378) for obstruction of  an investigation, and pen _ 
sanctions  of at  least  ORG  1  million  (ECU  3.378)  for  the  first  offense,  twice  that  for 
succeeding offenses;  Ireland, criminal fines of up to Ir£1.000 (ECU 1.247);  Italy, up toIL : 
million (ECU 24.91 0) for refusal or failure to supply information or documents, and up to L 
100  million (ECU 49.810) for  supplying incorrect or misleading information;  Luxembour-
LF  2.505  to  10.000 (ECU 64-256)  ;  the Netherlands, up  to  NLG 50.000 (ECU 6.681) £ 
individuals,  and  up  to  NLG  100.000  (ECU  13.360)  for  undertakings;  Portugal,  Escud  ...... ., 
100.000-10 million (ECU  51 0-51.020);  Spain, Pts 50.000-1  million (ECU 303-6059), or p•~ 
150.000 (ECU 909) per day. 
A prison sentence also  may  be  imposed for  obstruction of an  investigation in  Finland (s· 
1  months maximum), France (six months maximum); Germany (six weeks maximum); Gree 
(three months minimum); Ireland (one year maximum); the Netherlands (six months); UK (two 
years). 
Third  (_ 'ozmtries  : In  the  US,  failure  to  comply  with  the  Hart-Scott-Rodino  premerger 
notification requirements is  punishable by court-imposed civil  penalties of up to  US$1 0.0 
(ECU 8.009)  per day.  For contempt of court, fines  and imprisonment of up  to  18  mon1  : 
may  be  imposed.  Sanctions under the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to  meet 
discovery obligations is  punishable by  fines and could result in entry of a default judgme  . 
Individuals who willfully destroy, alter, conceal or manufacture documents or other evider  : 
are  subject  to  fines  and  prison  sentences  of up  to  five  years.  Finally,  individuals  who 
knowingly give false testimony under oath are guilty of perjury and subject to fines and pris  1 
sentences. 
In Canada, criminal fines of  up to C$5.000 (ECU 2.852) and imprisonment for up to two ye 
may  b~ imposed  against  individuals  or corporations which  obstruct an  investigation. 
individual who alters any  record required to  be produced and for  which a warrant has beer 
issued may be liable for criminal fines of up to C$50.000 (ECU 28.520) or imprisonment 
to  five  years. 
In  Mexico,  a  fine  of up  to  7.500  times  the  general  minimum  wage  may  be  imposed 
making  false  statements  or  providing  false  information,  and  up  to  twice  that  amount 
repeated offenses.  A fine  of up to  100 thousand times the general minimum wage may  b< 
imposed for  failure to  notify a concentration. 
In Switzerland, criminal fines of up to SFr 20.000 (ECU 12.480) may be imposed for failur· 
to comply with requirements to provide information.  Under the new draft code, administra  ' 
fines up to SFr 100.000  (ECU 62.380) would may be imposed for failure to provide reqm  ..  :< 
information. l 
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Court powers in  investigation process 
European  Union  : Commission decisions imposing fines  for  obstruction of an investigation 
are subject to  review by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice.  The community 
courts play no  other role in the investigation process. 
Member States : As discussed above (see section on On-site inspections, page 14), courts may 
issue warrants to  permit on-site inspections or to  permit other types of investigation in nine 
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Sweden).  In Austria, the Cartel Court, which is the enforcement authority, may issue warrants 
to  permit on-site inspections. In addition, in Greece, the court may order police intervention 
to  assist officials obstructed in the  exercise of their duties of investigation or denied access 
to  information. 
Judicial review of fines  is  available  in  thirteen Member States  which provide  for  fines;  in 
Ireland  and  Luxembourg,  fines  are  court-imposed  and  subject  to  the  normal  appellate 
procedure. 
In Spain, the courts have power to  conduct a new investigation in reviewing decisions of the 
TDC  or  the  Government.  Similarly,  in  the  UK,  the  RPC  may  summon  witnesses  for 
examination by  the parties and take the final  decision in a case. 
Third Countries : In the US, all of the powers of discovery discussed above are reinforced by 
the  courts.  Thus,  courts  may  issue orders  to  comply  with  discovery requests.  Failure to 
satisfy such orders constitutes contempt,  which the court may  sanction as  discussed above. 
Courts also  may  issue warrants  and  subpoenas.  Similarly,  in Canada, courts may  impose 
fines, prison sentences, issue warrants and subpoenas.  In Mexico, courts play no role in the 
process. ., 
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TABLE lA. 
NOTIFICATIONS AND  OTHER MEANS OF  LEARNING OF VIOLATIONS 
Notification  Other Means 
Requirement  to Discover Violations 
lnfonnation 
Restrictive  Notification  from Other 
EU/Member State  Agreements  Concentrations  Fonn  Complaints 
(IA2)  (IF)  Government 
(IA1)  (I B)  Units 
(IF) 
European Union  no1  yes2  yes3  yes  yes 
Austna  yes4  yes5  no6  yes7  no8 
Belgium  yes9  yes1o  yes  yes11  yes12 
Denmark  yes13  no14  no1s  yes1s  yes16 
Finland  no17  no1s  no19  yes  yes2o 
France  no21  no22  no23  yes21  no 
Germany  yes24  yes2s  no26  yes27  yes2s 
Greece  yes29  yes3o  yes31  yes  yes32 
lrelancf
3  no34  yes3s  yes36  n/a37  n/a 
Italy  no3s  yes39  yes  yes4o  yes41 
Luxembourg  no  no42  no  yes43  yes 
Netherlands  yes44  no4s  yes46  yes47  yes4s 
Portugal  no49  yes  50  nos1  yess2  yess3 
Spain  no  54  noss  yes  yes  yes 
Sweden  yes  56  yess7  yes  58  yes  yess9 
United Kingdom  yes60  nos1  yess2  yess3  yes64 
Third Country 
Canada  no  yesss  no66  yess7  yes68 
Mexico  no  yessg  no7o  yes71 
Switzerland
72  no  no73  n/a  yes
7~  no 
USA  no  yes7s  yes  yes7s  yes77 
FOOTNOTES TO TABLE lA 
1.  Regulation 1  7 requires notification of  agreements, decisions and concerted practices prohibited by 
Art.  85(1) of the  Treaty, and for  which the party seeks an exemption pursuant to  Art.  85(3). 
However,  it  sets  forth  specific situations  in  which  notification  is  not  required, but optional. 
Moreover, pursuant to Art. 2, parties may submit an application for certification that there are no 
grounds under Art. 85(1) or 86 for action on the Commission's part with respect to an agreement, 
decision or practice.  Fines may not be imposed with respect to acts falling within the limits of 
the activity  in  the notification and taking place after notification but before the Commission 
renders its decision with regard to Art. 85(3).  (Commission Reg. 17/62 of  6 February 1962, Arts. 
4,  15) 
2.  The Merger Regulation requires notification of mergers meeting specified thresholds (aggregate 
worldwide turnover of  all undertakings greater than ECU 5 billion, and Community-wide turnover page 22  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
of each of at least two of the undertakings greater than ECU 250 million, unless each undertakin 
achieves more than  2/3  of its  aggregate Community-wide turnover within  one Member State'" 
(Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 (Merger Regulation), Arts.  l, 4) 
3.  Regulation  17  requires  that  applications  for  negative  clearance under  Reg.  17,  Art.  2,  an 
notifications for exemption under Reg. 17, Art. 4, shall be submitted on Form AlB.  (Commission 
Reg.  27/62  of 3  May  1962,  Art.  4).  The  implementing regulation for  the  Merger Regulatio 
requires that notifications under the Merger Regulation be submitted on Form CO (Commissio 
Regulation (EC) No 3384/94 of 21  December 1994 on the notifications, time limits and hearings 
provided for in  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 published in  OJ L 377, 31.12.1994). 
4.  Austrian  law  requires notification of cartels, which  are  defined to  include  agreements: which 
restrict competition in  production, turnover, demand or price; which pertain to market behavio 
which consist of recommendations on price, price levels, methods of  calculation, rebates, discoun 
which restrict competition; which relate to the use of particular standards; or which are designed 
to  rationalize investment,  production or research programs and  distribution  methods.  Certai 
sectors are exempt, and the Minister of Justice can exempt certain categories of cartels from th 
general application of the law.  (Sec. 17) 
5.  In  Austria, concentrations are required to be notified when they meet the following threshold. 
together, their turnover was at least 3.5 billion Austrian schillings (ECU 259.4 million) in the year 
before the merger, and at least two of  the undertakings has a turnover of  5 million schillings (ECT r 
3 70.600). These thresholds may  be  adjusted by  the  Minister and  Paritatischer AusschuB  wit 
respect to certain markets.  (Sec. 42a) 
6.  Regarding  cartel  agreements,  Austrian  law  requires  that  the  notification  include  exact  an 
exhaustive details which enable a judgment of the economic effects of the cartel, in  particula . 
size and overall production in  the relevant sector and  size of that portion of the  production by 
cartel members; name of important undertakings in  the relevant market not participating in  th 
cartel (for all but price or distribution cartels); and information on relations with existing cartel 
(Art. 60) 
Regarding concentrations, the law requires that notification include exact and exhaustive detai 
which enable a judgment of the economic effects of a concentration in which a dominant position 
may  arise or  be  strengthened, including  details  about:  the  structure of the  new  undertakit 
created; each participating enterprise, including ownership and group relationships, and turnov 
relating to goods and services during the previous financial year; market share of  each participating 
enterprise;  market structure in  general, and in  relation to the media, information relating to tt 
possible effect on choice.  (Art. 68a)  · 
7.  The  Austrian  competition  authority  considers  complaints  made  by  government  authoritie 
interested parties, and other parties specified in  the competition law.  (Arts. 8a,  25, 3 7) 
8.  Upon order of the Cartel Court (when considering a specific case) or the Ministry of Justice, the 
Paritatische AusschuB,  which consists of industrial social  partners, delivers an  expert opinio 
concerning the competitive situation in  specified economic sectors.  (Sec. 112) 
9.  In  Belgium, notification of agreements, decisions, and  concerted practices which constitute 
restriction of  competition, as set forth in Art. 2, para. 1, is required when an exemption or negati
1 
clearance is  sought.  (Art. 7,  para. 1) 
l 0.  In Belgium, concentrations in  which the total turnover of the concerned enterprises exceeds B 
1 million (ECU 25.370), and where they together control more than 20% of  the relevant market, 
must be notified.  (Art. 11)  Until the Consei1 renders a decision on the notified concentration, tl 
enterprises concerned may  not  take  measures which  make  the  concentration  irreversible, ' t 
! 
·, 
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permanently change the structure of the market.  Within one month of notification, the Conseil 
may decide which measures satisfy these qualifications. 
11.  Belgian authorities consider complaints by both consumers and competitors. 
12.  Belgian authorities consider information from both EU and local governments. 
13.  Danish competition law is based on the abuse control principle.  Accordingly, the purpose of the 
notification requirement is  to  ensure transparency so  that it  may  be  determined whether abuses 
have occurred.  No exemptions exist under the law.  Notification is  required of "agreements and 
decisions by  which  a dominant influence is  exerted or may  be  exerted on  a certain market." 
Notification must be made within 14 days ofthe conclusion of  the agreement or decision.  Receipt 
of the notification does not constitute acceptance.  (Sec. 5( l )) 
14.  Denmark does not have a merger control statute. 
15.  The Danish Competition Council does not  require use of any particular form  for  notifications. 
Written agreements must be submitted.  Decisions and concerted practices must be evidenced by 
dated transcript from  ledgers or similar documentation.  (Notice from the Competition Council, 
1.2.90) 
16.  The  Danish  Competition  Council  very  rarely uses  means  other  than  notification to  discover 
violations.  However, it sometimes learns of cases on the basis of complaints or referrals from 
other authorities or the EU.  It keeps a record of  such cases, but does not always investigate them. 
17.  In  Finland,  undertakings must  notify  prohibited restrictive agreements, which  include  certain 
specified horizontal and vertical agreements, for which they seek an exemption.  (Sec. 19) 
18.  The  Finnish  Office of Free Competition may order notification by  an  undertaking holding  a 
dominant position,  or an  undertaking in  a regulated industry,  of any contract concerning  the 
purchase of a majority holding, or other acquisition of a firm.  (Sec. 11,  para. 2) 
19.  In  Finland,  if a  party wishes  to  notify  a  cartel, it  may  request  a  list of questions  from  the 
Authority.  The questions which would be provided by the Authority concern the parties, the type 
of  restriction, market shares, competitors, efficiency  enhancing effects, etc. Alternatively, the party 
may file a notification without first obtaining the list of questions.  In either case, the Authority 
may thereafter seek further information.  (Sec. 10, 20) 
20.  Finnish authorities consider Information from EU, county and local governments. 
21.  in  France, neither a  voluntary nor an obligatory system of notification exists  with  respect to 
restrictive agreements.  Rather, violative restrictive agreements are detected by investigators of  the 
Conseil de  Ia  Concurrence based  on their sectoral investigations  and  review of competitive 
indicators,  and consumer and competitor complaints. (1986 Ordonnance, Art. 45) 
22.  In France, notification of mergers is optional.  Concentrations not more than 3 months old may 
be notified to the Minister of  Economy.· A notification may include proposed undertakings. (1986 
Ordonnance, Art. 40) 
23.  France does not have a merger notification form.  However, the law specifies five categories of 
documents which should be included with the notification (a copy of  the agreement, a list of  the 
parties and their affiliates, their annual reports and market shares for the last three years, a list of 
the principle concentration transactions consummated by the parties over the last three years, and 
information regarding subsidiaries of  the parties).  (Decret du 29 decembre 1986, Art. 28) page 24  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national com~  &a-s 
24.  In  Germany, only  those  specified categories of agreements which  can  be  exempted  from the 
general prohibition must be  notified. (GWB 2-6) 
25.  In Germany, concentrations satisfying certain threshold requirements must be  notified under the 
GWB.  Below these thresholds, there  is  no  notification requirement and  no  control exe:r.::iz.ed. 
(GWB  Sec.  23)  Within  one  month  of  receipt  of  the  completed  notification,  if  the 
Bundeskartellamt notifies the parties that it  intends to  investigate further, then it  must re:Jder a 
decision within  four months of receipt of the notification, during which the merger rna~ not be 
consummated.  If, however, it  does not so  notify the parties within one month, then the merger 
may be  consummated without further delay.  (GWB Sec. 24a) 
26.  In Germany, the information which must be provided regarding those restrictive agreements -,.nich 
must be notified is set forth in the law.  The entire agreement, signed by the parties and cont.aming 
their addresses and the addresses of their representatives, must be provided to authorities.  1 G \\  ~. 
Sec. 9) 
Regarding concentrations, the  information  which  must  be  provided  includes  the  fonn  of the 
concentration, the addresses of the parties, the nature of their business, their market shares and 
how they are calculated, the  number of employees, turnover, and if the transaction invoh es the 
purchase of shares, the number of shares being purchased and the total amount of shares held b) 
the purchaser.  (GWB, Sec. 23(5)) 
27.  German authorities consider all  complaints, and  in  particular those  made  by  present or former 
employees, consumers and customers to discover violations.  · 
28.  The Bundeskartellamt considers Information received from the EU  or from the Landeskartellamt, 
and information from  press reports. 
29.  Under Greek law, parties must notify agreements, decisions and concerted practices within 30 days 
from the date of their conclusion when they seek an exemption or negative clearance.  (Law 703 
of 1977,  Art.  21;  Act 2296/95,  Art.  5,  para. 2,  Art.  10,  Art.  11)  The  provision  for  negative 
clearance was  reinstated  by  Act  2296/95,  Art.  4,  para.  8.  Notified  agreements are  deemed 
provisionally valid during the  period between notification and  a decision  by the  Competition 
Committee.  (Ibid., Art. 23) 
30.  In Greece, all concentrations must be notified within one month from their realization except when 
less than 10% of the market share in the relevant market will be affected by the concentration, or 
the aggregate turnover of all firms involved does not exceed ECU 10 million.  (Law 703/77, Art. 
4a;  Act 2296/95, Art. 2,  para. 2)  Every concentration where the  market share in  the relevant 
market is  at least 25%, or the aggregate turnover of all firms involved exceeds ECU 50  million 
is  subject to pre-merger control procedures.  (Law 703/77, Art. 4b; Act 2296/95, Art. 2, para. 3) 
Such concentrations must be notified within ten working days of the conclusion of the agreement 
or the announcement of the public bid,  or the acquisition of a controlling interest.  Within two 
months  of notification,  the  Competition  Commission  may  issue  a  decision  prohibiting  the 
concentration from being effected, or allowing it under specified conditions.  If a decision is  not 
rendered within  this  time  limit,  the  merger is  deemed approved.  (ld., Art.  4c)  The merger 
cannot be  put into effect before the Minister's decision or expiration of the time limits, and if it 
has been, it  may be divested or other measures may be taken.  (Id., Art.  4d) 
3 I.  Under Greek law, there is a notification form for restrictive agreements but not for concentrations. 
However, a concentration may be notified using the restrictive agreements notification form until 
a notification form for mergers is  introduced.  (Law 703/77, Art. 4a; Act 2296195, Art. 2, para 
2)  A notification must include the following information:  the business name of  all participating 
undertakings and the documents incorporating the relevant agreement or decision.  (Law 703/77' 
Art. 22; Act 2296/95, Art.  5,  para. 3) Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 25 
32.  Greek public servants, servants of public law entities, and employees of public undertakings are 
obliged  to  notify  the  Competition  Committee of any  information  they  obtain  by  any  means 
concerning infringements of the law pertaining to  prohibited restrictive practices.  Failure to do 
so is  punishable by imprisonment of up to six months or a fine of DRG 100.000-500.000.  (Law 
703/77, Art. 4a; Act 2296/95, Art. 2, para. 2) 
Greek competition officials utilize information from  EU and local government officials, as well 
as from the daily press, to  learn about possible violations. 
33.  The information provided herein regarding Ireland is based on the  1991  act.  However, Ireland is 
currently considering modifications to this statute.  Thus, information as to  what the rules would 
be under the revised statute also is  provided. 
34.  Under Irish law, agreements, decisions, or concerted practices must be notified to the Competition 
Authority if a party seeks a "certificate" (corresponding to  a negative clearance under Art. 85  of 
the EU Treaty) or a "license" (corresponding to an exemption under Art. 85(3) of the EU Treaty). 
(1991 Act, Sec. 7(1 ))  Otherwise, notification is voluntary.  Notification does not lead to immunity 
from fines since there are no  fines under the 1991  Act, but notification does clarify the status of 
the agreement.  If an  action is  subsequently brought by a private plaintiff, a court may annul a 
certificate, but no damages may be  awarded for the period covered by  a certificate.  ( 1991  Act, 
Sec. 6(6)) 
35.  In Ireland, each enterprise involved in a proposed merger meeting specified thresholds must notify 
the Minister for Industry and Commerce in  writing before implementation.  ( 1978  Act, Sec. 5) 
The Minister has three months from the date of notification in which to decide on the legality of 
the proposed merger.  (Id., Sec. 6)  Until the three month period has elapsed or the Minister states 
that no prohibition order will be imposed (whichever is earlier), title to any shares/assetsconcerned 
in  the merger shall not pass.  (ld., Sec. 3) 
36.  Under Irish law, form CIA must be used to notify restrictive agreements.  For mergers, no form 
exists.  The 1978  Act merely states that notification must be  in  writing and must "provide full 
details." 
37.  The Irish Competition Authority has no incentive to discover violations given that it has no power 
to fine companies for violations.  The emphasis in the 1991  Act is  on private enforcement. 
38.  Under Italian law,  notification of restrictive agreements is  optional.  (Law  n.  287,  Art.  13, 
10.10.90) 
39.  Under Italian law, concentrations must be notified when the turnover exceeds IL 586 billion (ECU 
298,1  million)  for the  combined undertakings, or IL 58  billion  (ECU 29,5  million)  for  the 
undertaking to be acquired.  (Art. 16)  After review of  the information in a completed notification 
or otherwise learning of a concentration, if the Authority believes that the concentration may be 
prohibited,  it must open  an  investigation within  30  days.  (Art.  16)  During this  period, the 
concentration is not prohibited from being consummated, but if the authority has doubts, it may 
ask the parties to suspend the execution of the transaction until the investigation is  completed. 
(Art. 17) 
40.  Under Italian law,  interested parties, including consumer groups, may inform the Authority of 
possible violations. (Lawn. 287, Art.  12) 
41.  Under Italian law, public bodies may inform the Authority of possible violations.  (Lawn. 287, 
Art. 12)  The Authority .also can proceed ex officio or at the request of  the Minister of Industry 
with investigations of  a general nature "in economic sectors where the development of  commerce, 
the  fluctuations of prices or-other circumstances imply  that competition  is  being prevented, page 26  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
restricted or distorted."  (Art. 12)  In addition,  if  a case has only national importance, the EU may 
inform the Authority or suspend an  investigation while the Authority investigates. 
42.  Luxembourg does not have a merger control statute. 
43.  In  Luxembourg,  consumer  and  competitor  complaints  are  considered  by  the  Ministre  de 
L'Economie.  Complaints received and investigations performed by the Service de Ia Concurrence, 
des Prix et de Ia  Protection des Consommateurs also are used by the Minister. 
44.  Dutch competition law is  based, in  principle, on abuse control.  A prohibition may be imposed 
against an agreement which the Minister believes to be contrary to the "general interest."  (WEM, 
Arts.  19,  24)  Thus, notifications are required so that this determination can be made.  Negative 
clearances do not exist under the  law,  but exemptions are available.  In  practice, following a 
notification, the Ministry will inform the parties when an agreement is considered to be within the 
scope of the generic prohibitions and whether an exemption is possible.  Until a formal exemption 
is  granted, an agreement falling under the generic prohibitions is  void and forbidden. 
45.  The Netherlands does not have a merger control statute. 
46.  In the Netherlands, separate forms exist for notifications and for exemption applications.  (WEM, 
Sec. 9g,  12) 
4  7.  Netherlands authorities consider consumer and competitor complaints. 
48.  Netherlands authorities consider Information from the EU and local governments, as well as other 
reliable sources. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
Under Portugese law, a restrictive agreement may be notified in  order to obtain an exemption or 
negative  clearance, but  notification  is  not  required.  (DL  371/93,  Arts.  5.2)  In  practice, 
exemptions may be granted even if the agreement has not been notified. 
Under Portugese law, if turnover of all the undertakings involved exceeds 30 million contos, net 
of taxes, or if market shares of  the merging companies in the relevant national market will exceed 
30%  after the  concentration, then  notification  of the  concentration  is  required  before  it  is 
consummated.  (DL 371193,  Art. 7)  Upon receipt of the notification, the DGCP must make a 
recommendation to the Minister within 40 days of the notification, who must ~ither authorize it 
or pass it on to the Conselho Da Concorrencia for further in_vestigation within 50 days from the 
date of notification, who must complete the investigation and make a  recommendation to the 
minister within 30 days, who must authorize, prohibit or impose conditions on the merger within 
15  days.  If, during this period, the merger was consummated, the Minister may order divestiture 
or other measures.  (Id., Arts. 31-34) 
Portugese law requires the following  information to  be included in  a  notification regarding a 
restrictive agreement:  identification of  the  undertakings or associations of  undertakings notifying 
or taking part in  the agreement;  the position of each in the relevant market;  specified essential 
elements of  the content of  the agreement,  including provisions affecting prices, production level, 
division of markets, discrimination, restricting economic freedom; proof that the purpose of the 
agreement is not to restrict competition; and justifications for why an exemption should be granted. 
(Portaria No. 1097/93, 29 de Outubro, Art. 3) 
Regarding concentrations, the  following  information must  be  provided:  identification of the 
individuals  and  undertakings taking  part in  the  concentration, legal  form  and  nature of the 
concentration, nature of goods  and  services provided;  companies  having  interdependence or 
subordinate relations with the parties; market shares after the concentration and criteria for their 
determination; turnover in Portugal of  the parties and the companies with which the parties have 
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and suppliers; and other information needed to determine effect on competition.  (DL 371193, Art. 
30) 
52.  Under Portugese law, the Direcyiio-Geral de Concorrencia e Precos can learn about a restrictive 
practice by any means.  (DL 371/93, Art. 22)  In practice, this includes consumer and competitor 
complaints,  as well as from doing general market studies for various sectors of the economy. 
53.  All  public administration services are required to  inform the Direcyiio-Geral de Concorrencia e 
Precos of any infringement of which they become aware.  (Art. 22(2)). 
54.  Spanish law requires notification of prohibited agreements, decisions and concerted practices for 
which the notifying party seeks a single exemption or that an agreement be construed to fall within 
a group exemption. (Law 16/89,  17  July  1989, Arts. 36, 38.1) 
55.  In Spain, notification of concentrations is  optional.  (LDC Art.  IS) 
56.  In  Sweden, notification is  required if the party seeks an exemption or negative clearance.  If the 
notified activity is subsequently determined to constitute a violation, no fines will be imposed for 
the period from  the time the  notification is  completed until the competition authority renders a 
decision.  (SFS 1993:  20,  paras. 9,  20, 29) 
57.  Under Swedish law, notification is required of  concentrations where the total combined worldwide 
turnover of the undertakings involved in  the concentration for the preceding year exceeded SKR 
4 billion (ECU 434.4 million). (SFS 1993:20, para. 37)  Within 30 days of receiving the completed 
notification, the authority must decide whether to  investigate.  During this  period, the  merger 
cannot be consummated.  After making this decision, the authority has three months within which 
to file an action with the Stockholm City Court.  The City Court must decide the case within six 
months.  (ld., paras. 38, 39, 42) 
58.  In Sweden, restrictive agreements must be notified on form Kl.  (KKVFS 1993: 1)  Concentrations 
must be notified on form K2.  (KKVFS 1993:3). 
59.  Swedish authorities rely upon  information provided by EU authorities to discover violations. 
60.  In the UK, restrictive agreements must be registered with the Director-General of Fair Trading. 
(Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, Sees. 1(1), 6, 7,  11,  12) 
61.  Under the Fair Trading Act, voluntary notification of concentrations is  provided.  Upon filing of 
the notification, a reference by the Director General of  Fair Trading must be made within 28 days. 
(Fair Trading Act of 1973, Sec. 7SA) 
62.  The same form must be used for notification of both restrictive agreements and concentrations. 
63.  In the UK, consumer and competitor complaints are a common source of information. 
64.  In  the  UK,  local  authorities  are  an  important  source  of information  for  both  cartels  and 
concentrations. To this end, the OFT has published a booklet for them entitled "Cartels: Detection 
and  Remedies,"  explaining  the  most  common  warning  signs  of the  existence  of a  cartel. 
Moreover, investigations of  concentrations by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and Office 
of Fair Trading often reveal restrictive practices.  Other sources include the press and industrial 
publications. 
65.  Under Canadian law,  the merger notification requirement does not apply to all mergers, but only 
share  acquisitions, amalgations asset acquisitions, and combinations satisfying specified  thresholds. 
(Competition Act, Part IX, Sec. II  0)  Each party to such a transaction is required to prenotify their 
plans in detail if: (I) the parties together with their affiliates have revenues or assets in excess of page 28  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
C$400 million (ECU 232.8 million), and (2) the transaction does not qualify as a joint venture, 
exempt  from  the  notification  requirements (Sec.  112)  or  does  not  fit  within  other specified 
exemptions (Sees. 111  and 113). 
If the  transaction  does  not  qualify  for  exemption,  the  parties  must  notify  the  Director of 
Investigation and Research of the planned merger, supply certain information, and wait at least 7 
but not more than 21  days before completing the proposed transaction.  (Sec. 114) 
66.  Under Canadian law,  parties are not  required to  report information in  a  specific format.  The 
information can be supplied in short form or long form.  The long form requires more information 
on affiliates and categories of products produced and purchased.  The information which must be 
provided, includes: a description of the proposed transaction, a summary of principal businesses, 
including affiliates; the categories of products produced and acquired; financial statements; a list 
of affiliates with significant assets or sales in  Canada; and the names of principal suppliers and 
customers and the volume of business with each.  (Competition Act, Sees.  120 to  122) 
67.  Canadian authorities receive complaints almost daily from businesspersons.  The law provides that 
any six Canadian citizens may address to the Director a formal application for an inquiry, and sets 
forth the procedures which must be followed.  (Competition Act, Sec. 9) 
68.  The  Canadian  Minister  of Consumer  and  Corporate  Affairs  may  instruct  the  Director  of 
Investigation and Research to inquire whether any provision of the Competition Act has been or 
is  about to  be violated. 
69.  Mexican law requires notification of a concentration in the following specific cases:  transactions 
which  involve a  value greater than  12  million times the general minimum  wage;  transactions 
which result in  the accumulation of 35% or more of the assets or shares of an economic agent, 
whose assets or sales are at least 12  million times the general minimum wage; or transactions in 
which  2  or more economic agents are  involved  whose assets or annual  sales, added together, 
amount to 48 million times the general minimum wage, and the transaction in question will result 
in  an  additional  accumulation of assets or equity of more than 4.8  million times  the  general 
minimum wage.  (Ch. 3, Art. 20) 
70.  Mexican law requires that the  following  information he  provided: the  names of the  economic 
agents involved; the last annual report; market shares and any additional information; and a copy 
of the agreement.  (Ch. 3, Art. 21) 
71.  Under Mexican law,  consumer and competitor complaints may be  considered by the authority. 
(Ch. 2, Art.  15) 
72.  The information provided herein is  based on the 1985 Swiss competition law, currently in effect. 
This law, which is based on the abuse control principle, is likely to be replaced soon.  A new draft 
competition  law  is  under consideration by  the  Swiss  parliament.  The  draft law  is  almost a 
prohibition system, but the Swiss Constitution, which provides that competition law "may remedy 
socially harmful effects of cartels,"  would  not  permit enactment of a  law entirely based on 
prohibition.  (Constitution, Art. 31-bis3(d)) 
Information is  provided as to what the rules would be under the draft law. 
73.  The new draft competition law would provide for notification of mergers. 
74.  Swiss law provides that any interested party may complain to the authority.  (Sec. 8)  The new 
·draft competition law would  provide that the authority may also learn of potential violations 
through its own initiative, and complaints of  involved and third parties.  (Draft Art. 26 Restr. Agr.) Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 29 
75.  The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires notification of proposed mergers or acquisitions that exceed 
specified size-of-party and size-of-transaction thresholds.  It further requires that the transaction 
not be consummated for a specified waiting period ( 15 days for cash tender offers, 30 days for all 
other transactions).  (15 USC  18a (1988 & Supp.  1993);  16  CFR 803.1  (1994)) 
76.  Enforcement authorities in  the US  rely on complaints from citizens and industry. 
77.  In  the  US,  authorities also  rely  on  reports in  major trade journals and newspapers,  sectoral 
studies undertaken by the agencies' attorneys or economists, an inquiry from a concerned senator 
or representative of the US  Congress, and monitoring private antitrust litigation. page 30  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
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TABLE lB. 
ACTIONS BY NOTIFIED AUTHORITY 
Authority's  Authority's  Actual 
Responsibilities  Practice 
Authority  Decide on  Decide on 
Receiving  Investigate  Legality  Other  Investigate  Legality  Other 
EU/Member State  (I D)  (I D)  (IE)  (IE)  Notification  (I D)  (IE) 
(I C) 
European Union  Comm1SS1on1 
yes2  yes2  yes3  yes  yes  yes 
Austria  Cartel Court  yes5  yes  no  yes6  yes  no 
Belgium  Serv1ce de Ia  yes7  yes8  no  yes  yes8  no 
Concurrence 
Denmark  Compet1t1on Counc1l  yes9  yes  no  no1o  yes1o  yes 
Finland  Office of Free  no11  yes  no  yes12  yes  no 
Compet1t1on 
France  Le Mmtstre de  yes13  yes13  no  yes14  yes  no 
I'Econom1e 
Germany  Bundeskartellamt ,  yes1s  17  yes  yes  no 
Landeskarte\lamt"  yes  yes 
Greece 
D~rector for Market  yes1s  yes1s  yes1s  yes19  yes  no 
Research and 
Competition, M1n1stry 
of Commerce 
Ireland  The Compet1t1on  yes21  yes21  no21  yes22  yes  no 
Authonty, the M1n1ster 
of  Industry and 
Commerce
20 
Italy  Autonta Garante della  yes23  yes  yes24  yes2s  yes  no 
Concorrenza e del 
Mercato 
Luxembourg 
Le Mmtstre de  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a27  n/a  n/a 
L'Econom1eM 
Netherlands  M1mstry of EconomiC  no2s  no2s  no  yes  no  no 
Afffa1rs 
Portugal  Conselho da  yes3o  yes3o  no  yes  yes  no 
Concorrenc1a, 
D~recyao-Geral  de 
Concorrenc1a e 
PrecosH 
Spain  Serv1c1o de Defensa  yes32  yes32  no  yes  yes  no 
de Ia Competenc1a 
(SDC)" 
Sweden 
Swed1sh Competition 
Authority  yes33  yes34  no  yes3s  yes  no 
United Kingdom 
Office of Fair Trad1ng  yes36  yes36  yes36  yes37  yes37  yes37 
Third Country 
Canada 
Director of 
lnvesbgat1on and 
yes39  yes39  no  yes4o  yes  no 
Research" 
Mexico 
Federal Compet1t1on  yes41  yes42  no  yes  yes  no 
CommiSSion 
Switzerland  Wettbewerbskomm1s- n/a43.  n/a43  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
sion 
USA  Depar1ment of 
Justice, Federal 
yes4s  yes4s  yes4s  yes  yes  yes 
Trade Comm1Ssion
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FOOTNOTES TO TABLE 18 
Reg.  17,  Art.  I 0 requires the Commission to  transmit copies of applications and notifications to 
the  competent authorities of the  Member  States.  The  Merger Reg.,  Art.  19,  requires  the 
Commission  to  transmit copies of all  notifications and  the  most  important documents to  the 
competent authorities of the Member States. 
Art.89, para.  I of the EC Treaty states that "[ o ]n  application by a Member State or on  its own 
initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member States, who shall give 
it  their  assistance, the  Commission  shall  investigate cases of suspected infringements of [the 
principles laid down  in  Articles 85  and 86]."  Art.  14  of Reg.  17  provides that the Commission 
"may undertake all necessary investigations into  undertakings and associations of undertakings" 
in  performing its  duties under Treaty Arts.  87  and 89. 
The Merger Regulation, Art. 6,  requires the Commission to examine the notification as soon as 
it  is  received.  If the  Commission  concludes,  after an  initial  investigation,  that  the  notified 
concentration "raises serious doubts [as to  whether it  is]  compatible with the common market," 
then  it  must initiate proceedings, involving a more in-depth investigation.  Article 10  sets strict 
time limits within which the Commission must complete these tasks. 
3.  Art.  89  of the EC Treaty requires the Commission to  make a decision following an  investigation 
of a suspected infringement of Artie les 85  or 86.  If the infringement has not been brought to an 
end,  the  Commission  is  required to  "record such  infringement of the  principles iq.a reasoned 
decision," which it may publish.  Reg. 17, Art.  I 0 requires the Commission to consult an Advisory 
Committee of the Member States prior to taking any decision on application or notification. 
Regarding  mergers,  the  Merger  Regulation,  Art.  8  requires  that  following  a  phase  two 
investigation, the Commission must decide whether the proposed concentration is "compatible with 
the  common market."  Art.  19  requires that  the  Commission submit  its  draft decisions to  an 
Advisory Committee of the Member States, which must deliver an  opinion on  the draft.  The 
Commission must take "utmost account" of the Advisory Committee's opinion. 
4.  Art. 89, para. 1 of the EC Treaty states that if the Commission finds that an infringement of Art. 
85  or  86  has  been committed, "it shall proprose appropriate measures to bring  it  to  an end." 
(emphasis  added)  Para.  2  states  that  if the  infringement  is  not  brought  to  an  end,  "[t]he 
Commission  may publish its  decision and  authorize Member States to  tak~ the  measures, the 
conditions and details of which it  shall determine, needed to remedy the situation." 
Reg.  17  does not require the Commission to take a decision as to whether an exemption should 
be  granted under Art.  85(3).  However, Art.  9  provides that "the  Commission shall have sole 
power to declare Art. 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to Art. 85(3) of the Treaty." 
5.  Upon receipt of a merger notification, the Austrian Cartel Court must announce it  immediately 
in  the  official  journal.  Thereafter, within  one  month,  various  government  authorities  and 
associations,  as  well  as  affected businesses,  may  request  the  Cartel  Court  to  investigate  to 
determine whether the merger is  allowed.  Otherwise, the Cartel Court must confirm that it has 
received no  such  requests or that  they  have  been  withdrawn.  (Sec. 42a,  42b)  However,  if 
requested to do  so, the Cartel Court must decide whether the merger is  permissible within five 
months of the date of notification.  (Sec. 42b) 
6.  When there is no application for an investigation following a merger notification, the Cartel Court 
confirms the merger without investigation.  (Sec. 42a, 42b) 
7.  In  Belgium, investigations are made of notified restrictive business practices for which a request 
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(Art. 23(l)(b)).  Investigations also may be commenced ex officio, on demand of the Ministry of 
Economics or of the Council for Competition, based upon a complaint of  a natural or legal person 
with a general interest in the matter, or on demand of the Court of Appeal of Brussels when it has 
been presented with a question on a competition matter.  (Art. 23( 1  )(f)).  Investigation of a sector 
may be initiated at the request of the President of the Council for Competition (Art. 26), or when 
applying for interim measures.  (Art. 35) 
8.  In  Belgium, the  Service de  Ia  Concurrence receives notifications, but the  Competition Council 
which is  responsible to decide on the legality of notified activities. 
9.  In  Denmark,  only  if a  notified  transaction  constitutes  an  obvious  infringement  would  an 
investigation be  commenced.  An  investigation can be  initiated at any time,  so  that  if market 
conditions change, a transaction not investigated at the time of notification may subsequently be 
investigated.  Even in  such cases, the normal result is  for the authority and the  parties to reach a 
settlement to  modify the violative provisions.  (Sees. 5,  6) 
10.  In  practice, the Danish Competition Council confirms receipt of the notification in  writing, then 
briefly reviews the notifications, and in the absence of obvious infringements, simply files them. 
If some doubts arise, the Council further evaluates the market to determine whether one or more 
of the parties to  the transaction holds a dominant position.  If, after inspection, the Competition 
Council concludes that a notified transaction contitutes a violation, it first attempts to  "terminate 
the harmful effects through negotiation."  (Sec. 11)  If this fails, then it can take further actions 
such as imposing fines.  However, in  most cases a negotiated settlement is  achieved. 
11.  The Finnish Office of Free Competition will  grant an  exemption if it  finds that the restriction 
contributes to an  increase in  the efficiency of production or distribution or furthers technical or 
economic progress, and if it mainly benefits the customers or consumers.  (Sec. 19)  To make this 
determination, the Office of Free Competition may request further information.  (Sec. 20). 
In the absence of  a notification, the Office of  Free Competition or County government may require 
an undertaking or association of undertakings to submit all information and documents necessary 
to examine the contents, purpose and effect of a  restriction on competition and conditions of 
competition, or whether that undertaking or association of undertakings is  in a dominant position. 
(Sec. 10). 
The Office of  Free Competition or County government also is empowered  to investigate in order 
to ensure compliance with the Act.  (Sec. 20). 
12.  Finnish authorities inspect in cases in which it appears that the agreement may have an important 
economic effect. 
13.  In France, the Minister's silence on  a merger notification for 2 months constitutes a clearance. 
This time period is extended to six months if the Minister has transferred the case to the Conseil 
de Ia Concurrence for investigation.  (Ordonnance of 1986, Art. 40) 
14.  French authorities investigate if they believe that a proposed concentration may be  injurious to 
competition. 
15.  Under German law, the Bundeskartellamt is  competent to  investigate concentrations, restrictive 
agreements concerning crisis cartels, export cartels, and  import cartels, agreements where the 
impact of  the restrictive behavior goes beyond one country, and some other agreements of minor 
importance. Otherwise, the competence to investigate lies with the Landeskartellamt. (GWB, Sec. 
44) 
16.  German law does not explicitly create a duty to investigate restrictive agreements.  Rather, the 
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German authorities are required to  investigate notified restrictive agreements and concentrations. 
(GWB, Sec. 2-8) 
17.  The Bundeskartellamt may demand an  immediate halt or modification to a violative restrictive 
agreement, or declare the  agreement void.  (GWB Sees. 9,  12)  Regarding concentrations, the 
Bundeskartellamt may prohibit or grant a clearance.  (GWB Sees. 23, 24) 
18.  In  Greece, the  Secretariat of the Competition Committee is  responsible to  investigate notified 
restrictive agreements and concentrations, then to report to the Competition Committee, which will 
decide what action to take. 
19.  In practice, the Secretariatofthe Competition Committee investigates after receiving a notification, 
as well as  following receipt of information from other public authorities and in  press reports, or 
following research which it  undertakes on  its  own initiative or pursuant to  Ministerial order. 
20.  The Irish Competition Authority receives notifications regarding restrictive practices (1991  Act, 
Sec.  7 (I)); the  Minister for  Industry and Commerce receives notifications regarding proposed 
mergers. ( 1978 Act, Sec. 5) 
21.  Under Irish law, the Competition Authority is  under no  duty to  investigate restrictive practices. 
( 1991  Act)  The 1994 bill, currently under consideration, would impose a duty on the Director of 
Competition Enforcement (a member of the Competition Authority) to  investigate any restrictive 
practices or abuses of a dominant position that he  suspects to  have occurred.  In  additiol), the 
Director would be obliged to recommend to the Authority whether to bring an enforcement action 
in  the  courts  with  respect to  a  restrictive agreement.  However, these  duties  would  not  arise 
specifically on  receipt of a notification. 
Regarding mergers, upon receipt of a notification, the Minister must either inform the enterprises 
in  question as soon as  possible that he has decided not to  issue a prohibition order regarding the 
merger, or he  must refer the notification to the Competition Authority for investigation.  Upon 
receipt of such referral, the Authority must investigate and send a report to  the Minister.  ( 1978 
Act, Sees. 7,  8) 
22.  In  practice, Irish authorities investigate mergers which have  been  notified and  referred by the 
Minister. 
23.  Under Italian law,  in  cases of suspected infringements of Art. 2 (Restrictive Practices) or Art. 3 
(Abuses  of Dominant  position),  the  Authority  is  required  to  open  an  investigation.  If the 
restrictive agreement has been notified, the Authority must open the investigation within 120 days 
of receiving the completed notification. 
After  review  of  the  information  in  a  completed  notification  or  otherwise  learning  of a 
concentration, if the Authority believes that the concentration may be prohibited, it must open an 
investigation within 30 days. (Art. 16) 
24.  In  cases  where  the  Italian  Authority  does  not  open  an  investigation  regarding  a  notified 
concentration, it  must so  inform the parties and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts, 
and deliver its opinion on the matter, within 30 days of receiving the notification. 
25.  In  practice, the  number of investigations  initiated  in  Italy  for  concentrations and  restrictive 
-,  'agreements is remarkably low in  comparison to the number of notifications filed. 
26.  The  Ministre  de  L'Economie  receives  complaints  only,  as  there  are  no  notifications  m 
Luxembourg. 
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28.  Competition law  in  the Netherlands is  based on the  abuse control principle.  Thus, there is  no 
obligation  to  investigate or decide on  the  legality of the  notified  activities.  However,  if an 
agreement contains clauses of the type forbidden by certain "generic measures" set forth in the law 
or  taken  by  an  Order  in  Council  under  WEM,  Art.  I 0,  (relating  to  collective  resale  price 
maintenance, collective bidding for contruction projects, rules for internal discipline for parties to 
a restrictive agreement, and horizontal price fixing), then a party may make modifications or apply 
for an exemption from the applicable generic prohibition. (WEM Art. 9(g), 12) The authority will 
decide  on  such  applications  withinin  several  months,  sometimes  after  collecting  additional 
information.  All  notifications that are received are filed in  a register of restrictive agreements, 
which is  not made public. 
29.  In  Portugal,  the  Direcyfta-Geral  de  Concorrencia  e  Precos  receives  notifications  regarding 
concentrations(Art. 30.1 ); the Conselho da Concorrenciareceives notifications regarding restrictive 
practices.  (Art. 5.2) 
I  30.  In  Portugal,  regarding restrictive practices, the  Conselho da  Concorrencia can  request further 
information, then send the case to the Direcyfw-Generalde Concorrencia e Precos to "instruct the 
case," which may include investigation and hearing.  (Art. 12)  The Conselho da Concorrencia is 
responsible to decide on  whether to grant an exemption.  (Art. 5.2) 
I 
Regarding  concentrations,  the  Direcyao-General de  Concorrimcia e  Precos  is  responsible  to 
"instruct  the  case,"  which  may  include  investigation  and  hearing,  followed  by  making  a 
recommendation to the Ministry, which ultimately decides on  legality.  (Art. 31) 
31.  The  Spanish  Servicio de  Defensa de  Ia  Competencia is  within  the  Ministerio de  Economia y 
Hacienda. 
32. 
33. 
Regarding restrictive practices in  Spain, upon receipt of a notification, the SOC investigates and 
sends the case with a proposed disposition to the TDC.  The TDC conducts a further investigation 
and issues a final decision within 20  days of receipt of the file.  (LDC, Arts. 31-44) 
Regarding concentrations, upon receipt of a notification, the SOC must investigate and prepare an 
advisory note  for the Minister.  Within one  month  of the date the  notification was  filed,  the 
Minister will either take no action,. in which case the concentration is deemed to be permitted, or 
send the case to the TDC for further investigation.  In the latter scenario, the TDC will prepare 
a non-binding decision, which is sent to the Minister, who forwards it to the government, which 
issues a final decision within three months of receipt of the file.  (LDC Arts. ·15  --34; Rg., Arts. 
3-15) 
The Swedish Competition Authority shall review the information contained in  a notification in 
order to determine whether a negative clearance or exemption should be granted.  (SFS 1993:20, 
paras. 8, 9, 20) 
The Swedish Competition Authority may initiate a special investigation concerning a  notified 
concentration within 30 days of receiving the completed notification.  During this period, the 
concentration cannot be consummated.  (SFS 1993:  20, para. 38) 
34.  Regarding restrictive agreements, the Swedish Competition Authority decides whether to grant a 
negative clearance or exemption.  The decision of  the Authority to grant a negative clearance does 
not prevent a private action.  The decision of  the Authority should specify the date from and until 
which the exemption applies. (SFS 1993:20, para. 10) 
Regarding concentrations, the Swedish Competition Authority must decide within 30 days of 
receiving a completed notification  whether it objects. If  it does, it can bring an action before the 
Stockholm City Court.  A decision not to oppose may be changed if the Authority subsequently 
learns that  the  information  provided  in  the  notification  was  incorrect.  (ld., para.  40)  The page 36  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
Stockholm City Court must decide the case within six months.  (Id., para. 42)  The Authority may 
ask the City Court to enjoin the consummation of the concentration for this entire period.  (Id., · 
para. 41) 
35.  The new Swedish competition law, which is  substantially the same as  EU  competition law, has 
only  been effective since 01.07.93. Therefore, Swedish authorities thus  far have little practical 
experience.  However, the practice has been to  investigate when there is  a clear need to do so. 
36.  In  the  UK,  the  Director General of Fair Trading  is  required to  bring  proceedings before the 
Restrictive Practices Court with respect to each agreement registered, except: where the European 
Commission has  granted an  exemption pursuant to  Art.  85(3)(RTPA Sec. 21(1)(a); where the 
agreement or restriction has been term ina  ted (R  TP  A Sec. 21 (I )(b); or where the DGFT opines that 
the restrictions are insignificant, and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry agrees.  (RTPA 
Sec. 21(2)) 
37.  In the UK, proceedings before the Restrictive Practices Court are opened only rarely.  The normal 
procedure is  that  when  the  DGFT  is  not  satisfied that the  agreement falls  under one  of the 
exceptions discussed in note 36 supra, he sends the parties a letter informing them that proceedings 
will be brought before the RPC, which normally results in the parties amending the agreement to 
bring it  into conformance with the law. 
3 8.  A "notifiable transactions unit" has been established within the Mergers Branch of  Canada's Bureau 
of  Competition.  Before filing, parties are encouraged to contact the unit with questions c9ncerning 
interpretation  of the  provisions,  whether  a  short  form  or  long  form,  or  the  nature  of the 
information which should be provided. 
39.  The Canadian Director of Investigation and Research must commence an  investigation whenever 
he has reason to believe that an offence has been or is about to be committed, or that grounds exist 
for the Tribunal to make an order respecting reviewable matters, such as a proposed merger.  (Sec. 
1  0) 
The officer assigned to the case must decide, based on the information filed, whether the notified 
transaction raises an issue.  If not, the merger can be completed without further investigation after 
the waiting period.  If  so, the -parties are contacted, usually within the 21  day waiting period, and 
advised of the director's concerns.  The merger branch undertakes a more in-depth investigation. 
Analysis of complex mergers may take longer than 21  days.  In such cases, parties normally will 
delay completion of the transaction until the Director has completed the investigation. 
40.  Canadian Bureau officials often visit and inspect the facilities of  the merging parties and will seek 
clarification of the written materials it has received by interviewing the appropriate personnel and 
experts.  Moreover, to verify the information provided by the parties and to form an independent 
view  of whether  the  merger is  likely  to  result  in  a  substantial  prevention  or  lessening  of 
competition, the Bureau staff normally contacts third parties (including federal and provincial 
government  departments  and  agencies  which  have  prepared  industry  studies,  customers, 
competitors and suppliers) for  their views.  The Bureau may also contact foreign  government 
sources or foreign third parties. 
Parties generally cooperate in  providing information requested and allowing sufficient time for 
authorities to conduct a complete assessment of the merger's impact. 
"41.  In  Mexico,  the  Competition  Commission  may  request additional  information  or  documents 
regarding a notified merger within 20 days of receipt of the notification.  (Ch. 3, Art. 21) 
42.  The Mexican Competition Commission must decide whether to prohibit a merger within 45  day 
of receipt of the completed notification and any  additional documents requested.  A  reasoned 
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decision must be  issued within this time limit.  Silence will be deemed to be approval.  (Ch. 3, 
Art. 21) 
43.  Under the draft law, the Wettbewerbskommission would be required to determine the effects on 
competition of a notified concentration.  If it does not create or augment a dominant position, or 
if it improves competition in other markets in compensation for creating or augmenting a dominant 
position, the concentration will be cleared.  (Draft Art.  1  0) 
The Secretary (the permanent body of the competition authority) would be obliged to  open an 
investigation  procedure if the  civil  court, competition commission,  or  Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs asks  for  it.  In  other cases, the decision to  open  an  investigation would  be 
discretionary.  (Draft Art. 27) 
44.  Notifications must be filed with both the United States Deparment of  Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission.  (15 USC  18A) 
45.  Under the Hart-Scott-RodinoAct, the Department of  Justice (DoJ) and Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) may, before the end of the relevant waiting period, make a "second request" - i.e., request 
additional information concerning a transaction.  The waiting period would thereby be extended 
to a specified number of days after receipt of material required by  the second request.  ( 15  USC 
18a(e)(l988))  Thereafter, the DoJ or FTC may approve the merger or file an  action in  federal 
district court for an order enjoining the consummation of the merger.  (15 USC 45, 53(b))  If the 
federal  court  declines  to  enjoin  the  merger,  it  may  still  thereafter  be  subject  to  an  FTC 
Administrative proceeding, following which the FTC may issue an order for divestiture,  subject 
to judicial review.  (15  USC 2lb, 45b)  Moreover, the  government and  the parties may enter 
consent decrees, which are final settlements, subject to court determination that such decree will 
be in  the "public interest" before it  is  entered.  (PL 93-528) page 38  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 39 
TABLE IIA. 
INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION 
Authority 
Empowered to 
Investigate  Authority~  Powers of  Investigation 
Within  Issue Written  Issue  Make On-Site  Question  Criminal 
EU/Member State 
Independent  Government  Interrogatories/  Document 
Inspections  Individuals  Investigative 
(II A)  Ministry  Question  nalres  Requests 
(IIC3)  Orally  Powers 
(II  A)  (IIC1)  (IIC2)  (IIC4)  (II G) 
:Jropean  Union  Comm1Ss1on  yes1  yes1  yes2  yes2  no 
:Jstria  Cartel Court  yes3  yes3  yes  yes  no4 
r;)elgium  Serv1ce de Ia  yes  yes  yes6  yes  no6 
Concurrence
5 
en  mark  CompetitiOn Counctl
7 
yes  yes6  yes9  yes1o  no9 
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government'' 
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14  l'econom1e
14 
Germany  Bundeskartellamt
11  Lander1<artellamt  yes17  yes17  yes17. 1s  yes17  yes1s 
:reece  Compet1t1on Comm1ttee
11  yes2o  yes2o  yes2o  yes2o  no2o 
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Mercato 
1
_uxembourg  La CommiSSIOn des  Serv~ce de  Ia  yes  yes  yes24  yes  no24 
Prat1ques Commerc1ales  Concurrence, des 
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23  Pnx et de Ia 
Protect1on des 
23 
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1
.  Jetherlands  Economic Compet1t1on  Mtntstry of  yes2s  yes2s  yes2s  yes2s  no2s 
Comm1ttee
25  Economtc 
Affa1rs
25 
'ortugal 
Conselho da  Dtre~o-Geral  yes  yes  yes27  yes  no27 
Concorrenc1azs  de Coocorrencta 
II  e Precos:re 
0 ()pain  T  nbunal de Oefensa de  ServtCIO de  yes  yes  yes29  yes3o  no29 
Ia Competencta"  Defensa de Ia 
Competencia " 
Jweden  Swedtsh Competttlon 
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rnited Kingdom 
Office of Fatr Tradtng,  yes33  yes  no  yes34 ·  no33 
Monopolies and Mergers 
Commosston, RestnctNe 
Practices Court" 
l 
Third Countries 
Canada  Dtrector of  yes'JRJ  yes'JRJ  yes'JRJ  yes'JRJ  yes'JRJ. 37 
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Research
35 
~exico  Federal Compelttton  yes  yes  no  yes  no 
u  Commission 
H  Switzerland  Wettbewerbs- yes  yes  no39  yes  no 
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51 
IJSA  Federal Trade  Department of  yes40  yes4o  yes4o  yes40  yes41 
II  CommiSSion  Justtce 
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FOOTNOTES TO TABLE IIA 
I.  The Commission may obtain all necessary information from the Member States, undertakings, and 
associations  of undertakings.  It  may  send  a  "request  for  information"  to  undertakings  or 
associations of undertakings.  This may include questions requiring written answers and a request 
for documents (Reg. 17, Art.  11  and Merger Reg., Art.  11) 
2.  In carrying out an investigation, Commission officials may examine and take copies from books 
and other business records,  ask for oral explanations on the spot, and enter premises, land and 
means of transport of undertakings.  (Reg. 17,  Art.  14  and Merger Reg., Art.  13) 
l 
3.  The Austrian Cartel Court can demand updated copies of agreements where the current ones are  I 
not understandable (Art. 64); an improved notification (Art. 65( 1  )); and updates on the economic 
situation where it  is  likely that this will change.  (Art. 66) 
4.  Criminal investigative powers arise in  Austria if the file is  passed on to the public prosecutor to 
initiate a case regarding those acts which also constitute violations of the criminal law.  (Criminal 
Law Sees. 129-141) 
5.  Under Belgian law, the power to  investigate rests with  the Service de  Ia  Concurrence, which is 
within the Ministry of Economics.  However, decision-making power rests with the Conseil de Ia 
Concurrence, an administrative court which is  within the Ministry of Economics.  (Art. 16) 
6.  Under Belgian law, on-site inspections may be made of the dwelling of directors, administrators, 
and financial officials of an  undertaking under investigation, with  a court-issued warrant.  The 
police may be  asked to  assist in  execution of an on-site inspection.  (Art. 23(2), (3))  Moreover, 
on-site inspection of business premises may be made with a mandate issued by  the President of 
the Council for Competition. 
7.  The Danish Competition Council is  an  independent authority.  Its chairman is  appointed by the 
King, and the other members are appointed for 4-year terms by the Ministry of Trade. 
8.  The Danish Competition Council may demand any information, including accounts, accounting 
records, transcripfs from  ledgers, other business records and electronic data which is  considered 
necessary for its activities.  (KKL Sec. 6) 
9.  The Danish Competition Council may obtain a  court order permitting it  to  gain access to the 
premises  and  vehicles  of an  undertaking  and  "on  the  spot  obtain  and  make  copy  of any 
information which is  of importance for the performance of supervision according to  [the Act], 
including accounts, accounting records, ledgers, other business records and electronic data." Police 
assistance may be required by the Council.  (Sec. 21)  However, this has never been done. 
I 0.  Danish Competition Council staff may call and ask representatives of the undertaking at issue for 
the information needed.  Thereafter, the Council staff person makes a summary of the telephone 
conversation. 
11.  The Finish competition authorities are independent, but administratively linked to the Ministry of 
Trade and  Industry.  Accordingly, their  budget  is  within  the  control  of the  Ministry,  but  it 
exercises no authority over the their operation. 
12:  ln Finland, the subject undertaking or association of undertakings may be required to submit all 
information and documents necessary to examine the contents, purpose, and effect of  a restriction 
on competition and conditions of  competition, to investigate whether the undertaking or association 
of undertakings is  in  a  dominant position.  Authorities may require that such  information be 
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The Office of  Free Competition or the County Government may conduct an inspection to supervise 
compliance with the Act and orders issued under it.  It must be given access to all  business and 
storage  premises,  land  areas and  means  of transport  in  its  possession,  provided  all  business 
correspondence,  accounts,  data  processing  records  and  other  documents  which  may  be  of 
importance to supervision of such compliance.  It may take copies.  (Sec. 20) 
13.  On  July  1,  1994,  pursuant to  the EEA  Agreement's requirement that the  Finnish Office of Free 
Competition must give the competition authorities of the EEA assistance in  inspections, Section 
20  was modified to allow police assistance in  investigations.  Such assistance is  possible only 
pursuant to  the requirements of Section 20  or the  EU  competition rules, both governing on-site 
inspections.  When this provision took force, the Office of Free Competition and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs entered an  agreement of cooperation, under which competition authorities may 
phone  the  police,  who  must  provide  an  ordinary  patrol  car at  the  site  of the  undertaking  in 
question.  This has never been done. 
14.  The  French Ministre de  l'Economie can  make  necessary investigations, and  the  Conseil de  Ia 
Concurrence may investigate in  areas where it has been delegated responsibility to  do  so.  ( 1986 
Ordonnance, Art. 45) 
15.  Pursuant to  a  request of the  Ministre de  l'economie or the Conseil de  Ia  Concurrence, French 
investigators may have access to  all  places, land, or means of transport, to  search and seize all 
documents or copies which are useful to  the  investigation, to  read all  books,  records and other 
documents and take copies thereof, to question all concerned individuals, by  call or on  site, and 
to issue written interrogatories, for all information and justification. On-site inspection of  premises 
can be made without a warrant.  ( 1986 Ordonnance, Art. 4  7).  However, a search for  items not 
in plain view can only be made pursuant to judicial authorization given by order of the president 
of the "Tribunal de grande instance."  ( 1986 Ordonnance, Art. 48) 
16.  The  Bundeskartellamt is  independent of the  government and  is  a  higher federal authority.  It 
reports to  the  Federal Minister of Economics.  (GWB  Sec.  48)  The  extent of the  Minister's 
authority to impose specific instructions on the Bundeskartellamt is controversial,  but he/she may 
impose general instructions regarding decisions pursuant to the GWB.  Such instructions do not, 
however, bind the courts. 
The Landerkartellamt report to the State Ministries of Economics and are not independent: 
17.  The Bundeskartellamthas authority to collect any evidence it deems necessary for the performance 
of its duties.  However, an investigation can only be  made to determine whether violation of a 
specific provision of the GWB  has  occurred; fishing  expeditions are not  allowed.  Thus,  the 
Bundeskartellamt must have reasonable grounds to believe that a violation has occurred. 
18.  On-site inspections under the GWB can only be made on business premises, and only pursuant to 
an  order of the  County  Court having jurisdiction in  the  territory where the  search  is  made. 
However, no order is necessary where there is danger in delay.  (GWB, Sec. 46(4)) 
Under the  OWiG,  the  means  to  coerce the  production of information  in  criminal  law  are 
permissible. Accordingly, searches and seizures of  premises, including dwellings, are permissible. 
(OWiG, Art. 46, para. 3)  Police assistance may be requested by enforcement authorities. 
19.  Recent amendments to the competition law have established the Greek Competition Committee 
as an independent authority, and have entrusted it with the responsibilities which had been those 
of the Directorate for Market Research and Competition.  (Law 703/77, Arts. 8, 8c; Act 2296/95, 
paras. I, 4) 
20.  The President of  the Competition Committee or the authorized officials of  its Secretariatmay send 
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mandate issued by  the President of the Competition Committee or the Director of its Secretariat 
can investigate the offices and other premises of undertakings and associations of undertakings; 
examine their books, records or other documents, and take copies.  Domiciles may be investigated, 
but only with a  warrant, and Constitutional guarantees must be observed.  Any person may be 
questi~med, and sworn or unsworn statements may be taken.  Subject to the provisions of specific 
law, Public Authorities and Corporate Bodies of Public Law are obliged to  provide information 
and assistance to the Competition Committee and its authorized officials during the execution of 
their duties.  (Law 703/77, Arts. 25,  26; Act 2296/95, Art. 6,  para. 2) 
21.  The Competition Authority, which  ts  an independent body whose members are appointed by the 
Minister,  may be required by  the Minister to  investigate a possible abuse of a dominant position 
( 1991  Act, Sec. 14), or a notification of a proposed merger. ( 1978 Act, Sec. 7) 
Under the  1994  bill,  the  Director of Competition Enforcement, who  will  be  a  member of the 
Competition  Authority,  would  be  required to  investigate  restrictive  practices or  abuses  of a 
dominant posttion which he/she suspects to violate the law.  (1994 bill, sec. 7) 
22.  Upon production of a court warrant, the Authority is  empowered to require any person involved 
in  business, and their employees, to  provide any necessary information.  (Sec. 21( I )(d), (e))  On 
production of a warrant issued by a Justice of the District Court, an authorized officer may require 
a person involved in  the business of supplying/distributing goods or providing services to produce 
any books, documents or records relating to such activities which are in  that person's control, and 
copy or take extracts from  them.  ( 1991  Act,  Sec. 21 (I )(b)); or to  enter and  inspect _business 
premises.  (1991  Act, Sec. 21  (!)(a)) 
23.  The Luxembourg Service de  Ia  Concurrence des  Prix et de  Ia  Protection des  Consommateurs, 
\vhich  is  within  the  Ministry of Economy, has  the  power to  conduct investigations.  (Loi du 
17.6.70, Art.  3;  Lot  du  2.10.93, Art.  2)  Moreover, the Minister has the discretionary power to 
request the  Commission  des  Pratiques Restrictives to  open  an  investigation.  However, the 
Minister must  make  such  request  if he  has  been  told  to  do  so  by  the  procureur d'Etat.  The 
Commission has the official power to conduct investigations when so requested.  The Commission 
is  an ad hoc independent administrative authority, but includes among its members fonctionnnaire 
representatives of  the Minister of  the Economy, the Minister of Justice, and "Ministere des classes 
moyennes."  Its  independence is  said to  be  based on  the  fact that it  is  not a  permanent body, 
convened only on an  ad  hoc basis.  In  practice, the Service de  Ia  Concurrence will conduct the 
investigations on behalf of the Commission. 
24.  Luxembourg investigators must have a written order of the Minister to make on-site inspections, 
which specifies its  objective.  Investigators  may check all documents and other objects on-site. 
If an  undertaking  or  association of undertakings opposes  an  investigation  or  inspection,  the 
investigators may obtain police assistance.  (Loi du 29.4.89, Art.  I; Loi  du 2.9.93, Art. 3) 
25.  The  Minister of Economic Affairs and,  to  a  more  limited  extent, the  Economic Competition 
Commission, have powers to  investigate, including powers to  issue  written  interrogatories, to 
question individuals orally and to  ask any person to  provide information necessary to make an 
initial assessment as to whether a restrictive agreement or dominant position is violative.  (WEM, 
Art.  16)  However, the Minister also possesses more extensive powers, which may be used only 
if demonstrable circumstances exist which raise doubts as to a violation exists.  The Minister also 
may make on-site inspections, with police help if necessary.  (WEM, Art.  17(3))  The inspection 
of a dwelling is  also possible if the inspectors have the special authorization of the Minister and 
are accompanied by  either the head of police or the mayor of the municipality.  The Minister's 
investigations. are carried out by officials of the "Economische Controledienst."  (WEM, Art. 17) 
These officials also conduct investigations necessary for  the imposition  of criminal sanctions. 
(WED, Art.  17) I 
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26.  Regarding  restrictive  practices,  the  Portugese  Conselho  da  Concorrencia can  request  further 
information, then send the case to the Direcyao-Generalde Concorrenciae Precos to "instruct the 
case," which may include investigation and hearing.  (Art. 12)  The Conselho da Concorrencia is 
responsible to decide on whether to grant an exemption.  (Art. 5.2) 
27. 
28. 
Regarding  concentrations,  the  Direcyao-General de  Concorrencia e  Precos  is  responsible  to 
"instruct  the  case,"  which  may  include  investigation  and  hearing,  followed  by  making  a 
recommendation to the Ministry regarding legality.  The Ministry ultimately decides on legality. 
(Art. 31) 
Under Portugese law, the Direcyao-Geral de Concorrenciae Precos can make on-site inspections 
only if the Director General of the DGCP has first obtained a judicial order issued by the judicial 
authority.  After receiving a request, the judicial authority has 48 hours to decide whether to issue 
such order.  The police may accompany officials to make such  inspections, if so requested by the 
Direcyao-Geral  de Concorrencia e Precos. (Art. 23) 
Regarding restrictive practices, upon  receipt of a_ notification, the  Spanish SOC will conduct an 
investigation and send the case with a proposed disposition to  the TDC.  The TDC conducts a 
further investigation and issues a final decision within 20 days of receipt of the file.  (LDC, Arts. 
31-44) 
Regarding concentrations, upon  receipt of a  voluntary notification, the  SOC  must conduct an 
investigation and prepare an  advisory note for the Minister.  Within one month of the date the 
notification is  filed,  the Minister will  either take no  action, in  which case the concentration is 
deemed to  be permitted, or send the case to the TDC for further investigation.  Under the latter 
scenario, the TDC will prepare a non-binding decision, which is sent to the Minister, who forwards 
it  to  the  government, which  issues  a  final decision within  three months  of receipt of the file. 
(LDC Arts.  15  --34; Rg., Arts. 3-15) 
If  a concentration has not been notified, the SOC may commence an investigation ex officio.  The 
procedure is  similar, except that the one month time limit does not apply. 
29.  Access to  the premises can be made either with the consent of the party or pursuant to judicial 
order. _In  practice, on-site inspections have always been made with the party's consent, and never 
pusuant to judicial order. 
30.  In Spain, individuals are required to provide information and data requested.  (Art. 32 LDC) 
31.  Swedish law requires that prior to making an on-site inspection, the Competition Authority must 
seek leave of the Stockholm City Court.  Some evidence must be presented to the court before 
leave will be granted. 
32.  In the UK, restrictive agreements are investigated by the OFT and the RPC, concentrations may 
be investigated by the OFT, DTI and the MMC.  When proceedings are brought before the RPC, 
witnesses may be summoned for oral examination, then consider arguments from the DGFT and 
the parties, as well as all the evidence, to decide on whether a restriction constitutes a violation. 
(RTPA, Sec. 1(3)) 
33.  To issue a  formal notice to  supply  information in  relation to  restrictive agreements, the UK's 
Director General of  Fair Trading must have reasonable cause to believe that a restrictive agreement 
exists.  (RTPA, Sec. 36(1))  Failure to comply with such notice may result in the imposition of 
sanctions described in note 57 to Table liB.  If  a .formal notice is not possible, the DGFT may 
issue only an informal letter requesting information, but this has no legal force and no sanctions 
apply for failure to comply.  Regarding concentrations and abuses of a dominant position, the 
MMC can, by notice, require information; there are sanctions for default.  (FT  A, Sec. 85) page 44  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
34.  Only  the  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  and  the  parties  in  proceedings  before  the 
Restrictive Practices Court can question individuals orally.  (FT  A, Sec. 85(1 ), (2))  The Director 
General of Fair Trading does not have this power except in  proceedings before the Restrictive 
Practices Court.  (RTPA, sec. 37(1); FTA, Sec. 85(1), (2)) 
35.  The Director of Investigation and  Research heads the  Bureau of Competition Policy, which  is 
within the federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, a federal government agency. 
36.  Under Canadian law, a judge: may order a person to deliver to the Director a written return under 
oath or affirmation for specified information  (Sec. 11 (1 )(c)) or  to produce a record at a specified 
time and place (Sec. II  (I )(b); may issue an order authorizing the Director or other named person 
to enter and search the premises for any record and copy or seize it, when reasonable grounds exist 
to believe that such order is  necessary, based on information submitted under oath or affirmation 
(Sec.  15( I)) or may order any person to  appear and be examined by the Director or authorized 
representative on any relevant matter under oath or solemn declaration (Sec. 11( 1  )(c)) (these may 
be done without court order if reasonable grounds exist but, due to exigent circumstances such as 
risk of loss or destruction of evidence, it  would not be practical to obtain a warrant).  In practice, 
the parties usually cooperate in  providing information.  Until  1991, the Court had never used the 
powers described above.  (Rowley &  Baker, International Mergers: The Antitrust Process, Sec. 
6.4.3 (1991)) 
37.  Under Canadian law,  the Attorney General may institute and conduct any prosecution or other 
criminal proceedings under the Act, and may exercise all powers conferred by the criminal ~ode 
to this end. (Sec. 23(2)) 
38.  The Swiss Wettbewerbskommission has  independent decision-making powers.  However, it  is 
administratively  attached  to  the  "Eidgeni:issisches  Volkswirtschaftsdepartement"  (Federal 
Department of Economic Affairs). 
39.  Under the draft law, on-site investigations would be permitted. 
40.  Government enforcement authorities  may conduct all  four types of investigation, and  private 
plaintiffs have access to all such discovery tools except on-site inspections. 
Cases learned of by government enforcers through means other than Hart-Scott-Rodino filings are 
initially  investigated after officials have authorized a  preliminary inquiry.  Such inquiry often 
proceeds by informal interview or informal document request, although a formal process may be 
used, and may thereafter lead to a full-phase investigation. 
In non-merger cases, the Dol's primary form of pre-complaint compulsory process is  the "civil 
investigative demand" (CIDs).  (Antitrust Civil  Process Act,  15  USC Sees.  1311-1314(1988)) 
These are general subpoenas which may be issued by the Assistant Attorney General of the DoJ 
Antitrust Division when there is  reason to believe a person has possession, custody or control of 
relevant material or information that might lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. (28 USC 
512; Antitrust Division Manual, III: 14, III:36, lll:62) CIDs may be used to compel the production 
or on-site inspection of documents, to require answers to written interrogatories, and to compel 
sworn testimony, which is transcribed verbatim.  (See 15  USC 1312(i)(7)(A)) CIDs also may be 
issued following the filing of a complaint. 
The  FTC's primary method of compulsory process  in  non-merger cases is  the  issuance of a 
·.subpoena, requiring the production of documents and sworn oral testimony.  (15 USC 49)  The 
·FTC subpoena provisions do not authorize interrogatories, but parties often consent to provide 
written answers.  The FTC also may issue CIDs.  (Act of Aug. 26, 1994, PL 103-312, Sec. 7; 
108 Stat. 1691  (1994)) 
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Regarding concentrations, whether or not they meet threshold levels requiring notification under 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the DoJ or FTC may request that the parties, through questionnaires, 
surveys and  interviews, provide  information voluntarily concerning the  transaction.  Proposed 
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 1994 (Draft for Public Comment), 
n.  12;  1993  FTC Operating Manual, Ch. 3.3 .6.6. 
Private parties and the government may seek discovery after filing a complaint pursuant to rules 
26-37 and 45  of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  They have the broad power to  "obtain 
discovery regarding any matter. .. which is  relevant to the subject matter involved in  the pending 
action," subject to the court's discretion.  Even if the information sought would be inadmissible 
at trial,  it  may  be  discovered if it  "appears reasonably calculated to  lead  to  the  discovery of 
admissible  evidence."  (F.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(l))  Discovery  tools  include  deposition  upon  oral 
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or 
permission to enter upon  land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and 
mental examinations; and requests for admission.  (F.R.Civ.P. 26(a))  Non-party witness can be 
compelled to  submit to  depositions upon oral examination or produce documents. 
See generally Hawk & Veltrop, "Common Law and Civil Law Approaches to Investigation and 
Discovery in  the  Enforcement of Competition Laws,"  ICC  Commission on  Law and  Practice 
Relating to Competition, Paris, France, 8-9 March 1993. 
41.  The DOJ has sole responsibility for criminal enforcement under the Sherman Act.  (15 U.S.C. 1) 
The DoJ  may initiate a  criminal investigation through the  empanelling of a  grand jury.  The 
principal discovery tool  is  a  subpoena, which  may  require the  production  of documents and 
materials, and command oral testimony before the grand jury without the presence of the judge 
or legal counsel.  A search warrant also can be obtained.  (F.R.Crim.P.) However, the DoJ cannot 
compel written responses to  interrogatories or requests for  admission, as  in  the  civil  context. 
Investigators from the FBI also may be used in a criminal investigation, which may use wiretaps 
and "plants" (where a government official may be secretly placed to work within an organization 
to observe whether illegal practices are occurring). page 46  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
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TABLE liB. 
~ECIPIENTS  OF INVESTIGATION REQUESTS & POWERS TO COMPEL RESPONSES 
RECIPIENT OF  TOOLS TO  COURT POWERS 
II 
INVESTIGATION  ENCOURAGE 
REQUEST  RESPONSES 
Individual  Favorable Treatment 
Personally  Offered for Cooperation 
Sanction  a  Review 
Third  Issue  for Failure  Authority's 
II  EU/Member State 
Undertakings  Individuals  Parties  Responsible  to  Warrants  Decisions  (IIB1)  (IIB2)  for  Other 
(1163)  Cooper~~te  (II H)  (II H)  Supplying  To  To  (liD) 
Answers  Individuals  Undertakings 
(liE)  (IIF1)  (IIF2) 
II European Union  yes1  no  yes  no  n/a  yes  yes2  no  yes3  no 
11  Austria  yes  yes4  yes4  yes  no  no  yes5  no  yes6  yes5 
Belgium  yes  no  yes  no7  no  no  yes7  yes8  yes9  no 
Denmark  yes  yes  yes1o  no  no  no  yes11  yes12  yes13  no 
II Finland  yes  yes14  yes  no  no  yes1s  yes1s  no  yes17  no 
France  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes1a  yes19  yes2o  no 
II Germany  yes21  no  yes22  yes23  yes24  yes  yes2s  yes26  yes27  no 
"Greece  yes  yes  yes  yes2a  no  no  .yes29  yes3o  yes31  no 
Ireland  yes  yes32  yes32  yes  n/a33  n/a33  yes34  yes3s  yes36  no 
Italy  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes37  no  yes3a  no 
Luxembourg  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes39  yes4o  yes41  no 
Netherlands  yes  yes  yes  yes42  no  no  yes42  no  yes43  no 
Portugal  yes  yes  yes  yes44  no  yes4s  yes46  yes4s  yes  no 
Spain  yes  yes  yes  no  no4a  no4a  yes49  yes  50  yess1  yess1 
1  Sweden  yes  yes  yes  nos2  no  no  yess3  yes  54  yes  no 
United Kingdom  yes  yes  yes  yesss  no  sa  no  sa  yess?  yes  yes  sa  yess9 
I  Third Countries 
. Canada  yes60  yes  yes  yess1  yess2  yess2  yess3  yes64  yes64  no 
l  Mexico  yes  yes  yes  no  noss  noss  yes66  no  (1067  no 
Switzerland  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes68  .no  yess9  no 
USA  yes?o  yes?o  yes?o  yes  yes71  yes71  yes72  yes73  yes  yes73 
FOOTNOTES TO TABLE liB 
1.  The  Commission  may  obtain  all  necessary  information  from  undertakings,  associations  of 
undertakings, and the Member States.  It may send a "request for information" to undertakings or 
associations of undertakings.  (Reg. 17, Art.  11  and Merger Reg., Art.  11) 
2.  Regarding restrictive agreements, fines of up to ECU 5.000 may be imposed by decision of the 
Commission for supplying incorrect or misleading information in an application or notification, 
in response to a request for information, for supplying incomplete books or records, or for refusing 
to submit to an investigation ordered by decision of  the Commission.  (Reg. 17, Art. 15)  Periodic 
penalty payments of up to ECU 1.000 per day may be imposed in order to compel undertakings 
or associations of undertakings to  supply  complete and correct information which  has  been page 48  Surveys of the Member States' powers to mvestigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
requested by decision, or to submit to an investigation which has been ordered by decision.  (Reg. 
17,Art.l6) 
Regarding mergers, fines of ECU  1.000-50.000 may be imposed for intentionally or negligently 
failing  to  notify a  concentration, supplying  incorrect or misleading information or incomplete 
documents.  (Merger Reg., Art.  14)  Periodic penalty payments of up to ECU 25.000 per day of 
delay  in  supplying  information requested or in  submitting to  an  ordered investigation may be 
imposed.  (Merger Reg., Art.  15( I)) 
3.  The Court of First Instance has unlimited jurisdiction to  review decisions of the Commission. 
With respect to decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments, it  may cancel, reduce or 
increase the  same.  The Court of Justice  may  review decisions of the  Court of First Instance. 
(Reg.  17,  Art.  17;  Merger Reg.,  Art.  16;  Art.  168a,  173,  EU  Treaty,  OJ  C224/l, 31.8.1992; 
Council  Decision of 24  October 1988  establishing a  Court of First  Instance of the  European 
Communities, OJ L319/l  (25.11.88)) 
4.  In  Austria, individuals and third parties may be questioned by the Paritatischen Ausschuf3 and by 
the Cartel Court.  The normal practice is for the Paritatischen Ausschuf3 to do the questioning in 
preparation of Its  expert's opinion. 
5.  Fines may be  imposed  by  the  criminal court for providing false  information in  a  notification. 
(Sec.  132)  The Cartel Court can  impose fines against an undertaking which fails to  satisfy the 
duty to  notify vertical agreements and mergers, or if it provides false or misleading inf<?rmation. 
(Sec. 142) 
6.  The decisions of the Cartel Court may  be  reviewed by the  Kartellobergericht.  (Sec. 88)  The 
cnminal court's decisions imposing fines may be appealed following criminal court procedures. 
7.  The  Belgian Conseil can impose fines  on  undertakings, and associations of undertakings, and 
those individuals obliged to notify a  merger for intentionally or negligently supplying incorrect 
information by  a notification or in  response to  a  request for information, providing incomplete 
information,  missing  a  deadline  for  supplying  information,  or  otherwise  obstructing  an 
investigation.  Fines also may be  imposed for consummating a  concentration without meeting 
notification requirements or when taking measures which render the concentration irreversible. 
(Art. 38, para. 1)  The amount of  the fine can range from BF 20.000 (ECU 507.5) to BF 1 million 
(ECU 25.370). (Art. 37) 
8.  Under Belgian law, a court-issued warrant is  required in order to conduct an on-site inspection of 
a dwelling, and a mandate issued by the President of the Council for Competition is  required in 
order to conduct an on-site inspection of business premises. 
9.  The Conseil's decisions, including those imposing fines for obstruction of an investigation, and the 
decisions of the President of the Council for Competition, are appealable to the Appeal Court of 
Brussels.  (Art. 43) 
10.  In  Denmark,  third  parties  would  be  the  recipient  of  investigation  requests  only  when  the 
Competition Council is  investigating a certain market. 
11.  In Denmark, daily or weekly fines of  an unspecified amount may be imposed against a party who 
neglects to  submit requested information, or submits  incorrect or misleading information.  In 
practice, however, sanctions have been imposed on very few occasions, as the party in question 
will normally produce the requested information after negotiating with the Competition Council. 
12.  The Competition Council may obtain a court order permitting it to gain access to the premises and 
vehicles of an undertaking and "on the spot obtain and make copy of any information which is of 
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accounting records, ledgers, other business records and electronic data."  Police assistance may be 
required by the Council.  (Sec. 21)  However, this has never been done. 
13.  Decisions  made  by  the  Competition  Council  may  be  appealed  to  the  Competition  Appeals 
Tribunal, then ultimately to the High Court. (KKL Sec.  18) 
14.  In  Finland,  individuals  deemed  to  be  undertakings  because they  offer for  sale,  buy,  sell  or 
otherwise for consideration procure or dispose of goods or services on a professional basis may 
be the recipient of investigation requests.  (Sec. 3) 
15.  In Finland, in  practice, cooperation may be considered in  determining the amount of the penalty 
for a substantive violation pursuant to  Sec.  8.  For example, such cooperation may be that one 
undertaking  participating  in  a  cartel  provides  the  Authority  with  information  about  other 
undertakings participating in the same cartel, thus assisting the authority in its enforcement efforts. 
To date, however, this has never been done. 
16.  Failure to notify a prohibited activity in Finland will result in imposition of an administrative  fine 
if it is subsequently detected.  (Sec. 8)  The Office of Free Competition may impose a conditional 
fine  to  enforce the  obligation to  submit  information or  make documents available, and  other 
requirements to  submit information.  These fines  shall  be ordered payable by  the Competition 
Council.  (Sees. 25, 26) 
Anyone who willfully submits false information to authorities shall be sentenced for a competition 
restriction offense to  a fine  of an  unspecified amount or to  imprisonment of not  more than  6 
months.  (Sec. 27) 
17.  Decisions of  the Authorities, including those imposing fines for obstructing an investigation, may 
be appealed to  the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court.  (Sec. 27) 
18.  Any person who impedes the exercise of the powers of investigation by  French authorities may 
be sanctioned by a fine of  not more than FFSO.OOO (ECU 7.614) or imprisonment of  not more than 
six months.  Such sanctions are imposed by the Tribunal de Grande Instance for the competent 
jurisdiction.  (1986 Ordonnance, Art. 52) 
19.  French investigators may  exercise their powers to search and seize based first on the request of 
the Ministre de l'economie or the Conseil de  Ia Concurrence, then on the judicial authorization 
given by order of the president of the "Tribunal de  grande instance"  stating the address to be 
searched.  (1986 Ordonnance, Art. 48)  · 
20.  The grant of a warrant by the French Tribunal de grande instance  is subject to court review. 
21.  In Germany, undertakings and associations of undertakings may be the subject of investigative 
requests.  (GWB Sec. 46) 
22.  In Germany, only third parties which are undertakings or associations of undertakings may be the 
subject of investigative requests.  (GWB Sec. 46) 
23.  The  law  specifies which  individuals  are responsible  for  providing  information on  behalf of 
undertakings.  Responsible individuals include the owners of undertakings, or  representatives of 
legal persons as provided by  law.  Individuals who have been appointed at the  request of the 
Bundeskartellamt, the Landeskartellamt, or the local district court may also be held responsible. 
(GWB Art.' 46, para. 2) 
24.  The German proceedings for assessing fines is subject to the "Opportunitaetsprinzip,  "which means 
that the authority has discretion regarding the initiation or stay of  proceedings and the size of  the 
fine.  Accordingly, the authority may stay the fines proceedings pending satisfaction of claims page 50  Surve~s of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanct1on violations of national competition laws 
made by  injured parties, or abolition of an  illegal condition.  The authority also  would  have 
discretion to  impose less severe sanctions against a cooperative party under this principle. 
25.  In  Germany, failure to cooperate in  an administrative investigation constitutes an administrative 
offense.  (GWB Sec. 39)  As such, it  may be fined pursuant to criminal proceedings a maximum 
of DM50.000 (ECU 26.1 00) for each wrongdoing (GWB Sec. 39;  STPO; OWIG) or subject to 
penalty payments pursuant to administrative proceedings a maximum of DM 2.000 (ECU 1.044). 
( VwVG Sec.  II)  Failure to cooperate in  a criminal proceeding may be penalized criminally a 
maximum of 6 weeks imprisonment or a penalty.  (STPO) Compliance can be enforced under the 
Federal Act on  the  Execution of Administrative Decisions (VwVG).  Failure of a  witness or 
expert to  provide answers to an oral interview may be fined but not imprisoned.  (GWB Sec. 54) 
26.  In  Germany, searches and seizures may only be conducted pursuant to court order, except in  the 
case of danger or delay.  (GWB, Art. 46) 
27.  The complainant may appeal the  decisions of the  Bundeskartellamt or Landeskartellamt to  the 
regional court of appeal with JLmsdiction.  (GWB Art. 62,  82)  These, in  turn, may be appealed 
to the  Federal High Court.  (GWB Art. 73,  83) 
28.  Greek  law  provides  that  when  information  is  requested of an  undertaking  or  assoctatiOn  of 
undertakings, the persons responsible are entrepreneurs in the case of  sole proprietorships, partners 
in  the  case  of partnerships,  administrators  in  the  case  of  limited  liability  companies  and 
cooperatives, and  members of the  board of directors  in  the  case of corporations.  Criminal 
proceedings  may  be  initiated,  and  crimmal  penalties  imposed,  against  these  individuals  for 
obstructing investigations.  (Law 703/77, Arts.  29,  30;  Act of 2296/95, paras. 6,  7)  Penalties 
include a mandatory prison term and a fine.  (Law 703/77, Art. 29; Act 2296/95, Art. 6,  para. 6) 
The Competition Committee has the power to  impose administrative penalties for obstruction of 
an  investigation without prejudice to the criminal sanctions imposed according to  Art. 29 of the 
Greek  Act.  These  include  fines  of up  to  DRG  3.000.000  (ECU  10.160)  against  directors, 
employees and individuals governed by private law.  If public servants obstruct an investigation, 
the matter is referred to the competent authority in order to initiate disciplinary proceedings. (Law 
703/77, Art. 25; Act of 2296/95, Art. 6,  para. 2) 
29.  Under Greek law, if a party fails to cooperate in  an investigation, the Service may petition to the 
public  prosecutor  for  police  intervention.  A  court  order  may  be  issued  requiring  police 
intervention.  The Competition Committee may impose fines.  These fines are DRG 3.000.000 
(ECU I 0.160)- 10% of the gross receipts of the undertakings during the year in which the offense 
was committed or during the previous year for non-notification of agreements.  (Law 703/77, Art. 
21;  Act of 2296/95,  Art.  5,  para. 2);  up  to  5% of aggregate turnover of the  parties for  non-
notification of  a merger under the notification provision (Law 703/77, Art. 4a; Act of2296/95, Art. 
2,  para. 2);  up  to  7% of the aggregate turnover of the  parties for  non-notification of a  merger 
under the obi igation of a preventive control procedure (Law 703/77, Art. 4b; Act of 2296/95, Art. 
2,  para. 3); and up to DRG 3.000.000 (ECU 10.160) for obstruction of an  investigation, subject 
to penal sanctions imposed by Art. 26 (Law 703/77, Art. 26; Act 2296/95, Art. 6, para. 3)  Penal 
sanctions of at least 3  months  imprisonment and a  fine  ranging from  DRG  1-3  million (ECU 
3.3 86-1 0.160) for the first offense of obstruction of an investigation or failure to supply required 
information in  a notification, twice that amount for a repetition of the offense.  (Law 703/77, Art. 
29; Act 2296/95, Art. 6, para. 6) 
. 30.  In  Greece, authorized officials obstructed in the exercise of their duties of investigation or denied 
access to  information  may  request the  assistance of the  local  police  authorities through  the 
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11.  The Athens Administrative Court of  Appeal may review decisions of  the Competition Commission 
(Ch. C, Sec. 14); the Council of State may review decisions of the Athens Administrative Court 
of Appeal (Sec. 15). 
~2.  In  Ireland, natural and legal persons involved in  the business of supplying/distributing goods or 
providing services may be the recipients of investigation requests.  ( 1991  Act, Sec. 21 (l  )(b), (d) 
and (e)) 
33.  Irish law provides no sanctioning system for substantive violations. 
14.  Under Irish law, a person who obstructs an authorized officer with a warrant from gathering books, 
documents or other records, or making an on-site inspection, may be liable for a maximum fine 
of IrL 1.000 (ECU 1.265) and/or not more than 12  months imprisonment.  (1991  Act, Sec. 21(3)) 
A person who fails to  respond to  oral questioning as authorized by the Act may be liable for a 
maximum fine of  IrL 1.000 (ECU 1.265) and/or not more than 6 months imprisonment.  (Schedule 
to  1991  Act, para. 7(4)) 
J5.  Under Irish law, before an authorized officer exercises any of his powers to  conduct an on-site 
inspection or to require the production of  documents or other information, he must have a warrant 
issued by a Justice of the District Court.  (1991  Act, Sec. 21) 
36.  In Ireland, sanctions are imposed by the courts and subject to the normal appellate procedure. 
17.  Italian  law  provides  that  persons  possessing  relevant documents or information and refusing, 
without justification, to produce them during an investigation, or producing false documents, shall 
be subject to administrative pecuniary sanctions.  Such sanctions may be up to IL 50 million (ECU 
25.430) for refusal or failure to supply information or documents, and up toIL 100 million (ECU 
50.860) for supplying incorrect or misleading information.  (Art. 14, para. 5) 
18.  The Administrative Court of Latium may review decisions of the Competition Authority.  (Art. 
33) 
,9_  In Luxembourg, a penalty ofLF 2.505 to  10.000 (ECU 63-254)  may be imposed for obstructing 
an investigation or for providing false or incomplete responses.  (Loi de 17 .6. 70,  Art. 8) 
-0.  The Luxembourg Administrative Court may review decisions of the Ministry.  (Art. 7) 
"f 1.  In Luxembourg, penal sanctions may be imposed by the court for obstruction-of an investigation, 
which may be appealed.  (Art. 8) 
42.  Under Dutch law, failure to cooperate in an investigation of the Minister of Economic Affairs or 
the Economic Competition Commission is an economic offense for which criminal sanctions may 
be imposed against individuals or undertakings by the Economische Politierechter.  Sanctions may 
be imposed against individuals in an undertaking who directed the prohibited conduct, or who sit 
on the board of directors.  For individuals, fines may be up to NLG 50.000 (ECU 23.280) and 
imprisonment up to six months; for undertakings, fines may be up to NLG 100.000 (ECU 46.555). 
Wet Economische Delicten (Economic Crimes Act), Sees. 1(4), 2(4), and 6 (1, 4); Criminal Code, 
Art. 23. 
43.  Imposition of  criminal sanctions by the Economische Politierechtermay be reviewed by the Court 
of  Appeal, and ultimately by the High Court. 
44.  In Portugal, the legal representatives of the company are responsible for supplying the answers. 
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45.  Portugese law does not address this  issue.  However, in  practice, the Conselho da Concorrencia 
takes into consideration the degree of cooperation when imposing fines. 
46.  Under Portugese law, a fine of up  to  Escudos  10.000.000 (ECU 51.046) for  undertakings, and 
Escudos 5.000.000 (ECU 25.523) for  individuals, may be  imposed by  the  Direcyao-Geral  de 
Concorrencia e Precos for providing false information or refusing to  cooperate in  investigation 
which  it  is  conducting.  (Arts.  3  7,  3  8) 
4  7.  In  Portugal, the judge of first  instance has  the  power to  issue  an  order, on  application of the 
Director General of  the Direcyao-Geral de Concorrenciae Precos permitting an on-site inspection. 
48.  In  Spain,  individuals  and  undertakings  are  required  to  provide  information  pursuant  to  an 
investigation request.  Failure to  do  so  may result in  higher fines for aggravation of the original 
violations. 
49.  In  Spain,  a  fine  of Pts  50.000- 1.000.000 (ECU  313,1-6.262) may  be  imposed  for  failure to 
cooperate in  an investigation or to supply requested information.  A fine of  Pts  150.000 per day 
(ECU 939,0)  may be imposed for obstruction of the SOC investigation procedings.  (Art. 32) 
50.  In  Spain, a judicial order is  necessary for the authority to  conduct an on-site inspection, in  the 
absence of the consent of the party.  (Art. 34)  To date, access has always been by  consent. 
51.  In Spain, decisions of  the TDC may be appealed to the "Audencia Nacional Sala de lo Cqntencioso 
-Administrativo."  (Art.  49)  In  reviewing the decisions of the  TDC or the  Government,  the 
competent judicial authority may conduct a new investigation. 
52.  In  Sweden, any individual can be asked to provide information.  The corporate president or one 
of his/her close colleagues normally will be the individuals questioned because they have the most 
information.  However, no individual representing an undertaking can be held personally liable for 
sanctions. 
53.  In  Sweden, the  Competition  Authority  may  require undertakings and  other  parties to  supply 
information ,  documents  or  other material.  Such obligation  may  be  imposed  subject to  fine. 
Actions  for  award  of such  fine  are  to  be  brought  before  a  District  or  City  Court  by  the 
Competition Authority.  (SFS 1993:20, para. 45, 57,  59) 
54.  Swedish law requires that prior to making an on-site inspection, the Competition Authority must 
seek leave of the Stockholm City Court.  Some evidence must be presented to the court before 
leave will be granted. 
55.  In  the  UK,  any director, manager, secretary or other officer of a  company, officer of a  trade 
association, or individual or member of  a partnership who carries on business, which is the subject 
of a formal notice issued pursuant to Sec. 36 of the RTPA may be personally prosecuted if the 
company's failure to supply answers is  due to their action or negligence, or committed with their 
consent or connivance.  (RTPA, Sec. 36(6))  Mere employees are not liable. 
Regarding a formal notice to supply information issued to any company pursuant to Sec. 85 of  the 
Fair Trading Act or Sec. 3(7) of the Competition Act, any director or officer may be punished if 
the company fails to comply.  (FTA, Sec. 85(7A); CA, Sec. (8)) 
In an investigation into abuse of a dominant position by the MMC, any person can be the subject 
of a request for information.  (FT  A Sec. 85) 
56.  In  the  UK,  the sanctions available for  anticompetitive behavior are aimed at preventing such 
behavior from  continuing due to  non-cooperation, not at punishing past actions.  The RPC may 
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57.  In the UK,  refusal to answer questions posed in  proceedings before the RPC, as with any court, 
constitutes contempt, punishable by an unlimited fine, up to 2 years imprisonment, or both.  In the 
case of imprisonment, cooperation normally leads to  immediate release.  Deliberately supplying 
false  information  in  response  to  questioning  in  court constitutes  perjury,  a  criminal  offense 
punishable by up  to 7 years imprisonment.  (Perjury Act 1911, Sec. 1(1)) 
Refusal to supply information required by  the MMC without reasonable excuse is  punishable as 
though  it  were contempt of court.  (FTA Sees. 85(7), (7 A))  Supplying the  MMC  with  false 
information  under oath  constitutes  perjury.  Falsifying,  suppressing or  destroying  documents 
required by  the  MMC constitutes a criminal offense, punishable by an unlimited fine and/or up 
to  2 years imprisonment.  (FTA Sec. 85(6))  The same penalties also apply to  obstruction of an 
investigation by  the  DGFT under the Competition Act.  (Sec. 3(8))  Failure to  comply with a 
notice  to  supply  information to  the  DGFT  in  relation to  a  suspected restrictive practice is  a 
criminal  offense,  punishable  in  the  same  way.  (RTPA,  Sec.  38(2),  (3))  Falsification of 
information supplied under such a notice is also a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to 
£1.000 (ECU 1.282).  (RTPA Sec. 38(1)) 
58.  In the UK, any decision of  an administrative authority other than an order by the Secretary of State 
for  Trade and  Industry may be  reviewed by  the  High Court (or,  in  Scotland, by  the  Court of 
Session). 
Decisions of the  RPC  may  be  appealed to  the Court of Appeal (or,  in  Scotland, the Court of 
Session).  (Restrictive Practices Court Act of 1976, Sec. 1  0( 1  )) 
59.  In the UK, with respect to an investigation into a restrictive agreement under the RTPA, the RPC 
may issue summonses for the examination of witnesses, as well as take the final decision as to the 
legality/illegality of the  restriction.  The  Court has jurisdiction to  make  interim  and variation 
orders.  However,  in  addition  to  the  RTP A  procedure, a  private action may  be  brought by  a 
wronged party in  the  High  Court (or in  Scotland, the Court of Session) for breach of statutory 
duty.  However, this  is  outside the normal procedure as the OFT is not involved. 
The High Court (or, in  Scotland, the Court of Session) has jurisdiction over cases of failure to 
comply with an  investigation and falsification of evidence, 
60.  When the  recipient of the  investigation request Is  an  undertaking, the  court may  require the 
production of its records and those of its affiliates, whether Canadian or foreign.  To obtain such 
an order, the Director must demonstrate the relevance of the record to his inquiry.  (Sec. 11(2)) 
61.  Any officer, director, or agent of  an undertaking who directed, authorized-or otherwise participated 
in the commission of  an offense related to obstruction of an investigation, as described in note 63 
infra, may be liable for the sanctions provided.  (Sec. 65(  4)) 
62.  In  1991,  the  Bureau of Competition  Policy  initiated  a  favourable  treatment program  which 
provides incentives for corporations voluntarily to disclose their participation in conspiracy and 
bid-rigging offenses prior to the Bureau's knowledge of such matters.  The program thereafter  was 
expanded to  include  individuals and  to  cover a  broader range of criminal offenses under the 
Competition Act.  The Attorney General has discretion to decide what favourable treatment to 
offer, normally after consultation with the Director. 
Moreover, immunity from prosecution can be offered under Canadian criminal law under certain 
conditions.  The Attorney General can stay criminal proceedings, assure immunity against future 
prosecution, or provide "use" immunity (under which evidence provided by the witness cannot be 
used as an admission of guilt in a subsequent prosecution). 
63.  Criminal fines of up to C$ 5.000 (ECU 2.910) and imprisonment for up to two years may be 
imposed against "any person" who: obstructs an investigation (Sec. 64(2)), impedes entry or search page 54  Surveys ot the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
of premises or impedes search of computer files (Sec. 65(1)), does not comply with an order for 
oral  examination,  production of documents,  or  written  responses, or  fails  to  supply  required 
premerger notification, or consummates a merger before expiration of obligatory waiting period 
following  notification (Sec. 65(2).  A  person who destroys or alters any  record required to  be 
produced and for which a warrant has been issued may be liable for criminal fines of up  to C$ 
50 000 (ECU 29.1 00) or imprisonment up to  5 years.  (Sec. 65(3)) 
If a  warrant to conduct an  on-site search has been  issued,  and authorities are refused access, a 
judge may direct a peace officer to take specified steps to gain access.  (Sec. 15(6)) 
64.  Under Canadian law, courts may impose sanctions as discussed in  note 63  supra.  Moreover, where 
a federal, superior or county court judge is  satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that 
It  is  necessary, based on information submitted under oath or affirmation, he may issue a warrant 
authorizing the Director or other named person to enter and search the premises for any record and 
copy  or  seize  it.  (Sec.  15( I))  This  may  be  done  without  a  warrant  if,  due  to  exigent 
circumstances (including risk  of loss  or destruction of evidence due  to  the  delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant), it would not be  practical to obtain a warrant.  Courts also may issue orders, as 
discussed in  note 58  supra. 
65  The criteria to  be considered in  setting the amount of fines are set forth  in  the law.  Cooperation 
in  an  investigation is  not one of the elements listed.  (Ch. 6,  Art. 36) 
66.  For making false statements or providing false information, a fine may be imposed of up ta 7.500 
times the  general minimum  wage, and twice that amount for  repeated offenses, and up  to  100 
thousand times the general minimum wage for failure to notify a concentration.  (Ch. 6,  Art. 35) 
67.  The Commission's decisions may be appealed to the Commission itself.  (Ch. VII, Art. 39) 
68.  In  Switzerland, criminal fines  up  to  SFr 20.000  (ECU  12.480) may be  imposed  for  failure to 
comply  with  requirement  to  provide  information.  (Sec.  40)  Under  the  new  draft  code, 
administrative fines up to SFr 100.000 (ECU 62.380) would be allowed to  be imposed for failure 
to comply with the requirement to provide information or produce documents. (Draft Art. 52) 
In practice, fines never have been imposed. 
69.  In Switzerland, the federal court may review decisions of the  Wettbewerbskommissi~:m. (Sec. 3 8) 
70.  In the US, an  individual or corporation over whom the court has personal jurisdiction is  subject 
to  compulsory  process and  can  be  forced  to  produce  information  and  documents  within  its 
posession, custody or control.  (F.R.Civ.P. 34, 45)  Compulsory process is  backed with the full 
weight and force of the criminal laws. 
CIDs may be addressed to persons under investigation and witnesses.  Non-party witnesses also 
can be compelled to produce documents and to submit to a deposition upon oral examination. 
71.  In August 1993, the United States announced a corporate leniency policy, and in  August 1994, a 
leniency  policy  for  individuals  who  report  criminal  antitrust  activity  of which  the  Justice 
Department had not been aware.  Under the· corporate leniency policy,  no criminal charges will 
be lodged against officers, directors and employees who come forward with their corporation with 
information about criminal antitrust activity and confess.  Under the individual leniency policy, 
individuals may confess ontheir own behalf  to seek leniency for reporting illegal antitrust activity. 
72.  Failure to comply with Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification requirements is  punishable by 
court imposed civil penalties of up  to  $10.000 (ECU 7.911) per day for each day a violation 
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A Dol CID is not self-enforcing.  The DoJ may seek a court order to enforce.  Violation of such 
a court order is  punishable as civil or criminal contempt of court.  (15 USC  1314(a))  US courts 
have broad powers to punish contempt.  A witness who refuses to produce documents in response 
to a court order in a civil action, for instance, may be imprisoned for up to  18  months.  (28 USC 
1826) 
If a party refuses to comply with an FTC subpoena, the FTC can seek an order from  a district 
court.  Failure to comply with the resulting court order is  punishable as contempt of court.  ( 15 
usc 49, 50) 
Sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests are provided in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Rule 3  7).  The court may sanction a party or counsel for failure to comply with a court 
order compelling discovery or for failure to respond to discovery legitimately requested by  the 
other party.  Sanctions include the imposition of costs or other monetary sanctions, or a default 
judgment.  Other sanctions also are possible.  Failure to comply with a court order or subpoena 
served pursuant to Rule 45  is  punishable as contempt of court.  (F.R.Civ.P. 45) 
Individuals who willfully destroy, alter, conceal or manufacture documents or other evidence are 
subject to  fines  and prison sentences of up  to  five years under US  laws on  the  obstruction of 
justice.  (18 USC  1505) They would also face imprisonment for violation of judicial discovery 
orders.  Parties who knowingly give false testimony under oath are guilty of perjury and subject 
to fines and prison sentences.  ( 18 USC 1621-23)  Attorneys who participate in these schemes are 
subject to the same fines and disbarment. 
Companies which have not yet been subpoenaed may be prosecuted for destruction of documents 
if they know a grand jury investigating the industry would likely subpoena the documents.  See 
US v.  Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156,  1160-61  (4th Cir. 1988) 
See generally Hawk &  Veltrop, "Common Law and Civil Law Approaches to  Investigation and 
Discovery in  the Enforcement of Competition Laws,"  ICC Commission on  Law and  Practice 
Relating to Competition, Paris, France, 8-9 March 1993. 
73.  See note 40 to Table IIA. page 56  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws I 
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SANCTIONS SURVEY 
I.  TYPE OF SANCTIONS ALLOWED 
Restrictive practices and abuses of dominant position 
The  type  of  sanctions  (administrative  fines  or  prohibition  orders,  criminal  fines  or 
imprisonment) established for the various types of competition law infractions is presented in 
Table I. 
In the EU and the Member States, the type of sanctions which may be imposed for restrictive 
practices and for  abuses of a dominant position are generally the same.  This is true for the 
third  countries  as  well,  with  the  exception of Canada,  which  make  criminal  a number  of 
restrictive practices but not abuses of a dominant position. 
Administrative Sanctions 
European  Union  : The Commission may impose prohibition orders for violations of Articles 
85  and  86.  It may  order  fines  for  substantive violations of those  articles,  as  well  as  for 
negligently or intentionally supplying incorrect or misleading information with respect to  an 
application for a negative clearance, notification, response to a request for information or other 
investigation. 
Member States : Prohibition orders may be imposed in all Member States for  some or all 
types of violations.  Administrative fines may be imposed for substantive infractions in  11  of 
the 15 Member States.  Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK do not provide for 
such fines. 
In Ireland, the 1991  Act essentially privatized enforcement, permitting an aggrieved party to 
file  an action in the  High Court for  injunction, declaration, and damages but providing no 
means for the imposition of fines by public authorities for restrictive practices or abuses of 
a dominant position. The Oireachtas is currently considering amendments to the law, expected 
to be enacted soon, which would introduce public enforcement without fines. 
Third Countries : Prohibition orders may be imposed in all third countries.  In the United 
States, the Department of Justice must, and the Federal Trade Commission may,  apply  to a 
Federal District Court for injunctive relief.  In addition, the Federal Trade Commission may, 
after administrative proceedings, itself issue cease and desist orders. 
Fines are provided for  by three of the four third countries, (all but Canada).  As discussed 
below, Canadian law heavily emphasizes criminal sanctions and provides for criminal fines. 
Criminal Sanctions 
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Member States : Of the  Member States,  only  Austria,  France  and  the  Netherlands provide 
criminal sanctions for  substantive violations of the antitrust laws.  In  Austria, criminal fines 
and  imprisonment  may  be  imposed  for  "abuse  of cartel."  In  France,  criminal  fines  and 
imprisonment may be imposed against individuals whose acts were crucial to the conception, 
organization,  and  implementation  of the  prohibited  practices.  In  the  Netherlands,  the 
competition law (which is  based on the abuse control principle) prohibits restrictive practices 
and  dominant  positions  which  are  contrary  to  the  "general  interest,"  and  provides  that  a 
declaration of non-binding effect may  issue when an  abuse has  been committed.  Criminal 
(and civil) sanctions may be  imposed following such declaration. 
Germany, Greece,  the Netherlands and the UK allow criminal sanctions, including fines and 
imprisonment,  for  obstructions  of investigations.  Italian  law  provides  that  administrative 
pecuniary sanctions may be imposed for such obstruction. 
Thzrd C  'ozmtries  : The third countries which provide criminal sanctions for substantive antitrust 
violations arc  Canada, Mexico and the United States.  Criminal sanctions are allowed under 
Canadian  law  for  certain  restrictive  practices,  but  not  for  abuses  of dominant  position. 
Mexican law provides for criminal sanctions against "absolute monopolistic practices," defined 
as contracts, agreements or combinations among competitors whose effect could be to exclude 
or hinder market access, or establish exclusive advantages in favour of one or several persons, 
and for  providing false  information.  US  law allows criminal sanctions for all  violations of 
Sections  1 and  2  of the  Sherman  Act.  In  practice,  however,  criminal  prosecutions· in the 
United  States  are  limited  to  traditional  per  se  offenses,  including  price  fixing,  customer 
allocations, and  bid-rigging. 
Concentrations 
Administrative Sanctions 
European  Union  : The  Commission  may  impose  prohibition  orders  against  violative 
concentrations, and may order divestiture of violative concentrations already consummated. 
It may impose fines  for failing to  satisfy the Merger Regulation's notification requirements, 
supplying incorrect or misleading information, or failing  to  satisfy the Merger· Regulation's 
time suspension requirements or conditions of compatibility.  Further, it may impose periodic 
penalty payments for delays in supplying requested information under the Merger Regulation, 
or in complying with conditions to  (i)  derogations from time suspension requirements, (ii) a 
decision of compatibility, or (iii) a divestiture order. 
Member  States : In  eleven  Member  States  (Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  UK),  orders  may  issue  to  prohibit  the 
consummation of a proposed merger which violates the competition law, either absolutely or 
except on certain conditions.  In seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Portugal,  Spain  and  the  UK),  divestiture  may  be  imposed  with  respect  to  violative 
concentrations already consummated. 
Fines may be imposed for a substantive violation of  the law on concentrations in five Member 
States (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden).  Fines may be imposed for failure to notify 
a concentration in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Italy and Portugal. 
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands do  not have merger control statutes. Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 59 
Third Countries : All of the third countries provide for orders to  prohibit the consummation 
of a proposed merger which violates the law.  Divestiture of violative concentrations already 
consummated is allowed in Mexico and the US.  Fines for substantive violations of the merger 
law are provided for  in Mexico, Switzerland and the US. 
Fines  and  injunctions  may  issue  for  failure  to  comply  with  Hart-Scott-Rodino  premerger 
notification requirements in the US. 
Criminal Sanctions 
European Union  : EU law does not provide for criminal sanctions. 
Member States  : None of the  Memb~r States except Austria provides criminal penalties for 
substantive violations  of the  laws  related  to  mergers.  In  Austria,  criminal  fines  may  be 
imposed for unjustified performance of a merger. 
In Greece and the UK,  the criminal sanctions described above pertaining to  obstructions of 
investigations also apply to concentrations.  Similarly, the administrative pecuniary sanctions 
described above for such obstructions in Italy also apply to  concentrations. 
Third Countries : Canadian law provides that criminal sanctions may be  imposed regarding 
concentrations only where there is  a failure to  notify the director that a notifiable merger is 
proposed, or to supply required information, or when the merger is consummated prior to the 
expiration of time  periods specified in  the act.  The other third countries do  not provide 
criminal sanctions with respect to  mergers. 
II.  ENTITIES WHICH OR INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN BE SANCTIONED 
The Enterprise 
Administrative Sanctions 
European Union  : Under EU law, prohibition orders, fines and periodic penalty payments may 
be imposed against the enterprise. 
Member States : Prohibition orders may issue against the enterprise in all Member States, and 
fines  may  issue against the enterprise in  11  of the  15,  as  described in Section Restrictive 
agreements (see page 9 supra). 
Third Countries : Prohibition orders may be imposed against the enterprise in all of the third 
countries, and fmes may be imposed against the enterprise in Mexico, Sweden and the US, 
as described in Section on Restrictive agreements (see page 9 supra). page 60  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
Criminal Sanctions 
European Union  : EU law does not provide for criminal sanctions. 
Member  States : Criminal  fines  may  issue  against  the  enterprise  for  substantive antitrust 
violations  only  in  Austria  and  the  Netherlands,  subject  to  the  qualifications  described  in 
Section on Concentrations (see page  10  supra).  Criminal fines may be imposed against the 
enterprise for failure to cooperate in an investigation in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Third Countries : Regarding third countries, criminal fines  may  issue against the enterprise 
in  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  US,  as  described  in  Section  on  Concentrations  (  seee  page  10 
supra). 
The individual 
Administrative Sanctions 
European  Union  : The  Merger  Regulation  provides  that  fines  may  be  imposed  against 
"persons  already  controlling  at  least  one  undertaking"  who  acquire  control  of another 
undertaking,  and  who  intentionally  or  negligently  fail  to  notify  a  concentration,  supply 
incorrect or misleading information or incomplete documents, or fail to satisfy time suspension 
requirements or conditions to  a decision of compatibility of a concentration. 
Member  States  : The  UK  and  the  Netherlands  are  the  only  Member  States  in  which  a 
prohibition order can be  directed against an  individual.  British common law provides that 
directors of an enterprise may be fined or imprisoned by the court for contempt for failing to 
follow a court order issued against the enterprise.  In Germany and Ireland, prohibition orders 
can be issued against individuals who constitute an enterprise. 
Six Member States (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece and Spain) provide for the 
imposition  of  fines  on  individuals  acting  on  behalf  of  the  enterprise  for  substantive 
infringements of the  law.  In  Austria,  fines  may  be  imposed against the  "entrepreneur or 
association of entrepreneurs"  by  the  Cartel  Court.  In  Greece,  an  individual  acting  as  an 
individual (or as  an enterprise) may be fined.  In contrast, in France, fines may be imposed 
against the individual only when he is acting as an enterprise.  In Denmark, the infringement 
may be intentional or by  gross negligence. 
Irish law provides that an individual who  is  "in control" of an enterprise may  be  fined  for 
failing to notify a proposed merger within the specified time limit.  The new competition bill 
would  add  that  such  individuals  may  be  fined  for  knowingly  and  wilfully  permitting  the 
provision of false information. 
Italian  law  provides  that  an  individual  possessing relevant  documents  or  information  and 
refusing,  without justification, to  produce  them  during an  investigation or producing  false 
documents shall be subject to fines.  In practice, this sanction has never been applied against 
an ,individual,  only  against enterprises.  Belgian law  provides that fines  may  be  imposed 
against the individual who fails to provide information or otherwise obstructs an investigation. 
'Luxembourg law provides that an individual may be fined for refusing to cease conduct which 
has been enjoined. 
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Third Countries : All of the third countries except Mexico provide that prohibition orders or 
injunctions can be addressed to  the individual.  Mexico and the United States  provide for 
fines against the individual. 
Criminal Sanctions 
European Union  : EU law does not provide for criminal sanctions. 
Member  States : Criminal sanctions may  be  imposed against the  individual  for  substantive 
violations  in  Austria  and  France.  Austrian  law  provides  for  fines  and  imprisonment  of 
"members of a cartel, organ, or tacit agent of a cartel or cartel member."  French law provides 
that criminal fines  and imprisonment may  be  imposed against individuals whose acts were 
crucial to the conception, organization, and implementation of  the prohibited practices.  Greek 
law provides that criminal fines and imprisonment may be imposed against individuals who 
obstruct  investigations  of the  antitrust  laws.  British  law  provides  that  directors  of an 
enterprise may  be  punished by  fines  and/or imprisonment for  obstructing an investigation, 
which constitutes a criminal violation. 
Third Countries : Canada, Mexico and the US  provide for criminal fines  and imprisonment 
of individuals for substantive antitrust violations, as  described in section on Concentrations 
(see page 10  supra). 
Ill SEVERITY OF SANCTIONS 
Statutory limits on sanctions 
European Union  : For substantive violations of  Articles 85 and 86, a fine may not exceed 10% 
of the enterprise's turnover for the preceding business year.  In setting the fine,  gravity and 
duration of the infringement must be considered. 
For supplying incorrect or misleading information with respect to an application for a negative 
clearance,  notification,  response  to  a  request  for  information,  or  other  investigation,  an 
absolute limit of ECU 5.000 is set.  For supplying incorrect or misleading information or 
incomplete documents with respect to a merger, the limit is ECU 50.000. 
For failure to notify a concentration, an absolute limit of 50.000 is set. 
For failure to satisfy time suspension requirements or conditions to a decision of  compatibility 
of a concentration, the limit is 10% of turnover.  In setting the fine, nature and gravity of  the 
infringement must be considered. 
For delay in supplying information requested, or in submitting to an ordered investigation, a 
periodic penalty payment of not more than ECU 25.000 per day may be imposed.  For delay 
in complying with conditions to time suspension requirements, or conditions to a decision of 
·compatibility, or divestiture, a periodic penalty payment of not more than ECU 100.000 per 
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Member  States : Statutory  limitations  on sanctions,  whether  for  substantive or  procedural 
violations, exist in  13  of the Member States.  In Ireland, the  law does not provide for fines 
(except in the  limited circumstances described in  section liB 1 supra)  or imprisonment; in 
Denmark, no  limits exist for fines. 
For substantive violations, a percentage of turnover alone is used in Belgium (10%),  France 
(5%), Greece (15% for consummation of prohibited mergers) Italy (10% for failure to comply 
with a prohibition order;  1-10% of turnover for  consummation of prohibited merger),  and 
Sweden ( 10% );  a percentage of turnover  is  used  in  conjunction with  an  absolute  limit  in 
Finland (up to 680.500 ECU, unless severity of restriction warrants higher fine, in which case 
limit is  10% of total turnover of each participant), Germany (521.800 ECU or up to 3 times 
additional receipts for intentional violations, and 260.900 or  1.5 times additional receipts for 
negligent violations), Greece (ECU 203.200-338.600 for abuses of dominant position, but for 
serious abuses,  10% of gross income),  and Spain (939.500  ECU plus  10% of turnover; for 
concentrations,  10%  of turnover).  An  absolute limit is  used in the Netherlands (6  months 
imprisonment  and  ECU  23.280  for  individuals;  ECU  460.000  for  enterprises;  plus 
supplementary pecuniary sanctions to disgorge the benefit of  the violation) and Portugal (ECU 
510,5  - 1.021.000 for  restrictive business practices and abuses of a dominant position).  In 
Austria, the limit on fines for substantive violations is set as the amount of unjust enrichment 
enjoyed by  the violator. 
In Austria, an absolute limit is set for criminal violations (ECU 741.300).  In France, absolute 
limits on fines and imprisonment are set for substantive criminal violations (ECU 761,3-76.130 
and 6 mos.- 4 yrs imprisonment). 
Limits on fines for contempt are set in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Portugal 
and  Spain.  A  periodic  penalty  payment  for  failure  to  comply  with  a  decision  is  used  in 
Belgium (ECU 6.343  per day); percentage of turnover limit is used in Italy  (1 0% related to 
the product at issue); absolute limits are used in Luxembourg (8 days- 1 year and ECU 253,7 
- 253.700),  the  Netherlands  (6  mos.  imprisonment and  ECU  11.640  for  individuals,  ECU 
46.550 for an enterprise, unless gains are more than 1/4 of fine,  in which case maximum for 
enterprise is ECU 465.500), Portugal (ECU 510,5-51 0.500) and Spain (ECU 62,63 - 939,5 in 
coercive fines, which may be repeated periodically). 
For obstruction of an investigation, a mandatory minimum fine and imprisonment term are set 
in Greece (3  mos.  and ECU 3.386 for  first offense,  twice  that for  repeated offenses); and 
absolute limits in Ireland (ECU 1.264 and/or 12 months imprisonment), Portugal (ECU 510,5-
51.050) and the UK (2  years and no  fine limit in crown court, 6 months and ECU 6.408 in 
magistrate's court). In the UK, absolute limits are set (3  months and ECU 1.282) for failure 
to  comply with a request for information. 
For failure to  satisfy notification requirements, a turnover limit is used in  Greece (3%) and 
Italy (1%) and an absolute limit is used in Austria (ECU 3.706) and Portugal (ECU 510, 5-
510.500). 
Third  Countries : In  third  countries,  absolute  limits  are  set  for  substantive  violations.  In 
Canada, fine limits exist for some violations while others are unlimited (ECU 5.824.000 and 
5 ·-years  imprisonment  for  restrictive  practices,  unlimited  fine  for  price  fixing  and  price 
discrimination, but imprisonment limited to 5 years and 2 years, respectively).  In Mexico, an 
;1bsolute limits are used. In the United States, a complex series of limits exists (see Table IV), 
of which the highest absolute limit is ECU 7.909.000 for substantive violations. 
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Most severe sanctions imposed 
European Union  : The highest fines imposed by the Commission have been ECU 248 million 
against the European Cement Association, 8 national cement associations, and 33  European 
cement producers  for  violations of Article  85  ("Cement"), ECU  132.15  million against  19 
companies in the cartonboard industry for violations of Article 85  ("Cartonboard"); ECU 117 
million against  16  companies in  the steel industry for  violations of Article 65  of the ECSC 
Treaty  ("Poutrelles"),  and  ECU  75  million  against  Tetrapak  for  violation  of Article  86 
("Tetrapak"). 
Member  States : The  highest  fines  have  been  imposed  in  Germany  (ECU  119.200.000; 
30.740.000;  12.990.000),  followed  by  France  (ECU  22.840.000;  5.329.000),  Italy  (ECU 
1.780.000; 1.017.000; 254.300), the Netherlands (settlement ofECU 1.024.000), Spain (ECU 
902.555; 470.081; 457.545), Portugal (ECU 153.200), Greece (38.940), Belgium (ECU 2.537; 
507,4)  and  Denmark (settlements of 1.333;  666,3).  No  fines  ever have  been  imposed in 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
Third  Countries : The  highest  fines  have  been  imposed  in  the  United  States  (ECU 
221.440.000), followed by Canada (ECU 1.925.000;  1.165.000; 931.900). Substantial prison 
terms have also been imposed in the United States, the longest of which was for 5 years.  No 
fines ever have been imposed in  Switzerland. 
IV  BODIES WITH AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS 
Imposition of sanctions 
European Union  : The Commission may impose fines and issue orders. 
Member States : Sanctions may be imposed by administrative authorities in all Member States 
except  Austriia,  where  they  are  imposed  by  the  Cartel  Court.  These  authorities  are 
independent agencies in Denmark, France (except regarding concentrations), Gemiany, Italy, 
Spain  (except  regarding  concentrations)  and  Sweden;  within  government  ministries,  or 
appointed by them, in Belgium, Greece, and Portugal (except regarding concentrations); and 
the  ministry itself in Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands and the  UK.  In  Finland,  the 
Office of  Free Competition, an independent authority, can propose the imposition of sanctions 
to the Cartel Court. 
In Ireland, the main remedies for  competition law violations are available on application to 
the courts.  In addition, the Minister of Industry and Commerce may issue prohibition orders, 
but the  Oireachtas has  power to  confirm or annul  such orders.  Similarly,  in the UK,  the 
President of the Board of trade may issue orders with the consent of Parliament. 
In France, a government ministry has sole competence to issue orders and execute sanctions 
regarding concentrations, on non-binding advice of the Competition Council.  Similarly, in 
Germany, the minister may prohibit a concentration.  In Greece, the Ministry may impose 
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in certain sectors.  In  Portugal, decisions concerning concentrations are  taken jointly by  the 
Minister of Commerce and  the  Minister responsible for  the  affected  sector.  In  Spain,  the 
government may  issue orders regarding concentrations. 
In France, criminal sanctions are handled separately by  the  Procureur de  la  Republique.  In 
the Netherlands, the  Minister of Economic Affairs may  declare that a dominant position is 
contrary to  the  "general  interest," after which he  may  issue a formal  prohibition order.  He 
also  may  issue a declaration of non-binding effect against a  restrictive practice.  A  Royal 
Decree may issue against a category of restrictive practices.  Conduct in violation of all such 
declarations constitutes a criminal violation. 
In the UK, the restrictive practices court may issue enforcement orders and impose sanctions. 
Courts may issue injunctions and award damages in  private actions in  Ireland. 
Third Countries : Sanctions are imposed mainly through court order in Canada and the United 
States.  Independent agencies may impose sanctions in Switzerland.  In Mexico, sanctions may 
be  imposed by  the  Federal Competition Commission, an administrative body of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industrial Promotion "technically and operationally autonomous" from it. 
Appeals 
European  Union  : The  Court of First  Instance  is  empowered  to  review the  legality  of the 
Commission's decisions.  It has  unlimited  discretion to  cancel,  reduce,  or increase fines  or 
periodic penalty payments.  The Court of Justice may  review decisions of the Court of First 
Instance. 
Member States : Courts are  empowered directly to review some or all  sanction decisions in 
13  Member States (all except Denmark and Germany). 
In Denmark and Germany, the decisions of the independent authority may be-reviewed by the 
ministry or a body which it appoints, then ultimately by  the courts. 
In  France,  the  Minister's  decisions  regarding  concentrations  are  not  reviewable.  In  the 
Netherlands, an administrative body has sole authority to review the minister's decisions.  In 
Portugal,  decisions  regarding  concentrations  may  be  appealed  only  to  the  Supreme 
Administrative Tribunal. 
In the UK,  the  decisions of the  Board of Trade are  not reviewable.  However, courts may 
review enforcement orders and sanction decision of the Restrictive Practices Court. 
Third Countries : Regarding  third  countries, judicial  review  is  available  for  court-ordered 
sanctions in  Canada,  and  the  United  States.  Court review of some or  all  decisions by  the 
administrative agencies is  available in Mexico, and Switzerland. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 65 
TABLE I. 
TYPE OF SANCTIONS ALLOWED FOR SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATIONS 
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES AND  ABUSES 
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FOOTNOTES TO TABLE I 
In addition to fines for substantive violations of  Articles 85  and 86, fines may be imposed for 
negligently or intentionally supplying incorrect or misleading information with respect to an 
application for a negative clearance, notification, or response to a request for information or 
other investigation.  (Reg. 17, Art.  15) 
2  Fines  may  be  imposed  under  the  Merger  Regulation  for  failing  to  satisfy  notification 
requirements, supplying  incorrect or misleading  information or  incomplete documents, or 
failing to satisfy time suspension requirements or conditions to  a decision of compatibility. 
(Merger Reg.,  Art.  14)  Periodic  penalty  payments  may  be  imposed  under  the  Merger 
Regulation  for  delays  in  supplying  requested  information  or  submitting  to  an  ordered 
investigation, or for delays in complying with conditions to derogations from time suspension 
requirements, conditions to a decision of compatibility, or a divestiture order.  (Merger Reg., 
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3  The  Commission  may  order  divestiture  with  respect  to  violative  concentrations  already 
consummated.  (Merger Reg., Art. 8) 
4  Austrian law provides for "absorption of enrichment" caused by an "unjustified performance 
of cartel" (Sec. 21) or abuse of a dominant position (Sec. 40).  Fines may be imposed for 
infringement of the obligation to notify a vertical restraint.  (Sec. 142/1) 
5  Austrian  law  provides  for  the  "prohibition of performance of a  cartel" (Sec. 25)  and  the 
prohibition  of vertical  restraints  (Sec.  30c  ).  Divestiture  may  be  ordered  under  certain 
circumstances (See Sec. 23) 
Regarding  abuse  of a  dominant  position,  the  Cartel  Court  may  instruct  the  violating 
undertaking to  "stop abusing the dominant position."  (Sec. 35) 
6  Criminal fines or imprisonment may be  imposed under Austrian  law for "abuse of cartel." 
(Sec. 129)  Criminal fines alone may be imposed for unjustified performance of  cartel, vertical 
restraint, or merger (Sec. 130), or abuse of a dominant position.  (Sec. 131) 
7  Austrian  law  provides that  a  fine  may  be  imposed  on  enterprises failing  to  meet merger 
notification requirements.  (Sec. 42a/4, 142/l) 
8  Austrian  law  provides  that  unless  a  release  has  been  issued  following  notification,  the 
consummation of mergers subject to notification is prohibited.  (Sec. 42a/4) 
9  Belgian law provides that fines may be imposed for failure to notify a concentration.· (Art. 37) 
10  Belgian law provides that the Council for Competition may order divestiture with respect to 
violative concentrations already consummated. (Art. 33, Sec. 4) 
11  Danish law provides that in addition to fines for substantive violations, fines may be imposed 
for  failing to  notify,  submit  required information, or report to  the  Competition Council in 
accordance with  statutory requirements, or failing to  satisfy undertakings entered with the 
Competition Council. (KKL sees. 19, 20) 
12  Denmark does not have a merger control statute. 
13  Under Finnish law, an administrative fine may be imposed on  an  undertaking or association 
of undertakings which engage in  vertical price fixing, bidding cartels, horizontal price fixing, 
market sharing and production restrictions, and abuse of a dominant position.  (Sees. 4-8) 
14  Finland does not have a merger control statute. 
15  French competition law provides that criminal fines and imprisonment may be imposed against 
individuals whose acts were crucial to the conception, organization, and implementation of  the 
prohibited practices. (Art. 17, Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986) 
16  French law provides that "injonctions et prescriptions" of the Minister of Economy must be 
followed by the parties to a concentration. (Art. 42(3)) 
17  In Germany, failure to cooperate in an administrative investigation constitutes an administrative 
offense and may be fined pursuant to criminal proceedings.  (GWB Sec. 39; OWIG) 
·.  18  German law provides·that fines may be imposed for failure to notify a concentration. German 
law also provides that the FCO may order divestiture with respect to violative concentrations 
already consummated. (S. 24 GWB) Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 67 
19  Greek law  provides that criminal fines  and imprisonment may  be  imposed  for obstructing 
investigations of possible violations of the competition laws.  (Sec. 29(2)). 
20  Greek law provides that fines may be imposed for a violation of  the substantive rules regarding 
concentrations (Art. 4'(d)(l)) and for failure to  notify a concentration.  (Sec. 4a(5); Decision 
of Minister of commerce) 
21  Greek law  provides that the Minister may prohibit a concentration, and that a concentration 
which has  been consummated in  spite of a Minister's prohibition order may  be  divested or 
subject to other appropriate orders.  (Art. 4(b)) 
22  Irish  competition  law  does  not  provide  for  the  imposition  of fines  by  any  administrative 
authority for restrictive practices or abuses of a dominant position.  The  1991  Act essentially 
privatized the enforcement of Irish competition law,  permitting an aggrieved party to  file an 
action in  the High Court for  injunction, declaration, or damages.  However, the Competition 
Bill of 1994  is currently under consideration in the legislature, and is expected to be enacted 
soon.  This legislation introduces public enforcement of the Competition law, although it does 
not envisage the imposition of fines for substantive violations. 
23  Irish competition law provides that in addition to the injunctive and declaratory relief  discussed 
in note 14 supra, the Minister for Industry and Commerce (and under the Competition Bill of 
1994, also the Competition Authority) may seek an injunction and declaration from a court for 
a breach of  Section 4, which prohibits agreements in restraint of  trade.  Moreover, the Minister 
for  Industry and  Commerce can  issue  an  order prohibiting the continuance of a dominant 
position and require, for example, the sale of assets, which must be confirmed by both houses 
of the Oireachtas.  (Sees. 6,  14, Irish Competition Act of 1991) 
24  Currently, if an enterprise fails to notify a proposed merger within the specified time limit, the 
"person  in  control" of the  enterprise is  liable  for  fines.  (Sec.  16,  Irish  Competition Act, 
replacing Sec. 5, Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies Act of 1978)  The Competition Bill of 
1994  would  add  that fines  may  be  imposed on  a  "person  in  control"  who  knowingly  and 
wilfully permits the provision of  false information in a notification.  It also would add Section 
19a, providing that merger and takeover agreements are not covered by section 4 of  the 1991 
Act, which prohibits agreements in restraint of  trade.  Instead, only the 1978 Act would apply 
to mergers, under which mergers meeting certain turnover thresholds must ·be notified to the 
Ministry for  Industry and  Commerce.  The Minister may  refer the  file to  the Competition 
Authority for investigation, which may, in turn, propose to the Minister that he prohibit the 
merger either absolutely or on certain conditions.  Any such order must be laid before each 
house  of the  Oireachtas, which  may  annul  the  order within  21  days.  (Sec. 9,  Mergers 
Takeovers and Monopolies Act of 1978) 
25  Italian  law  provides  that  in  addition  to  fines  for  substantive  violations,  individuals  and 
enterprises possessing relevant documents or information and refusing, without justification, 
to produce them during an  investigation, or producing false documents, may be subject to 
administrative pecuniary sanctions.  (Art.  14,  para. 5)  In practice, however, such sanctions 
never have been applied against an individual. 
26  Italian law provides that if  an enterprise fails to satisfy an administrative order more than once, 
the Authority may order the suspension of  the activity of  the enterprise for up to 30 days. (Art. 
15, LawN. 287, Oct.  10,  1990) 
27  Italian law provides that the authority may impose fines in case of failure to respect an order 
prohibiting a concentration, or failure to notify. (Art. 18, LawN. 287, Oct. 10, 1990) 
28  Luxembourg law provides that fines and imprisonment may be imposed against individuals 
who refuse to cease conduct which has been enjoined.  (Art. 8) page 68  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
29  Luxembourg does not have a merger control statute.  However, concentrations which constitute 
restrictive practices or abuses of a dominant position are prohibited.  (Art. 7) 
30  Netherlands competition law, which is  based on abuse control, prohibits restrictive practices 
which are considered contrary to the general interest, either individually through Decision of 
the Minister of Economic Affairs (WEM, Arts.  19,  22), or by category of practice, declared 
by  Royal Decree (WEM, Arts.  I 0,  15).  When a dominant position is  deemed to be contrary 
to the general interest, the Minister of Economic Affairs may decide either to prohibit or oblige 
certain conduct (WEM, Art. 24).  Violation of such decisions and Royal Decrees is subject to 
crimina! sanctions. 
3 I  The Netherlands does not have a merger control statute. 
32  Portugese  law  provides  that  fines  may  be  imposed  for  supplying  false  information  m  a 
notification, or for failure to notify a notifiable concentration.  (Art. 37(3)). 
33  Spanish law provides that the Tribunal for the Defense of  CompetitiOn may impose prohibition 
orders and coercive fines to oblige compliance with such orders. (Art.  II) 
34  The  Spanish  Penal  Code establishes criminal fines  and  imprisonment for  acts which  may 
violate the  competition  laws.  In  practice, however, this  provision  has  been applied  rarely 
regarding such acts. 
.· 
35  Spanish law provides that divestiture may be ordered with respect to a violative concentration 
already consummated. (Art.  17) 
36  British law does not provide fines for violations of the competition laws.  However, breach of 
a  prohibition order of the  Restrictive Practices Court (regarding restnctive practices) or the 
High Court (regarding abuses of a dominant position or concentrations) constitutes contempt 
and is  punishable by the Court by fines, imprisonment or sequestration of assets. 
3 7  British law provides that certain agreements must be registered with the Director General of 
Fair Trading, and failure to do  so will render any such restriction void. (Sec. 35, Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act  1976)  Moreover, the  Restrictive Practices Court may  issue  an  order 
prohibiting an  attempt to  enforce any restriction which  it  finds  to  be contrary to the public 
interest, whether or not it has been registered. 
38  British  law  provides  that obstruction of an  investigation  by  the  Director General of Fair 
Trading, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, and/or the Secretary of State (President of 
Board of Trade) is  a criminal violation punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.  (Sees. 36 
and 3 8,  Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976; Sees. 46(2), 85 and 93 B, Fair Trading Act  1973; 
Sees. 3, 7,  Competition Act  1980) 
39  British  law  provides  that  in  addition  to  prohibiting  the  consummation  of a  merger, the 
President of the Board of Trade may order divestiture or behavioral remedies with respect to 
violative concentrations already consummated. (Sec. 56, Sched. 8,  14, Fair Trade Act of 1973; 
Sec. I 0, Competition Act 1980) 
40  In addition to fines, Canadian law provides that a person who has been convicted of violating 
the Act may be required to make restitution of  damages to injured parties.  (Sec. 725, Criminal 
Code) 
41  Canadian law provides that criminal sanctions may be imposed regarding concentrations only 
where there  is  a  failure  to  notify,  to  supply  required information, or when  the  merger is 
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42  Mexican law provides that "relative monopolistic practices," (defined as  acts, agreements or 
combinations whose effect could be to exclude or hinder market access, or establish exclusive 
advantages in  favour of one or several persons, including vertical divisions of markets, resale 
price maintenance, tied sales, exclusive dealing, allocation of customers, refusals to deal, and 
vertical  boycotts)  require  market  analysis  to  assess  their  legality,  and  are  subject  to 
administrative sanctions, including prohibition orders and fines.  (Ch. 2,  Art.  I 0) 
43  Mexican law provides that "absolute monopolistic practices," (defined as contracts, agreements, 
or combinations among competitors whose effect could be to exclude or  hinder market access, 
or establish exclusive advantages in  favour of one or several persons, including price fixing 
agreements, cartel agreements, horizontal market divisions, and bid rigging) are deemed to  be 
per se illegal, and are subject to prohibition orders, as well as criminal fines and imprisonment. 
(Ch.  2,  Art.  9)  Criminal  sanctions  also  may  be  imposed  for  making  false  statements or 
providing false information. (Ch. 6,  Art. 35) 
44  Mexican law provides that partial or total divestiture may be imposed with respect to violative 
concentrations already consummated.  (Ch. 3,  Art.  19) 
45  Swiss law provides only that certain behaviours may be required by the Ministry, and allows 
for the imposition of fines for the failure to satisfy investigative demands or to comply with 
orders and decisions. (Arts. 30, 32, 37, 39-40 KG). 
46  US  law  provides  that  the  Department of Justice  may  seek  fines  through  court order for 
violations of the  antitrust laws,  but may not  impose fines  itself.  (15  U.S.C.  1,  2,  4)  The 
government can maintain an action for treble damages plus costs if the US  is  injured by an 
Antitrust violation ( 15 USC Sa); state attorneys general may bring such actions when the state 
is  injured ( 15 USC 15c ); and private parties may bring such actions when they are injured ( 15 
USC  15).  Fines  may  be  imposed  for  failure  to  comply  with  premerger  notification 
requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.  ( 16 CFR 803.30 (1994)) Finally, fines may be 
imposed for violations of FTC cease and desist orders. (15  USC  15c) 
47  US  law provides that the  Department of Justice and  Federal Trade Commission may  seek 
injunctive relief(including temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and permanent 
injunctions  which  may  require divestiture) from  a  federal district court for  Sherman Act, 
Clayton Act and  FTC  Act violations.  (15  U.S.C. 4,  45,  53(b)) Such  order may  issue  to 
prohibit consummation of a concentration which would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
In addition, the FTC may issue a cease and desist order, subject to judicial review.  ( 15 U .S.C. 
21b,  45b)  Injunctive relief may  be  imposed  for  failure to comply with  Ha.rt-Scott-Rodino 
premergernotification requirements.  (16 CFR 803.30 (1994)) Moreover, the government and 
defendants  may  enter consent decrees,  which  are  final  settlements  for  relief before  any 
testimony has been taken in  a case.  The Antitrust Proceedings and Penalties Act requires a 
court to determine whether such decree will be in the "public interest" before it is entered. (PL 
93-528)  Finally, private parties may seek injunctions through court order.  (15 U.S.C. 26) 
48  US  law provides that only the Department of Justice may seek criminal penalties, including 
fines and imprisonment, for Sherman Act violations.  (15  U.S.C.  1,  2,  4)  In practice, the 
Department  prosecutes  only  per  se  violations,  usually  involving  price  fixing,  customer 
allocations, bid rigging, or other cartel activities. page 70  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws ~-~er_s of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 71 
TABLE II. 
ENTITIES WHICH OR  INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN BE SANCTIONED FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATIONS 
ENTERPRISE  INDIVIDUAL 
Administrative  Criminal 
Administrative 
Criminal 
EU/Member 
Fines 
Prohibition 
Fines  Fines 
Prohibition 
Fines 
States  orders  Orders 
Imprisonment 
European Unton  yes  yes  no  no1  no  no  no 
Austria  yes  yes  yes2  yes3  no  yes4 
yes4 
Belgium  yes
5  yes  no  no
5  no  no  no 
Denmark  yes  yes  no  yes6  no  no  no 
Fmland  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
France  yes  yes  no  no7  no  yes
8  yes
8 
Germany  yes  yes  nag  yes1o  no  nag  no 
Greece  yes  yes  no  yes11  no  no12  no12 
Ireland  no  yes  no  no13  no14  no  no 
Italy  yes  yes  no  no1s  no  no  no 
Luxembourg  no  yes  no  no16  no  no16  no16 
Netherlands  no  yes  yes17  no  yes  yes
17  yes17 
Portugal  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
Spam  yes  yes  no  yes1s  no  no1g  no1g 
Sweden  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
United Ktngdom  no2o  yes  no  no21  yes  no
22  no
22 
Third Country 
Canada  no  yes  yes23  no  yes  - yes24  yes24 
Mexico  yes  yes  yes  yes2s  no  yes  yes 
Switzerland  no  yes  no  no  yes  no  no 
USA  yes26  yes27  yes2s  yes26  yes27  yes2e  yes2e 
FOOTNOTES TO TABLE II 
1.  Under the Merger Regulation, fines may be  imposed against "persons already controlling at 
least one undertaking" who acquire control of another undertaking, and who intentionally or 
negligently  fail  to  notify  a  concentration, supply  incorrect or  misleading  information  or 
incomplete documents, fail to satisfy time suspension requirements or conditions to a decision 
of compatibility of a concentration.  (Merger Reg., Art. 3(1), 14) 
2.  Under Austrian law,  criminal courts can impose fines on  enterprises if the elements of an 
offense by an "entrepreneur" are satisfied.  (Sec. 13 7) 
3.  Under  Austrian  law,  fines  may  be  imposed  on  the  "entrepreneur or  the  association  of 
entrepreneurs" by the Cartel Court.  (Sees. 21, 40,  142) page 72  Surveys of the Member States' powers to Investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
4.  In  Austria, imprisonment and/or fines may be imposed against "members of a cartel, organ, 
or tacit agent of a cartel or cartel member."  (Sec. 129)  All "entrepreneurs" of a cartel are to 
be held liable for fines jointly with the convicted person.  (Sec. 136) 
5.  Belgian law provides that fines may be imposed on the individual who or enterprise which fails 
to  provide information or otherwise obstructs an  investigation.  (Art. 37)  In  addition,  the 
enterprise may be  fined for the substantive violation.  (Art. 36) 
6.  Danish law provides that fines may be imposed on individuals acting on behalf  of  the company 
if they have infringed the rules intentionally or by gross negligence.  (KKL Sec. 20(1)) 
7.  French law  provides that  fines  may  be  imposed against the  individual  in  cases where the 
individual is  an enterprise. (Art. 13, Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986) 
8.  French competition law provides that criminal penalties may be imposed against individuals 
whose acts were crucial to the conception, organization, and implementation of the prohibited 
practices. (Art. 17,  Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986) 
9.  In  Germany, criminal penalties may be imposed for failure to cooperate in  an administrative 
investigation.  (GWB Sec. 39; OWIG) 
I 0.  German law provides that individuals acting on behalf of enterprises may be fined.  (Sec. 38 
GWB) 
11.  Greek law provides that individuals acting in  their personal capacity or as representatives of 
legal persons can be fined (Sec. 29, para. 1) and may be held liable jointly with the enterprise 
for the payment of fines. (Sec. 30, para.  1) 
12.  Greek law provides that criminal proceedings may be initiated, and criminal penalties imposed, 
against  entrepreneurs in  the  case  of sole  proprietorships, against  partners  in  the  case of 
partnerships, against administrators in the case of limited liability companies and cooperatives, 
and  against members of the  board of directors in  the  case of corporations for  obstructing 
investigations of  antitrust violations.  (Sees. 29, 30)  Penalties include a mandatory prison term 
and a fine.  (Sec. 29, para. 2) 
13.  Irish law provides that if an enterprise fails to notify a proposed merger within the specified 
time limit, the  "person in  control" of the enterprise is  liable for fines.  (Sec. 16,  1991  Irish 
Competition Act, replacing Sec. 5,  Mergers, Takeovers, and Monopolies Act of 1978)  The 
Competition  Bill  of 1994  adds  that fines  may  be  imposed  on  a  "person  in  control"  who 
knowingly and wilfully permits the provision of  false information.  Fines and/or imprisonment 
may be imposed against individuals for obstruction of investigations. (Sec. 21 (3),  1991  Irish 
Competition Act;  Sec. 7(4), Schedule of 1991  Competition Act) 
14.  Prohibition orders relate to "undertakings," which encompass individuals "engaged for gain in 
the production, supply, or distribution of  goods or the provision of  a service."  (Art. 3( 1  ), 1991 
Irish Competition Act) 
15.  Ita  I  ian  law  provides  that  individuals  and  enterprises  possessing  relevant  documents  or 
information and refusing, without justification, to  produce them during an investigation, or 
producing false documents, shall be subject to administrative pecuniary sanctions.  (Art. 14, 
para. 5)  In  practice, however, such sanctions never have been applied against the individual. 
16.  Luxembourg law provides that fines and imprisonment may be imposed against individuals 
who refuse to cease conduct which has been enjoined.  (Art. 8) Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 73 
17.  Violation  of a  Royal  Decree prohibiting or obliging  certain conduct after the  Minister of 
Economic Affairs has found a dominant position to be contrary to the general interest is subject 
to criminal penalties.  (WEM, Arts.  19,  22, 24) 
18.  Spanish  law  provides  that  fines  may  be  imposed  against  natural  persons  who  are  legal 
representatives of the  enterprise or who  were  members of the  administrative  bodies  that 
participated in  the agreement or decision. (Art.  l 0) 
19.  The Spanish Penal Code establishes criminal fines and imprisonment against the individual for 
acts  which  may  constitute  violations  of the  competition  laws.  In  practice, however,  this 
provision has been applied rarely. 
20.  British law does not provide fines for violations of the competition laws.  However, breach of 
a  prohibition order of the Restrictive Practices Court (regarding restrictive practices) or the 
High Court (regarding abuses of a dominant position or concentrations) constitutes contempt 
and is  punishable by  fines,  imprisonment or sequestration of assets. 
21.  British common law provides that directors of an enterprise may be fined or imprisoned by the 
court for contempt for failing to follow an order of the Restrictive Practices Court or the High 
Court issued against the enterprise. 
22.  British  law  provides  that  directors  of an  enterprise  may  be  punished  by  fines  and/or 
imprisonment for obstructing an  investigation by  the  Director General of Fair Trading, the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, and/or the Secretary of State (President of the Board 
of Trade).  (Sees.  46(2),  85  and  93B,  Fair Trading  Act  1973;  Sec.  38,  Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act  1976;  Sees. 3,  7,  Competition Act 1980) 
23.  Canadian law provides that corporations guilty of entering agreements in  restraint of trade, 
price fixing, or discriminatory pricing are subject to criminal fines.  (Sees. 45, 61 (9), and para. 
50( 1  )(a)) 
24.  Canadian law provides that individuals guilty of  entering agreements in restraint of  trade, price 
fixing,  or discriminatory pricing are subject to  imprisonment and criminal fines.  (Sees. 45, 
61(9), and para. 50(1)(a)). 
25.  Mexican  law  provides  that  individuals  who  have  participated  "directly  or  indirectly  in 
monopolistic practices or prohibited [concentrations] on behalf or in  representation and by 
order of corporations" may be fined  for  the  substantive violations and for providing false 
information.  (Ch. 6,  Art. 35) 
26.  US  law  provides  that  the  Department of Justice  may  seek fines  against  individuals  and 
enterprises through court order for violations of the antitrust laws, but may not impose fines 
itself.  (15  U.S.C. 1,  2,  4)  The government can maintain an action for treble damages plus 
costs against individuals and enterprises if the US is  injured by an antitrust violation ( 15 USC 
Sa); state attorneys general may bring such actions when the state is injured ( 15 USC 15c  ); and 
private parties may bring such actions when they are injured ( 15  USC  15).  Fines may be 
imposed for failure to comply with premerger notification requirements under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act. (16 CFR 803.30(1994)) Finally, violations of an FTC cease and desist order are 
punishable against individuals or enterprises by penalties. ( 15  USC 15c) 
27.  US  law provides that the  Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may seek 
injunctive relief(including temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and permanent 
injunctions, which may require divestiture) against individuals and enterprises from a federal 
district court for Sherman Act, Clayton Act and FTC Act violations.  ( 15  U .S.C. 4, 45, 53(b  )) 
Such an order may issue to  prohibit consummation of a concentration which would violate 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In addition, the FTC may issue a cease and desist order against page 74  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investrgate and sanction vrolatrons of natrona  I competitron laws 
the individual or the cnterpnse. subJect to judicial rev1cw.  ( 15  U S.C. 45  and [add Sec.  II  of 
r_:hvton Act])  l11iunctive relrefmay be imposed for failure to complv with !lart·Scott-Rodino 
;),-cmergt:irwtrftr.ati,,:l n·qtmemenh  (16 CFR 803 :10)1994))  Moreov~r. the government :11:d 
.lefendant<>,  e1ther  individuals  or  enterprises,  may  enter consent decrees,  which  are  final 
settlements for reliefbcfore any testimony has been taken in a case. The Antitrust Proceedings 
and  Penalties Act requires a  court to determine whether such decree will  be  in  the "public 
interest" before it  is entered. (PL 93-528)  Finally, private parties may seek injunctions against 
individuals or enterprises through court order.  ( 15  U.S.C  26) 
28.  US  law provides that only the Department of Justice may seek criminal penalties, including 
fines against the enterpnse, and fines and imprisonment against the individual, for Sherman 
Act  v1olat1ons.  (15  U.S C.  I,  2,  4)  In  practice,  the  Department prosecutes  only  per  se 
violations,  usually  Involving  pnce fixing,  customer allocations, bid  r1ggmg  or  other cartel 
activity 
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II EU/Member 
')tate/Third 
:;ountry 
II European Union 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
Austria 
II 
Belgium 
Denmark 
TABLE Ill. 
SEVERITY OF SANCTIONS 
(ECU conversions by rates of OJ  No.  C308/1, 4.11.94) 
STATUTORY LIMITS ON 
SANCTIONS 
1  ECU  1.000-1 000.000,  or sum in  excess 
of that up  to  10% of turnover in preceding 
busmess year,  for violation of Art.  85 or 86. 
In  setting fine,  regard  shall be  had to gravity 
and duration of infringement.  (Reg.  17,  Art. 
15(2)) 
2.  ECU  100-5.000 for intentionally or 
negligently supplying incorrect or misleading 
information with respect to  an  application for 
a negative clearance, notification, response 
to a request for information, or other 
investigation.  (Reg.  17,  Art  15(1)) 
3  ECU  1.000-50.000 for intentionally or 
negligently failing to notify a concentration, 
or supplying incorrect or misleading 
information or incomplete documents. 
(Merger Reg.,  Art  14) 
4.  Up to  10% turnover for falling to satisfy 
time suspension requirements or conditions 
to a decision of compatibility of a 
concentration.  In setting fine,  regard  shall 
be had  to  nature and gravity of 
infringement. (Merger Reg.,  Art.  14) 
5.  Periodic penalty payments of up to  ECU 
25.000 per day of delay in  supplying 
information requested or in submitting to 
ordered investigation  (Merger Reg  , Art. 
15( 1)) 
6.  Periodic penalty payments of up to 
100.000 per day of delay in  complying with 
conditions to derogations from time 
suspension requirements of concentration or 
conditions to a decision of compatibility, or 
er  Art.  1! 
1.  To disgorge the  benefits of the 
infringement, the Cartel Court imposes 
payment to the government of an amount 
equal to the unjust enrichment derived from 
the infringement.  (Sec. 21) 
2.  Fines of up to ATS 500.000 (ECU 3.706) 
may be imposed for failure to satisfy 
notification requirements.  To determine the 
amount, the court considers the seriousness 
of the infringement, the degree of 
culpability, and  economic efficiency.  (Sec. 
143) 
3.  Fines of up to ATS 10 million (ECU 
7  41.300) m  be  im  by the criminal 
1.  10% of turnover;  additional daily 
payment of up to BF  250.000 (ECU 6.343) 
for failure to comply with decision. (Art.  36) 
2.  Fines of BF  20.000-1  million (ECU 
507,5-25.370) can be imposed for 
obstructing an investigation.  (Art.  37) 
Competition law contains no limits. 
MOST SEVER SANCTIONS 
IMPOSED 
1.  On  30  November 1994, the 
Commission imposed a fine of ECU  248 
million a9a1nst  the European Cement 
Association, 8 national cement 
associations and  33  European cement 
producers for infnngements of Article 
85(1 ).  (Press Release 
I  P/94/11 08)("Cement") 
2.  In  July 1994, the Commission 
imposed a fme of ECU  132.15 million 
against 19 companies in the cartonboard 
industry for violations of Art  85(1)  (OJ 
No.  L243/1,  19.9.94)("Cartonboard") 
3.  In  February 1994, the Commission 
imposed a fine of ECU  117 million 
against 16 companies in the steel 
industry for violations of Art.  65( 1  ).  (OJ 
No.  L  116/1, 6.5.94)("Poutrelles") 
4.  In July 1991,  the Commission 
imposed a fine of ECU  75  million against 
Tetrapak for violation of Art  86.  (OJ  No. 
L72/1,  18.3.92)("Tetrapak") 
To date,  neither fines nor a prison term 
have been imposed. 
Only 2 fines have been imposed thus far: 
1.  In July 1993, a fine of BF 20.000 
(ECU 507,4) was imposed for failure to 
make a timely notification. 
2.  In Se()tember 1994, a fine of BF 
100.000 (ECU 2.537) was imposed for 
Fines rarely imposed.  In 1991, a 
settlement was entered in which the 
company agreed to pay DKK 10.000 
(ECU 1.333) for a refusal to supply. 
Fines  would not exceed DKK 
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Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Fines of FIM  5.000-4 million (ECU 851-
680.500) can  be imposed for substantive 
violations.  The amount is based on the 
nature of the restriction and  its duration. 
(Sec.  8,  para.  2).  This maximum may be 
exceeded where the restriction on 
competition and circumstances warrant,  but 
not more than  1  0% of the total turnover of 
each of the participating undertakings or 
associations of undertakings for the year 
precedinq the violation. 
1.  Civil fines are limited to 5%  of turnover. 
(Art.  13) 
2.  Crimmal fines of FF  5.000-500.000 (ECU 
761,3 - 76.130) or a prison term of 6 
months - 4 years may be imposed against 
individuals convicted of personal 
involvement in the  proscribed acts.  (Art.  17, 
Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986) 
3.  For obstruction of investigation, up to FF 
50.000 (ECU  7.614) or imprisonment of up 
to  six months. 
1.  For intentional violations, up to  DM  1 
million (ECU  521.800);  beyond that, up to 3 
times additional receipts from the violation 
for intentional violations (Sec.  38(4) GWR) . 
2.  For violations involving negligence, up to 
DM  500.000 (ECU  260.900)(Sec.  1 and  2, 
OWIG) and  1.5 times additional receipts 
from the violation (Sec.  17(2)0WIG). 
3.  For failure to cooperate in  an 
administrative investigation, criminal fines of 
up to DM  50.000 (ECU  26.100) for each 
wrongdoing  (GWB Sec.  39;  STPO; OWIG), 
or penalty payments of up to  DM  2.000 
(ECU  1.044)(VwVG Sec.  11 ).  Criminal 
penalties of up to 6 weeks imprisonment or 
monetary penalty for failure to cooperate in 
a criminal proceeding.  (STPO) 
1.  Fines of DRG 60 million- 100 million 
(ECU 203.100 - 338.600) for strengthening 
or abusing a dominant position; for serious 
infringements, 10% of gross income of 
violator during the year infringement 
committed, or preceding year.  (Sec.  9, 
para.  2) 
2.  For obstruction of an  investigation, at 
least 3 months imprisonment and  a fine of 
at least  DRG  1 million (ECU  3.386)  for the 
first offense;  twice that amount for repetition 
of the offense.  (Sec.  29,  paras.  1&2) 
3.  Up to 3%  of turnover for failure to notify 
a concentration. (Sec. 4a,  para.  5) 
4.  For consummation of a prohibited 
concentration, fine of up to  15% of total 
turnover of the undertakings participating in 
the concentration. (Decision of the Minister 
of commerce  Art. 4(d)  Sec.  1) 
1.  No fines or imprisonment provided in 
1991  Act for substantive violations. 
2.  For obstruction of an  investigation, up to 
lrl 1.000 (ECU  1.265) and/or up to  12 
months imprisonment.  (1991  Act,  Sec. 
21(3)) 
To date,  no fines have been imposed. 
The Office of Free Competition has 
proposed fines in several cases,  but the 
Competition Council, which exercises 
jurisdiction in competition matters, has 
not yet decided whether to impose these 
fines. 
1.  In  1989,  a fine of FF  150 million 
(ECU 22.840.000) was imposed against 
72  enterprises for violations of Art.  7 of 
the Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986. 
(Decision du Conseil de Ia Concurrence 
du  25 Octobre 1989) 
2.  In  1994,  a fine of FF  35  million (ECU 
5.329.000) was imposed against CARAT 
for violation of Arts.  7 and 8 of the 
Ordonnance du  1 Decembre 1986. 
(Decision D SJ  59 du Conseil de Ia 
Concurrence du  15 Decembre 1993) 
FCO has repeatedly relied on Sec.  17(2) 
OWl  G. 
1.  In  1988,  a fine of DM  228.5 million 
(ECU  119.200.000) was imposed against 
the German Cement Industry due to long 
and severe breach of competition rules. 
DM  111  million (ECU  57.930.000) is the 
highest fine imposed·against an 
individual company; and  DM  600.000 
(ECU 313.100) is the highest fine against 
an  individual, both in same cement case. 
2.  In  1988,  a fine of DM  58.9 million 
(ECU 30.740.000) was imposed against 
70 enterprises and  145 individuals in the 
heating and  air conditioning industry. 
3.  In  1982, the FCO imposed fines of 
DM  56.5 million (ECU 29.480.000) 
against 83 enterprises and  their 
responsible officers.  Fines were 
subsequently reduced on  appeal to DM 
24.9 million (ECU  12.99 million) for two 
reasons: worsening economic situation, 
and recalculation of undue profits. 
The Competition Committee advised 
fines as follows  a~ainst the Greek 
bottling company  '3E":  1) DRG 20 
million (ECU  67.730) for abuse of 
dominant position in price and discount 
policy; 2) DRG 2 million (ECU  6. 773) for 
abuse of dominant position through price 
discrimination; 3)  DRG 500.000 (ECU 
1.693) for failure to notify acquisition of 
competitors' shares; 4)  DRG 20 million 
(ECU 67. 730) for abuse of dominant 
position through the acquisition.  The 
Minister accepted the first three 
recommendations, but lowered the 
proposed fines by a total of DRG  11 
million (ECU  37.250).  Thus,  the total 
fine was DRG 11.5 million (ECU 38.940). 
(Competition Policy in OECD Countries, 
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11  Luxembourg 
II Netherlands 
II 
II  11  'jortugal 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
1.For a failure to follow orders designed to 
restore competition following consummation 
of a prohibited merger,  fines of 1 - 10% of 
turnover during accounting year preceding 
service of warning, referring to products 
which are object of the undertaking or 
abuse of dominant position, depending on 
the gravity of the violation.  (Arts.  15,  19) 
2.  For fa1lure to complt with a prohibition 
order,  fines of up to  10 Yo  of turnover,  and  if 
fine had  already been applied, then  at. least 
two times fine already applied up to  10% of 
turnover.  In the case of repeated  failures to 
comply, the authority may suspend 
operations for up to 30  days.  (Art.  15) 
3.  For failure to  notify a concentration,  up 
to  1% of the preceding year's turnover,  in 
addition to other fines discussed above. 
(Art.  19) 
4.  For refusal or failure to supply 
information requested,  up to Lire 50  million 
(ECU 25.430);  for supplying incorrect or 
misleading information, up to  Lire 100 
million (ECU  50.860). 
Prison term of 8 days - 1 year and fine of 
LF  10.000- 1 million (ECU  253,7-
253.700) for failure to obey an  order to 
cease violative conduct.  (Art.  8_) 
A maximum fine of Fl  50.000 (ECU  23.280) 
and/or a maximum prison term of 6 months 
may be imposed against individuals.  A 
maximum fine of Fl.  1.000.000 (ECU 
460.000) may be imposed against an 
enterprise. (Art. 6 io.; Art.  23,  Criminal 
Code)  In addition, a supplementary 
pecuniary sanction may be imposed to 
disqorqe the benefit of the violation. 
1.  Escudos 100.000-200 million (ECU  510 
- 1.021.000) for substantive violations 
regarding restrictive practices and  abuses of 
a dominant position.  (Art.  37{2)) 
2.  Escudos 100.000- 100 million (ECU  510 
- 510.500) for failure to comply with order of 
Competition Council concerning restrictive 
business practices or abuses of a dominant 
position or decision of Ministries concerning 
concentration, failure to notify a 
concentration, supplying false information in 
a notification or in reply to a request for 
information concerning a concentration. (Art. 
37{3)} 
3.  E:scudos  100.000- 10 million (ECU 
510,5- 51.050) for obstructing an 
investi~ation or giving false information 
regarding restrictive business practices or 
abuses of a dominant poisition (Art.  37(4)) 
5.  Escudos 50.000 - 5 million (ECU 255,:3 -
25.530) for false declarations by third 
parties in an investigation or giving false 
Information regarding restrictive business 
practices or abuses of a dominant position. 
(Art.  37(5)) 
1.  In  1992, fines of Lire 3.5 billion (ECU 
1.780.000) and 2 billion (ECU  1.011.000) 
were imposed for restrictive agreements 
in the Cementi-Sacci case.  (Relazione 
Annuale deii'Autorita Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato,  pp.  32-34, 
1993). 
2.  On July 10,  1991, a fine of Lire 500 
million (ECU 254.300) was imposed for 
failure to notify a concentration.  (ld.,  p. 
48,  1992). 
To date,  no individuals have been 
imprisoned under this provision.  Most 
cases settled.  Maximum pecuniary 
sanction imposed was  Fl  2,2 million 
(ECU  1.024.000). 
1.  From the time Law No.  422/83 was 
enacted until the end  of 1989, the 
Competition Council has examined 32 
cases and  has imposed fines in  10 of 
these,  ranging from  Escudos 50.000 -
5.000.000 (ECU 255,3 - 25.530). 
2.  In  1990, fines of Escudos 10.000.000 
(ECU 51.050) were imposed against 
each of three gas distnbutors, totaling 
Escudos 30.000.000 (ECU  153.200). 
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Spain 
Sweden 
United K1ngdom 
Canada 
1.  Up to  Pts 150 million (ECU 939 500) 
This amount may be increased to  up to 
10% of turnover for the fiscal year 
precedmg the court's decision 
2.  Pts 10.000- 150.000 (ECU 62,63-
939,5) in coercive fines, which may be 
repeated penodically. (Art.  11) 
3  For concentrations, up  to  10% of 
turnover  (Art  18) 
4  Pts  50 000-1  m1lllon (ECU 313-6 263) 
for failure to cooperate in  an  investigation or 
to supply requested information; up to  Pts. 
150 000 per day for obstruction of the SDC 
mvest1gat1on proceedmgs  (Art  32) 
10% of turnover  However,  in  pract1ce,  the 
fme is  based on  an  evaluat1on of damages 
and  profits from the v1olat1on. 
1  For obstruction of mvestigat1on in 
v1olat1on of Fa1r Trad1ng  Act of 1973, 
Restnct1ve Trade  Practices Act 1976 and 
Compet1t1on Act 1980 or for contempt of 
court,  max1mum  penalty  1s  2 years 
1mpnsonment and  unl1m1ted fmes in  Crown 
Court,  and 6 months impnsonment and/or L 
5 000  f1ne  (ECU 6 408)  1n  magistrate's 
court 
2  Fa1lure to comply w1th  a request for 
mformation IS  punishable by  3 months 
Imprisonment and/or L  1.000 fme  (ECU 
1 282)  (Sec  36,  RTPA) 
1.  Unlimited for some offenses,  lim1ts for 
others  For agreements 1n  restraint of trade, 
a max1mum fine of C$  10 million (ECU 
5 824 000) and/or a max1mum pnson term 
of five years.  (Sec  45)  For price fixmg,  an 
unlim1ted fine and/or a max1mum  pnson 
term of f1ve  years  (Sec.  61 (9))  For 
d1scrimmatory pncing, an  unl1m1ted fine 
and/or a max1mum  prison term of 2 years. 
(Sec  50(1)) 
2.  Cnminal fines of up to C$  5.000 (ECU 
2 91 0)  and  imprisonment of up to two years 
may be  imposed against "any person" for 
obstruction of an  Investigation; criminal fmes 
of up to C$  50 000 (ECU 29.100) or 
1mpnsonment of up  to five years may be 
Imposed on  a person who destroys or alters 
any document requ1red  to  be  produced 
(Sec  65(3)). 
1  On July 8,  1992, a fine of  ECU 
902.555 was imposed against 
Envasadores Ace1tes  (Case 294/91 ). 
2.  On July 14,  1992, a fine of ECU 
470.081  was imposed against servicios 
funerarios (case 308/91 ). 
3.  On March 6,  1992, a fine of ECU 
457 545 was 1mposed against 
Detergente en  Polvo (case 306/91) 
All three cases involved violations of Art. 
1,  related to concerted pract1ces 
Only one case dec1ded  thus far,  agamst 
Swedish electric company, wh1ch  is on 
aooeal. 
1  Fines have never been imposed for 
obstruction of an  mvest1gation. The 
Restnct1ve Practices Court has warned 
that company directors could be 
1mpnsoned for contempt,  but did not do 
so.  in the British P1pe  Assoc1at1on case. 
(J  17-12-80, Ap.  1711 82,  reported 
r1983]1 AllER 203) 
2  In  a case involving the ready mix 
concrete mdustry,  the Restrictive 
Practices Court fined 4 compan1es a total 
of L81  000 (ECU  103 823)  for contempt 
for breaching undertakmgs by ·operatmg 
a cartel,  and fined 2 employees a total of 
L2  200 (ECU  2 820) for a1dmg  and 
abettmg the breach.  The case IS  on 
appeal  1n  the  House of Lords,  but 1t  is 
clear that if the  l1ab111ty of the company 
stands,  so does that of the employees 
(1990 Annual  Report of the Director 
GeneralofFa1rTrad1ng, pp  110-111; 
Wh1sh:  Compet1t1on  Law,  3rd  Ed  . pp. 
168-169) 
3.  The Restnct1ve Practices Court held 
that to be held liable for aiding and 
abetting, employees must have been 
actually involved  Mere knowledge of 
breach  IS  not enough.  (Director General 
of Fair Tradma v.  Buckland  r19901IAUR) 
1.  In  1990, civil fines totaling 3 305.000 
(ECU  1 925.000) were 1mposed against 
four firms in  a bid-riggmg case.  Of this 
amount, C$  1 million (ECU 582.400) was 
1mposed agamst one firm,  and th1s was 
the largest fme ever 1mposed against a 
smgle firm. 
2  In  1988, c1vil  fmes totalmg C$ 1.6 
m1ll1on (ECU  931  900) were 1mposed 
against four cornpames 1n  a bid-rigging 
case. 
3  In  1979, cnminal fines rangmg from 
C$ 450 000- C$2  m1ll1on  (ECU 262.100 
- 1 165.000) were imposed in  the 
Dredging case against 8 firms for bld-
nggmg and fraud.  Under the Crimmal 
Code,  five executives were sentenced 
from 2-5 years Imprisonment 1n  that 
case.  However, no busmess executive 
has ever been impnsoned for violating 
the Compet1t1on Act or its predecessor 
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1exico 
Switzerland 
1  Up to  375 thousand times the minimum 
general wage for an  absolute monopolistic 
practice.  (Art.  35,  para.  Ill) 
2.  Up to 225 thousand times the minimum 
general wage for a relative monopolistic 
practice;  up to  100.000 time the  minimum 
general wage for other acts that impede 
competition (Art.  35,  para.  V) 
3  Up to 225 thousand times the minimum 
general wage for taking part in a prohibited 
concentration; and  up to  100 thousand 
times the minimum general wage for failure 
to  notify a concentration (Art.  35,  para.  VI) 
4.  Up to 7.500 times the minimum general 
wage against individuals who engage 
directly or indirectly in  monopolistic practices 
or prohibited concentrations; twice that 
amount for repeated offenses (Art.  35,  para. 
VII) 
1  For violation of recommendations and 
decisrons of the Ministry or of the Cartel 
Commission, SFr 100.000 (ECU 62.380). 
(Art  39) 
2.  For failure to supply information, 
documents, or breach of secrecy 
requirement, SFr 20.000 (ECU 
12.480)(Sec. 40) 
Under the new draft code,  adminrstrative 
fines up to SFr 100 000 (ECU 62.380) could 
be  imposed for failure to comply with the 
requirement to provide informatron.  (Draft 
Art.  52) 
No fines ever imposed  Only one order, 
concerning a cartel in the banking 
industry, has been  issued. page 80 
USA 
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Assessment of fines based on type of 
Violator, time of violation, and statute or 
guidelines under wh1ch  fine computed 
1  Under the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 (18 USC 3571)(whlch covers 
ant1trust v1olat1ons) and the Sherman Act 
(15 USC 1-3), corporate defendants may be 
fined up to US$10 million (ECU 7.909 000), 
other defendants up to  US$ 350.000 (ECU 
276.800) plus, for individuals, up to three 
years imprisonment  In the alternative, up 
to tw1ce  the gross pecun1ary gain or loss 
caused by  the offense  ( 18 USC 
3571(d)(1988) Supp  1993)) 
2  The Sentencmg Gu1delmes of the US 
Sentencmg CommiSSIOn, wh1ch  govern 
horizontal b1d  nggmg, pnce f1x1ng,  and 
market allocation VIOlations, and non-
compliance w1th  FTC subpoenas and 
requirements, set mandatory actual 
mm1mum fmes of US$ 20 000 (ECU 15 820) 
for Individuals, max1mum f1nes  of a 
percentage of the volume of commerce 
attributable to  the VIOlation ( 1-5% turnover 
for indiVIduals, 20% for organ1zat1ons),  and 
imprisonment of 8-33 months, based on the 
amount of commerce attnbutable to the 
v1olat1on  and spec1f1c aggravating and 
m1t1gatmg  factors  (Sec  2  R 1 1,  Ch  8) 
3  Fa1lure to comply w1th  a  f1nal  FTC order 
1s  punishable by  max1mum penalt1es of US$ 
10 000  (ECU 7 908) per day under the FTC 
Act (15 USC 211).  and US$ 5 000 per day 
(ECU 3 954) under the Clayton Act (15 USC 
45) 
4  Pr1vate  pla1nt1ffs  may obtam treble 
damages plus Interest and attorneys fees 
(15 usc 15) 
5  The US government and state 
governments can mamtam an  act1on  for 
treble damages plus costs 1f they are InJUred 
by  an  ant1trust V1olat1on  (15 USC 15a,  15c) 
6  Failure to  sat1sfy the Hart-Scott-Rodmo 
Act premerger not1f1cat1on  requirements IS 
punishable by f1nes  of up to  US$ 10 000 
(ECU 7 908) for each day the VIolation 
contmues 
In 1992, new crimmal cases were filed at 
the rate of 80 per year  Between 1989· 
and 1992, 260 corporations and 197 
individuals were convicted of antitrust 
violations and related crimes, resulting in 
more than US$ 88 3 m1llion (ECU 
69 830 000) in corporate fines or US$ 
340 000 (ECU 268.900) per convicted 
corporate defendant.  Individual Jail 
sentences averaged more than 3 months 
per convicted defendant.  Record fine of 
US$ 280 m1111on  (ECU 221  400 000) 
asset forfeiture in case agamst Salomon 
Bros.  for price f1xmg  (Speech of 
Charles A  James, actmg Ass1s  Atty 
Gen , Antitrust D1v  , Dept  of Just1ce, 
Nov  6,  1992) 
At least one f1rm  has been f1ned  the 
max1mum of US$ 10 million (ECU 
7 908 000) 1n  3 separate act1ons for 
electncal construction b1d-ngg1ng  The 
longest pnson term Imposed on an 
1nd1V1dual was 5 years under 2 
1nd1ctments mvolving 8 V1olat1ons of the 
law  Imprisonment IS  ordered  1n  a large 
proportion of government cnmmal 
antitrust cases but often w1th  suspended 
sentences f 
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TABLE IV. 
BODIES WITH AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS 
-
:t  Member 
;L~e/Third 
,;f"'·mtry  ADM/NISTRA  TIVE AUTHORITY  COURT 
EL  'pean Union  The Commission may  im£ose fines and  The Court of First Instance has unlimited 
issue orders.  (Reg.  17,  rts.  3,  9,  15,  16;  jurisdiction to review decisions of the 
Merger Reg.,  Arts.  6,  7,  8,  14,  15)  Commission.  With respect to decisions 
imposing a fine or periodic  ~enalty 
payment,  it may cancel,  re  uce or 
mcrease the same. The Court of Justice 
mab  review decisions of the Court of First 
Ins ance.  (Reg.  17, Art.  17;  Merger Reg., 
Arts.  16; Art.  168a,  173,  EU  Treaty,  OJ 
C224/1,  31.8.1992;  Council Dec1sion of 24 
October 1988 establishing a Court of First 
Instance of the Eurocean Communities, 
OJ  L319/1  (25.11.8 n  -
AI  tria  The Cartel Court has competence to 
impose sanctions for competition law 
violations.  Its decisions may be reviewed 
by  the "Kartellobergericht."  Criminal 
sanctions mar be imposed by  the criminal 
courts subjec  to normal appellate 
procedures.  (Sec.  129)  -
B  7ium  Council for Competition, created by  Court of Appeal  may  review decisions of 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, may 1mpose  Council for Competition. (Art.  43) 
sanctions.  (Art.  36) 
c  rmark  Competition Council may  impose  High Court may  review decisions of 
sanctions, appealable to Comfetition  Competition Appeals Tribunal. (KKL Sec. 
Appeals Tribunal (members o  which are  18) 
appointed bt Ministry of lndustry)(KKL 
- Sees.  16  1  18 
F  and  The Cartel Court has  authori~ to order  The decision of the Cartel Court to impose 
~enalties on the proposal of t  e Office of  a penalty may  be reviewed by  the 
ree Competition, which is an  independent  Supreme Administrative Court.  (Act on 
authority.  (Sec.  8,  para.  4)  Appeal in Administrative Affairs,  154/1990, 
Sec.  27)  -
F-. once  1.  Regarding civil violations, Competition  The Court of Appeal of Paris may review 
Council, an  independent authority,  may  decisions of the Competition Council. 
issue orders, except regarding  (Art.  15) 
concentrations. 
2.  Ministry of Economy has competence 
regarding concentrations, with the non-
binding advice of the Competition Council, 
and to execute sanctions regarding 
concentrations.  The Minister's decisions 
are not a~ealable. (Art.  42) 
3.  Regar  ing criminal violations, the 
Procureur de Ia Republique has 
competence to prosecute infractions, after 
transmission of the file by the Corpetitif)n 
Council or throuah other means.  Art.  11 
I  ~rmany  Federal Cartel Office may impose  Berlin Court of ApCeals  ma~  review 
sanctions, subject to review by the Federal  decisions of Minis er, then  ederal 
Minister of Economics. (Sec.  47(.1 )OWl G)  swreme Court. (Sees. 46,  51ft, and 82 
Land cartel authorities, which are  ~art of  G  B)  Land cartel authority decisions 
the state Ministry of Economy of t  e  appealable to Court of Appeal in district 
Lander,  also have specific comretences.  where authority located, and  ultimate!~ to 
Minister may order wohibition o  a  Federal Supreme Court, on points of aw. 
concentration, and  CO may order 
divestiture of ~rohibited merger.(Sec. 
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Greece  Competition Commission, which is within  Athens Administrative Court of Appeal 
the Ministry of Commerce, may impose  may review decisions of Com~et1tion  · 
I  sanctions. (Sees.  8,  9,  12)  Ministry may  Commission and Ministry.  (C  . C,  Sec. 
impose fines for failure to notify a  14)  Council of State may review 
concentration. (Sees.  4,  5)  Ministry may  decisions of Athens Administrative Court 
prohibit a concentration in certain sectors.  of Appeals. (Sec.  15) 
(Sees.  4(b)(3)  4(c)(1))  I 
Ireland  Minister of Industry and  Commerce may  High court may issue  i~unctions, 
issue prohibition orders;  those wohibiting a  declarations, and awar  dama~es in 
dominant position must be con 1rmed by a  private actions.  Circuit courts  ave similar 
resolution of both  houses of the  powers,  subject to  limitations on the  I  Oireachtas. (Sec.  14,  Act of 1991) Orders  award of damages.  (Sec.  6,  Act of 1991) 
prohibiting a merger (either absolutely or 
conditionally) are subject to annulment by 
resolution of either house of Oireachtas.  I  (Sec.  9,  Act of 197~ No  statutory right to 
aRpeal,  but such or  ers are subject to 
c  allenge in the High Court. 
Italy  Competition and  Market Authority, an  The Administrative Court of Latium may  I  independent authoritft,  may  impose  review decisions of the Competition 
sanctions, except wi  h respect to  certain  Authority. (Art.  33) 
sectors where other independent 
authorities are com.Qetent.jArt. 2Ql  I  Luxembourg  The Ministry of the National Economy may  The Administrative Court m~  review 
impose sanctions, after investigation of the  decisions of the Ministry. (A  . 7) 
case  by the Commission of Restrictive 
Commercial Practices (which is part of the 
Ministrv)(Art. 3)  I 
Netherlands  The Minister of Economic Affairs may  1.  Decisions of the Minister may  be 
declare that a dominant position is contrary  reviewed  b~ the  Colle~e van Beroep voor 
to the general interest, after which he  may  het bedrMfs even (Art.  3,  WEM~ 
issue a formal prohibition order.  (Art.  24,  2.  The  conomische Politierec  ter may 
WEM)  The Minister may issue a  impose criminal sanctions for violations of 
"declaration of non-binding effect" against  the competition laws, which constitute 
a restrictive practice (Art.  19,  WEM),  and  a  crimmal offenses (Wet Economische 
Royal  Decree may  be  issued against a  Delicten), following prosecution under the 
category of restrictive practices (Art.  10,  general cnminal law statutes.  The Court 
WEM) which are contrary to the general  of Appeal may review decisions of the 
interest.  Any conduct in violation of such  Economische Politierechter, and  ultimately 
I  declaration is a criminal violation of  the  the  H1gh  Court 
law.  (Arts.  15,  22 WEM) 
I  Portugal  The Competition Council, which is within  Decisions of Competition Council may be 
the Minist:r; of Commerce,  ma~ impose  appealed to the Court of First Instance of 
administra ive sanctions regar  ing  Lisbon ("Tribunal Judicial Da  Comarca De 
restrictive practices and abuses of a  Lis boa") 
I  dominant position (Intra.,  Law 422/83)  Orders pertainina to concentrations may 
Decisions concerning concentrations are  only be appeale  to the Supreme 
taken jointly by  the Minister of Commerce  Administrative Tribunal. (Art.  34(2),  Law 
and  the Minister responsible for the  371/93 
sectors affected by  the concentration,  I  following consultation w1th  the Competition 
Council. 
Spain  Tribunal for Defense of Competition, an  Decisions of Tribunal may be appealed to 
I  independent authority, may issue orders.  "Audiencia Nacional Sala de lo 
Government may issue orders with respect  Contencioso - Administrative."  (Art. 49) 
to concentrations.  "Sala Ill Tribunal Supremo" may review 
the decisions of the government with 
respect to concentrations.  I 
Sweden  Swedish Competition Authority, an  At the request of the Comdjetition 
independent agency,  may order an  Authority, the Stockholm  ity Court may 
undertaking to terminate infrin?tements of a  order an  undertaking to pay an 
I  prohibition under a penalty of  me.  anticompetitive behavior charge to deter 
undertakings from  infri~ing prohibitions. 
! 
Appeals to the Market  ourt, which is the 
final court of appeal. Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws  page 83 
United Ktngdom  The Secretary of State (President of the  1  The Restnct1ve Practices Court may 
Board of Trade).  With  the consent of  enjoin restrictive practices wh1ch  are 
I 
Parliament, may issue prohibition orders  contrary to the public mterest or which are 
and partial or total divestiture orders for  the subject of an  agreement which has 
concentrations and abuses of a dominant  not been registere  .  The High Court ma'( 
position. (Schedule 8,  Fair Tradin~ Act  issue an  injunction to enforce an  order o 
I 
1973;  Sec.  10,  Competition Act 1  80)  the Secretary of State.  Breach of either 
These orders are legislative acts and,  as  court order constitutes contempt and may 
such,  are  not reviewable  be  punished as such by  the court wh1ch 
issued the order 
2  Decisions of the  Restrictive Practices 
I  Court,  the Hifh Court,  and the  Crown 
Court may al  be  appealed to  the Court of 
Appeal, and  ultimately to the House of 
Lords 
I 
3.  The Mag1strates' Court or Crown Court, 
wh1ch  are criminal courts,  adJUdicate 
cases where obstruction of an 
mvest~ation (a  cnminal offense) has been 
I 
allege  . 
4.  Decisions of the Magistrates' Court may 
be  appealed to the Crown Court. 
Canada  Bureau of Competition Policy (part of the  Provmcial Court may 1mpose cnmmal 
I 
Federal Department of Consumer and  sanctions.  Superior Court of Criminal 
Corporate Affairs) has no  power to  Impose  Justice or Court of Criminal Jurisdiction 
sanctions itself, but may seek the  may 1ssue orders regarding md1ctable 
Imposition of sanctions from the  offenses by  individuals.  Federal Court -
I 
Compet1t1on Tribunal  (Sees  77,  79,  91)  Trial Division may 1ssue orders regard1ng 
indictable offenses committed by 
corporations or individuals.  Appeal to 
Federal Court of Appeal for anfr  dec1sion 
or order,  final or interlocutory,  rom 
Competition Tribunal. (Sec.  13) 
Mexico  Federal Competition Commission, an  High level admmistrative court,  F1scal 
administrative body of the Ministry of  Federal Court,  or Federal Commerce 
Trade and  lndustnal Promotion "technically  Tribunal may rev1ew  resolutions of 
and  operationally autonomous" consisting  Commission. 
of 5 commissioners appomted for 10 year 
terms by  the Federal Executive, may 
impose  administrative sanctions, and 
report criminal VIolations to  Public 
Prosecutor.  (Ch.  4,  Art.  23,  25,  26) 
Appeals regardmg fines may be  made to 
the Commission itself.  (Ch.  7  Art.  39) 
Switzerland  The Federal Cartel Commission, an  Federal Court may review decisions of 
independent authoritb composed of 11-15  Federal Cartel Commission and  Federal 
members apfrointed  y the Federal Council  Department of Economic Affairs. 
(Bundesrat)  rom the academic and 
business world,  address recommendations 
to  the enterprise and adopt certain 
decisions to produce information during an 
investigation.  (Arts.  31,  35)  If such 
recommendations are not accepted,  the 
Federal Department of Economic Affairs 
may issue orders to require specified 
conduct.  (Sec.  37  KG) 
USA  Following an  initital decision b~ an  1.  Federal Trade Commission decisions 
administrative law judge, the  ederal  are appealable to a Federal Circuit Court 
Trade Commission may impose a  of Appeals. 
divestiture order or a cease and desist  2.  Upon  a~plication by the Department of 
order,  appealable to Federal Court of  Justice or  ederal Trade Commission, 
Appeals. (15 USC 45)  Federal District Courts m~  impose civil 
and criminal sanctions un  er Federal 
antitrust laws, and may order damages in 
private actions. I 
i 
I 
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Belgium  Kurt De Loor, Anne Den Tandt, Thys Stifaan 
Denmark  Marie Lundsten 
Finland  Johanna Juusela 
France  Florene Bastien, Fidel Ndeshyo 
Germany  Irina Orssick, Bianca Pirk, Bernhard Tute 
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APPENDIX/I 
INVESTIGATIONS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
6 December 1994 
I.  Notification 
A.  Is  there a notification requirement for: 
l.  Restrictive agreements? 
2.  Concentrations? 
B.  If there  is  a notification requirement, is  there a form  which must be  used? 
If so,  please attach a copy of the  form. 
If not, what information must be  provided? 
C.  Which authority receives the notification? 
D.  What  are  the  notified  authroity's  responsibilities  upon  receipt  of a  notification?  (e.g., 
investigate, decide on  legality of activity) 
E.  In  practice, does the authority investigate after receiving the notification? 
F.  What other means does the authority use to learn about possible violations?  (e.g., consumer 
or competitor complaints, information from  EU or local government authorities) 
II.  Investigations 
A.  Which  authority  has  the  power to  investigate?  Is  it  independent or part of a government 
ministry? 
B.  Can the discovery requests be directed to: 
l.  Undertakings? 
2.  Individuals? 
3.  Third parties? 
C.  What is  the authority empowered to do in conducting the investigation? 
1.  Issue written  in~errogatorie~/questionnaires? 
2.  Issue document requests?  ' 
3.  Make on-site inspections ("dawn raids")? 
4.  Question individuals orally? 
D.  What  are  the  consequences of failing  to  cooperate  in  an  investigation  (e.g.,  court  order 
compelling cooperation, sanctions for contempt) 
E. 
F. 
Is  any individual personally responsib~e for supplying the answers?  If so, who? 
I 
Is  favourable  treatement  offered  by  the  authority  for  cooperation  in  an  administrative 
investigation to: 
1.  Individuals? 
2.  Undertakings? 
G.  Does the authority have criminal law powers of investigation?  If so: 
1.  Please describe these powers. 
2.  Can  the  authority· offer  individuals  immunity  from  prosecution  in  exchange  for 
cooperation in providing information to investigators? 
H.  Do the courts play any role in the investigation process?  (e.g., issue warrants, subpoenas, 
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Sanctions Survey Questionnaire 
October 20,  1994 
I.  Type of Sanctions 
A.  Can administrative remedies, such as fines and/or prohibition orders, be imposed for: 
1.  Practices which  prevent,  restrict or  distort  competition (e.g.,  price  fixing, 
production  or  market restrictions,  discrimination  in  price  or  other trading 
conditions, tying arrangements)? 
2.  Abuses  of a  dominant  position  (e.g.  unfair  pricing  or  trading  conditions, 
production  or  market restrictions,  discrimination  in  price  or other trading 
conditions, tying arrangements)? 
3.  Concentrations which create or strengthen a dominant position? 
B.  Can criminal sanctions, such as fines and/or imprisonment, be imposed for any of the 
above? 
II.  Entities which or individuals who can be fined 
Can some or all of the sanctions identified above be imposed against 
A.  The enterprise?  Which sanctions? 
B.  Individuals personally?  Which individuals (e.g. responsible officers or employees)? 
Which sanctions? 
III.  Severity of sanctions imposed 
A.  Are  there  statutory  or  regulatory  limitations  on  the  amount  of administrative  or 
criminal fines that can be  imposed?  Do such limitations refer to turnover or profits 
derived from the infringement? 
(Optional) What are the three highest fines ever imposed?  For what violations? When 
were they imposed? 
B.  Has the imprisonment sanction ever been utilized?  How often? 
(Optional)  What  is  the  longest  prison  term  which  has  been  imposed?  For what 
violation? 
IV.  Bodies with authority to impose sanctions 
A.  Does an  administrative body have authority to  impose some or all of the sanctions 
identified above?  Which administrative body (e.g. independent authority or part of a 
government ministry)? 
B.  Does a court have authority to impose sanctions or review sanctions imposed by one 
of the authorities identified above?  If so, which court? 
I '  I 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Member State and Third Country Sanctions Survey 
List of Statutes 
Kartellgesetznovelle 1993, BGBL 693/93. 
Law of August 5,  1991, concerning the protection of competition. 
Danish Competition Act (KKL), January I,  1990. 
Act on Restrictions on Competition (Laki Kilpailunrajoituksista), No. 480/92, 27 May 
1992. 
Ordonnance Relative a Ia  Liberte des Prise et de  Ia Concurrence (No.  86 - 1243  du  I 
decembre 1986, J.O.R.F. 9 decembre). 
Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbbeschraenkungen(GWB), 
Act  on  the  Control of Monopolies  and  Oligopolies  and  on  the  Protection of Free 
Competition, Act 703,  September 26,  1977. 
Irish  Competition  Act  of  1991,  Statute  No.  24  of 1991,  as  commenced  by  the 
Competition Act,  1991  (Commencement) Order 1991, SI 249 of 1991; The Mergers, 
Takeovers and Monopolies (Control) Act 1978, as amended in  1987 and by the 1991 
Act. 
Law No. 287, October 10,  1990. 
Law of June 17,  1970. 
Wet Economische Mededinging of  28  June 1956 (Stbl. 195 8,  413) (WEM); Wet op 
de  Economische  Delicten of 22  June  1950  (Stbl.  K  258)  (WED);  Wetboek van 
Strafrecht of 3 March 1881  (Stbl. 35). 
LawN. 422/83, 3 Dec. 1983 (Restrictive Practices and Abuses of Dominant Position); 
LawN. 428/88,  19 Nov.  1988 (Concentrations). 
LawN. 16/89, 17 July  1989; Penal Law. 
Competition Law, SFS 1993:20. 
Competition Act of 1980, Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1976, Fair Trading Act 
of 1973 
Competitiqn Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34; Criminal code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
Ley Federal de Competencia Economica,  24 December 1992. 
Federal  Act  on  Cartels  and  Similar  Organizations  of  20th  December  1985 
(Kartellgesetz(KG))(RS 251 ); Federal Act on Administrative Penal Law (RS 173.11 0). 
Sherman Act, 15 USC Sees. 1-8; Clayton Act, 15 USC Sec. 12-27;  Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act of 1976, 15 USC Sec. 18a; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15  USC Sees. 41-58; 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984,  15  USC Sees. 4301-4306. page 88  Surveys of the Member States' powers to investigate and sanction violations of national competition laws 
APPENDIX IV 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NOT/FICA T/ONS AND INVESTIGA  T/ONS 
Austria:  Notifications  are  received  and  investigations  are  conducted  by  the  Cartel  Court,  which  is 
independent. 
Belgium:  Notifications are received and investigations are conducted by the Service de Ia Concurrence, 
which is within the Ministry of Economics.  However, decision-making power rests with the 
Conseil de Ia Concurrence, an administrative court which is within the Ministry of  Economics. 
Denmark:  Notifications are  received and investigations are conducted by  the Competition Council, an 
independent authority whose chairman is appointed by the King and whose other members are 
appointed for  4-year terms by  the Ministry of Trade. 
Finland:  Notifications are received and investigations are conducted by the Office of  Free Competition; 
investigations  also  are  conducted  by  the  County  government.  The  Finnish  competition 
authorities are independent, but administratively linked to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Accordingly, their budget is  within the control of the Ministry, but it exercises no  authority 
over their operation. 
France:  Notifications are received by  the Ministre de l'Economie.  Investigations are conducted both 
by the Conseil de Ia Concurrence, which is independent,  and the Ministre de l'Economie.  The 
Ministre de l'Economie can make necessary investigations, and the Conseil de Ia Concurrence 
may investigate in  areas where it  has been delegated responsibility to  do  so. 
Germany:  Notifications are received and  investigations are conducted by the Bundeskartellamt and the 
Landeskartellamt.  The  Bundeskartellamt is  independent of the government and is  a higher 
federal authority.  It reports to the Federal Minister of Economics.  The extent of  the Minister's 
authority to impose specific instructions on the Bundeskartellamt is controversial, but he/she 
may impose general instructions regarding decisions pursuant to the GWB.  Such instructions 
do  not,  however,  bind  the  courts.  The  Landeskartellamt report  to  the  State Ministries of 
Economics and are not independent. 
Greece:  Notifications are received by the Directorate for Market Research and Competition which is 
within  the  Ministry  and  the  Ministry of Commerce.  Investigations  are  conducted by  the 
Directorate for  Market Research. 
Ireland:  Notifications regarding restrictive practices are received by the Competition Authority and those 
regarding  concentrations,  by  the  Minister of Industry  and  Commerce.  Investigations  are 
conducted by the Competition Authority, an independent body whose members are appointed 
by  the  Minister.  It may  be  required by  the  Minister to  investigate  a possible  abuse  of a 
dominant position or notification of a proposed merger.  Under the  1994 bill, the Director of 
Competition Enforcement, who  will  be a member of the  Competition Authority, would be 
required to  investigate  restrictive practices or abuses of a dominant position  which he/she 
suspects to violate the  law. 
Italy:  Notifications  are  received  and  investigations are  conducted  by  the  Autorita  Garante della 
Concorrenza e del  Mercato, an  independent authority. 
Luxembourg:  Notifications are received by the Ministre de l'Economie; investigations are conducted by the 
Commission des Pratiques Commerciales Restrictives, an ad hoc independent authority (but 
includes among its  members fonctionnaires of the Ministre de  l'Economie, the  Ministre de 
Justice, and the Ministre des Classes Moyennes), and the Service de Ia Concurrence, des Prix 
et de  Ia  Protection des  Consommateurs, which is  within  the Minstre  de  l'Economie.  The 
Ministre  has  discretionary  power  to  request  the  Commission  to  open  an  investigation. 
However, the Ministre must make such request if he has been told to do so by the procureur 
t I 
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d'Etat.  The Commission has official power to conduct investigations when requested to do so 
by  the Ministre. 
Notifications are received by the Ministry of Economic Affairs; investigations are conducted 
by the Economic Competition Commission, which is  an  independent advisory body, and the 
Ministry.  The  Ministry's  powers  of investigation  are  more  extensive  than  those  of the 
Committee. 
Regarding restrictive practices, notifications are received by  the Conselho da Concorrencia, 
which  can  requiest  further  information,  then  send  the  case  to  the  Direc<;:ao-Geral  de 
Concorrencia e Precos to "instruct the case," which may include investigation and hearing.  The 
Conselho is  responsible to decide whether to grant an exemption.  Regarding concentrations, 
notifications are received by the Direc<;:ao-Geral de Concorrencia e Precos, which is responsible 
to  "instruct the  case," which  may  include investigation and hearing,  followed  by  making a 
recommendation to the Ministry regarding legality.  The ministry makes the ultimate decision. 
Notifications are received by the Servicio de Defensa de  Ia  Competencia, which is within the 
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda.  Regarding restrictive practices, the SOC will conduct an 
investigation and send the case with a proposed disposition to the Tribunal de Defensa de  Ia 
Competencia, which conducts a further investigation and issues a final decision within 20 days 
of receipt of the file.  Regarding concentrations,  upon receipt of a voluntary notification, the 
SOC must conduct an investigation and prepare an advisory note for the minster.  Within one 
month of the date the notification was filed, the Minister will either take no action, in which 
case the  concentration is  deemed to  be permitted, or send the case to  the TDC  for  furhter 
investigation.  Under the latter scenario, the TDC will prepare a non-binding decision, which 
is sent to the Minister, who forwards it to the govenment, which issues a final decision within 
three months of receipt of the file. 
Notifications  are  received  and  investigated by  the  Competition  Authority,  an  independent 
authority. 
Notifications  are  received  by  the  Office  of Fair  Trading.  Restrictive  agreements  are 
investigated by the OFT, and dominant positions and concentrations may be investigated by the 
OFT and the MMC. 
Notifications are received and investigations conducted by the Director of Investigation and 
Research, who heads the Bureau of  Competition Policy, which i~ within the Federal Department 
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, a federal government agency. 
Notifications  are  received  and  investigations  conducted  by  the  Federal  Competition 
Commission, an independent authority. 
Notifications are received and investigations conducted by  the Wettbewerbskommission, an 
authority with independent decision-making powers which is administratively attached to the 
"Eidgenossisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement."  · 
Notifications are received and investigations are conducted by the Department of  Justice, which 
is  within the federal executive branch, and the Federal Trade Commission, an independent 
government agency. Price (excluding VAT)  in  Luxembourg: ECU 13 
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